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INTRODUCTION
On February 10, 2017, the United States marked the fiftieth anniversary of
the ratification of the Constitution’s Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Born out of
the tragedy of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, the
Amendment’s provisions on presidential succession and inability have
supplied stability in other times of crisis during the Amendment’s first fifty
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years.1 Nevertheless, scholars and experts have identified remaining flaws
and gaps in the presidential succession system.2
Fordham University School of Law has a history of promoting solutions to
flaws in the nation’s presidential succession system,3 beginning with John D.
Feerick’s October 1963 Fordham Law Review article, “The Problem of
Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?”4 and his two articles
during the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s drafting and refortification.5 The law
school then hosted a symposium on the vice presidency in 1976.6 In the past
decade, Fordham has continued its engagement on presidential succession
issues through a symposium in 20107 and a Presidential Succession Clinic
that published a report with reform recommendations in 2012.8
In August 2016, Fordham University School of Law formed a second
Presidential Succession Clinic that met during the 2016 to 2017 academic
year. Like the first Clinic, the second studied the succession system and
interviewed experts to develop reform proposals.9 Accordingly, the Clinic
advances recommendations with respect to six areas: (1) contingency
planning in the executive branch for presidential succession, (2) the
presidential line of succession, (3) simultaneous inabilities of the President
and Vice President and sole inabilities of the Vice President, (4) Congress’s
responsibility to resolve disputes over the President’s capacity under Section
4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, (5) health disclosures of presidential
candidates, and (6) political party rules for replacing and removing
presidential candidates.

1. See infra Part I.A.
2. See, e.g., Past Reform Recommendations on Presidential Succession, FORDHAM L.
ARCHIVE SCHOLARSHIP & HIST. (2017), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1005&context=twentyfifth_amendment_reports [https://perma.cc/44MK-DWZ8].
3. See generally Twenty-Fifth Amendment Archive, FORDHAM L. ARCHIVE SCHOLARSHIP
&
HIST.
(2017),
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_archive/
[https://perma.cc/8F7A-FEEW].
4. See generally John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress
Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1963) (discussing the issues of presidential
succession).
5. See generally John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 173 (1965); John D. Feerick, The Vice-Presidency and the
Problems of Presidential Succession and Inability, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 457 (1964).
6. Symposium on the Vice Presidency: American Bar Association Special Committee on
Election Reform, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 707 (1977).
7. See generally Symposium, The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in the
21st Century: Filling the Gaps and Clarifying the Ambiguities in Constitutional and
Extraconstitutional Arrangements, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 775 (2010) (discussing the history of
presidential succession and the ambiguities that surround it).
8. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Ensuring the
Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2012)
[hereinafter First Clinic Report] (explaining the history of presidential succession in the United
States and providing recommendations for improvement).
9. This Clinic focused on some of the same topics as the first Clinic but it also explored
new issues. This Clinic reached the same conclusions as the first on some issues, while it
differed on others.
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This Report begins with an overview of the presidential succession system,
particularly the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provisions. The remaining Parts
describe the Clinic’s recommendations.
The first Part of the Clinic recommendations discusses executive branch
contingency planning and outlines two steps the White House can take to
prepare for presidential inabilities. First, the Clinic recommends that the
President determine in advance situations where the Vice President should
act as President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s voluntary transfer
provision at Section 3. Such a “prospective declaration of inability” would
allow for transfers of power during emergencies when the Cabinet is not
easily reachable to invoke Section 4, the Amendment’s other inability
provision. Second, given that some Presidents have suffered psychological
ailments, the Clinic recommends that the White House add a mental health
professional to the unit of doctors and nurses who care for the President.
The next Part describes the Clinic’s recommendations for improving the
line of succession. These recommendations address concerns about the
successors’ qualifications and other vulnerabilities.
The Clinic’s
recommendations include removing legislators and lower-ranking Cabinet
members as well as adding some officials chosen by the President and
confirmed by Congress.
Next, the Report addresses the absence of procedures for vice presidential
inabilities and “dual inabilities” of the President and Vice President. These
gaps could prevent orderly transfers of power. The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment’s inability provisions are unusable when the Vice President is
incapacitated. In a “dual inability” situation, there is no formal way for the
next person in the line of succession to take power. The Clinic recommends
statutes that mirror the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s inability provisions to
address these gaps.
The following Part considers how Congress would carry out its
responsibility to resolve a dispute over whether the President is unable.
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gives Congress twenty-one days
to “decide” whether the President is unable if the President contests an
inability determination by the Vice President acting with the Cabinet or
another body. The Clinic recommends the creation of a joint committee of
both Houses of Congress. This Part also anticipates legal disputes that may
arise in such a scenario.
The final two Parts focus on succession and inability issues during
presidential campaigns. Some candidates have been less than forthcoming
with the public about their health histories. To encourage more transparency,
the Clinic recommends that a commission develop guidelines for what
candidates should disclose about their health. Last, the Report considers the
political parties’ procedures for replacing presidential candidates. The
parties’ current replacement rules lack detail and have unclear provisions for
situations where candidates become unable. The Clinic recommends making
the vice presidential nominee the designated successor to the nomination in
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the final weeks of the campaign and creating a provision for candidate
inabilities.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION SYSTEM
The presidential succession system comprises constitutional and statutory
provisions as well as procedures created by the executive branch. Article II,
Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution makes the Vice President the first
successor to the presidency and authorizes Congress to establish procedures
for presidential succession.10 Congress has in turn passed three laws to
establish lines of succession.11
The Twelfth Amendment provides the procedure for electing the President
and Vice President, modifying the original Electoral College system in
Article II.12 The Twentieth Amendment provides for succession when the
President-Elect has died or failed to qualify before the inauguration.13 The
Twenty-Fifth Amendment addresses presidential succession and disability as
well as a vice presidential vacancy.14
A. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment has four sections. Section 1 provides that
the Vice President becomes President if the President dies, resigns, or is
removed from office.15 There had been ambiguity about the Vice President’s
status upon succession that may have deterred at least one Vice President
from acting as President when the President was disabled. When President
James Garfield “wavered between life and death” for nearly three months in
1881 after he was shot, Vice President Chester Arthur did not assume the
powers and duties of the presidency in part out of fear that doing so would
permanently displace the President, regardless of whether he recovered.16
Section 1 clarifies this ambiguity by stating the only contingencies where the
Vice President becomes President. The Amendment’s inability provisions in
Sections 3 and 4 make clear that the Vice President merely acts as President
when the President is disabled. Section 1 was used in 1974 when Vice

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; see also infra Appendix A.
See infra Part III.A; see also infra Appendix C.
U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
Id. amend. XX.
Id. amend. XXV; see also infra Appendix B.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
See JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 10–11 (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT]; see
also Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-Presidential Behavior in Disability Crisis: The Case of Thomas
R. Marshall, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, at 37, 46–47 (stating that this ambiguity may have
reduced the likelihood of Vice President Thomas Marshall acting as President following
President Woodrow Wilson’s stroke in 1919). The ambiguity over the Vice President’s status
was highlighted by the controversy surrounding Vice President John Tyler’s claim that he
became President—not Acting President—upon President William Henry Harrison’s death in
1841. See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
89–98 (1965) [hereinafter FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS].
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President Gerald R. Ford succeeded to the presidency upon President Richard
Nixon’s resignation.17
Section 2 allows the President to fill a vacancy in the vice presidency
subject to approval from majorities of both houses of Congress.18 Prior to
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the country was without a Vice
President on many different occasions, the length of these vacancies totaling
over thirty-seven years.19 These examples illustrate the need for this
provision. Additionally, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s presidential
inability procedures, which do not work without a Vice President, created
another reason to curtail vacancies. Section 2 provided stability during the
Watergate era, allowing the nominations of Gerald Ford after Vice President
Spiro Agnew’s resignation in 1973 and Nelson Rockefeller after Ford’s
succession to the presidency in 1974.20
Section 3 allows the President to temporarily transfer presidential powers
and duties to the Vice President by submitting a written declaration to the
Speaker of the House and Senate President pro tempore that he is “unable”
to discharge those powers and duties.21 The President can resume his powers
and duties by submitting a written declaration to the same officials.
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush have invoked Section 3
before undergoing medical procedures under general anesthesia.22 White
House officials have also considered invocations of Section 3 before

17. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 165.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
19. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 314.
20. See Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 972 (2010). President Nixon may have
been more hesitant to resign had Gerald Ford not been Vice President. Without a Vice
President, Nixon’s resignation could have led to a change in party control of the White House
because Democratic Speaker of the House Carl Albert would have been the successor. See id.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
22. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 196–98, 202–03.
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Presidents Jimmy Carter,23 Ronald Reagan,24 George H.W. Bush,25 Bill
Clinton,26 and Barack Obama27 underwent medical procedures.
Section 4 allows for the President’s temporary removal if he is unable or
unwilling to invoke Section 3.28 The Vice President becomes Acting
President when he and either a majority of the Cabinet29 or “such other body
as Congress may by law provide”30 submit a declaration to the Speaker of
the House and Senate President pro tempore stating that the President is
“unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”31 If the President
declares to the Speaker and President pro tempore that he is able, he returns
to the powers and duties of the presidency, unless the officials who initiated
his removal submit another declaration within four days reasserting that the
President is unable. In that case, Congress has twenty-one days to “decide
the issue.”32 Unless two-thirds of both houses of Congress vote that the

23. The White House drafted documents for invoking Section 3 when it appeared that
President Carter might have hemorrhoid surgery under general anesthesia. See Robert J.
Lipshutz & Office of the White House Counsel, Documents from Carter’s Contemplated Use
of
Section
3,
FORDHAM L. ARCHIVE SCHOLARSHIP & HIST.
(1978),
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_executive_materials/4/
[https://perma.cc/HG5Y-AFBA].
24. Before President Reagan underwent surgery for skin cancer, the White House
Counsel’s Office drafted a declaration for President Reagan to invoke Section 3, but the
surgery did not ultimately require general anesthesia. See ABA Division for Public Services,
The 25th Amendment, Vice Presidential Selection and Remaining Issues in Presidential
Succession, YOUTUBE (May 18, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T-5k17y7RpE
[https://perma.cc/6EB6-GHCJ] (sharing comments of former White House Counsel Arthur B.
Culvahouse Jr. at timestamp 20:15).
25. When President Bush developed an irregular heartbeat, the White House considered
invoking Section 3 if he needed to undergo a procedure to return his heartbeat to normal. See
FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 200–01.
26. The Senior White House Physician was prepared to recommend invocation of Section
3 if the knee surgery that President Clinton underwent in 1997 required general anesthesia.
See E. Connie Mariano, In Sickness and in Health: Medical Care for the President of the
United States, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT
83, 93 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000).
27. The White House contemplated invoking Section 3 before President Obama
underwent a colonoscopy in 2010. See Fresh Air, NPR (Apr. 18, 2017),
http://www.npr.org/programs/fresh-air/2017/04/18/524534726/fresh-air-for-april-18-2017
[https://perma.cc/3T4R-AA97] (interviewing former White House Deputy Chief of Staff
Alyssa Mastromonaco at timestamp 14:00); see also Press Release, The White House, Release
of the President’s Medical Exam (Feb. 28, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/release-presidents-medical-exam
[https://perma.cc/7Q5A9ZB8].
28. See infra Part I.B.2.
29. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment refers to the Cabinet as the “principal officers of the
executive departments.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. The legislative history indicates that
acting department heads can participate in declaring the President unable. See FEERICK,
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 117–18.
30. Congress has never created another body to participate in the Section 4 process, but,
in 2017, several lawmakers proposed legislation to do so. See H.R. 1987, 115th Cong. (2017);
see also H.R. 2093, 115th Cong. (2017).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
32. Id. amend. XXV, § 4.
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President is unable, the President returns to power.33 Section 4 is the only
provision of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that has never been invoked.
B. Defining Inability in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers purposely avoided a specific
definition of inability.34 They intended the Amendment’s text to be flexible
“to cover all cases in which some condition or circumstance prevents the
President from discharging his powers and duties.”35 While instances of
physical or mental illness are clearly covered,36 it extends to “any imaginable
circumstance[]” in which the President “is unable to perform the powers and
duties of that office.”37 For example, the President’s inability to reliably
communicate with the White House could qualify.38 The next two Parts
discuss the various situations in which Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment could be invoked.
1. Inability in Section 3
Invocation of Section 3 might be appropriate in certain circumstances
when invocation of Section 4 would not be appropriate.39 That the President
determines when to invoke Section 3 might allow for a broad interpretation
of “unable,” while Section 4, which does not involve the President in the
determination, might cover a narrower set of circumstances.40 The
President’s broad discretion finds further support in Section 3’s structure,
such as its lack of a review provision like the one in Section 4.41
The framers of the Amendment envisioned that the President would use
Section 3 when ill or undergoing surgery42 but did not intend to confine its
invocations to those contingencies.43 The limits of Section 3 were explored
during the Watergate era when members of Congress were among those to
33. Id. amend. XXV, § 4.
34. See Richard H. Poff, Presidential Inability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
STUDENT L.J., Dec. 1965, at 15, 17. Representative Poff, a key drafter of the Amendment,
noted that attempting to define inability could have resulted in a “rigidity which, in application,
might sometimes be unrealistic.” Id.
35. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 112.
36. See id. at 60.
37. See KENNETH R. CRISPELL & CARLOS F. GOMEZ, HIDDEN ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE
209–10 (1988).
38. See Presidential Inability: Hearings on H.R. 836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 240 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Herbert
Brownell, former Att’y Gen.).
39. Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Power
of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 26, at 165, 195–96.
40. See Adam R.F. Gustafson, Presidential Inability and Subjective Meaning, 27 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 459, 461–62 (2009).
41. See id. at 472–73. But see FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at
113 (“Section 3 does not provide a mechanism for a President to step aside temporarily without
justification, thereby neglecting his duties.”).
42. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 113.
43. See Gustafson, supra note 40, at 480–81.
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suggest that President Nixon might use the provision to step aside
temporarily.44 In practice, however, Section 3 has been used for brief
surgical procedures, as the Amendment’s framers predicted.
2. Inability in Section 4
Senator Birch Bayh, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s principal sponsor in
the Senate, said Section 4 was for situations where the President is “unable
to make or communicate his decisions as to his own competency.”45
Representative Richard Poff, a manager of the Amendment in the House, said
Section 4 inability included physical impairments that prevented the
President from declaring himself unable and psychological impairments that
prevented the President from “mak[ing] any rational decision, including
particularly the decision to stand aside.”46 Notably, the circumstances under
which an inability arises could be relevant to using Section 4; a fleeting
inability, such as a brief surgical procedure, would not merit the use of
Section 4 absent an immediate need for exercise of presidential powers.47
Perhaps in response to the ambiguity of inability under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, some doctors, including a former White House physician, have
developed criteria to assist inability determinations.48
II. EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTINGENCY PLANNING
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s provisions must be supplemented by
contingency planning in the White House. The military and presidential
administrations over the past half-century have planned extensively for
ensuring continuity of government and providing the President exceptional
healthcare.49 The Clinic’s recommendations focus on two of the many
aspects of this planning. First, the Clinic recommends that the contingency
44. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 161; see also John D.
Feerick, The Way of the 25th, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 1973), http://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/
13/archives/the-way-of-the-25th.html [https://perma.cc/YNY9-U6NQ].
45. 111 CONG. REC. 3282 (1965).
46. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 117.
47. See id. at 116–17 (quoting Senator Bayh as saying, “[a] President who was
unconscious for 30 minutes when missiles were flying toward this country might only be
disabled temporarily, but it would be of severe consequence when viewed in the light of the
problems facing the country”).
48. See HERBERT L. ABRAMS, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT: CONFUSION, DISABILITY,
AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF
RONALD REAGAN 221–27 (1992); PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY 276–82 (James F. Toole & Robert
J. Joynt eds., 2001); Lawrence C. Mohr, Medical Consideration in the Determination of
Presidential Disability, in MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 26, at 97, 99.
49. See generally GARRETT M. GRAFF, RAVEN ROCK: THE STORY OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT’S SECRET PLAN TO SAVE ITSELF—WHILE THE REST OF US DIE (2017) (exploring
the government’s planning since World War II for surviving catastrophic attacks); Mariano,
supra note 26, at 83–95; Presidential Succession, C-SPAN (July 2, 2009), https://www.cspan.org/video/?287421-1/presidential-succession [https://perma.cc/Q25W-DFE3] (recording
the remarks of former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Frances F. Townsend on the steps taken by President George W. Bush’s administration for the
continuity of government); Interview with John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intelligence Agency,
in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2016).
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planning for uses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should provide for
emergencies where there is no time to coordinate with the Vice President and
Cabinet to invoke Section 4. The President should create a prospective
declaration of inability to allow for quick transfers of power in these
situations. Second, the White House should ensure that the President has
adequate access to mental healthcare. Ideally, the White House Medical Unit
should add a mental health professional to achieve this goal.
A. Prospective Declarations
Before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provided legal mechanisms for
transferring power during presidential inabilities, Presidents created
arrangements that allowed their Vice Presidents—or the Speaker of the
House, in one of President Johnson’s arrangements—to discharge the powers
and duties of the presidency if they ever became disabled.50 These “letter
agreements,” which President Dwight D. Eisenhower first implemented,51
authorized the Vice President to unilaterally declare the President unable.
For example, the letter agreement between President Eisenhower and Vice
President Richard Nixon only required Nixon to engage in “such consultation
as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances” before declaring the
President unable and proceeding to act as President.52
The agreements, while exercises in responsible and creative contingency
planning, lacked a firm legal basis.53 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment
provided a major improvement by explicitly authorizing certain officials to
declare the President unable.54 However, by requiring that the Vice President
work with the Cabinet, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gave the Vice President
significantly less discretion than the letter agreements.
Section 4’s expanded procedural requirements could be an issue in a
narrow set of emergency circumstances where power must be transferred
immediately. To account for such contingencies, Presidents and their Vice
Presidents should develop arrangements similar to those in the letter
agreements but that are consistent with the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. The
Clinic believes that Section 3’s broad grant of authority to the President for
determining inabilities allows the President to create a prospective
declaration of inability giving the Vice President authority to initiate a
transfer of power in certain predetermined circumstances.55
50. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 53–54; see also Arthur
Krock, The Johnson-Humphrey Agreement Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1965, at 28.
51. See Jeffrey Frank, What If a President Loses Control?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/what-if-a-president-loses-control
[https://perma.cc/7N8U-8GHG].
52. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 53.
53. See id. at 54. Perhaps the only legal argument in support of the letters was based on
the contingent grant-of-power theory. See infra Part IV.B.2.
54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
55. The first Presidential Succession Clinic proposed that the President, Vice President,
and any official who acted as President create prospective declarations. This recommendation
was intended as a remedy for the absence of procedures for declaring (1) the President unable
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1. The Need for Prospective Declarations
Prospective declarations of inability are needed for situations where
presidential action must be taken immediately but the President is unable and
the Section 4 decision-makers are not easily reachable to participate in
declaring the President unable. The assassination attempt on President
Ronald Reagan in 1981 and the events of September 11, 2001, illustrate some
of the challenges that may arise during a crisis when the President is unable
for medical or other reasons, such as communication failures.
On March 30, 1981, President Reagan was shot after giving a speech56 and
was placed under general anesthesia for surgery shortly thereafter.57
Officials resisted invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment due to political
considerations and concern that it would alarm the public.58 But its use might
not have even been possible because Vice President George H.W. Bush, an
indispensable participant, was flying aboard Air Force Two without reliable
communications.59
In the White House Situation Room, Secretary of State Alexander Haig
declared to several officials that “constitutionally” he was in charge until
Bush arrived back at the White House.60 Haig was the highest-ranking
member of the Cabinet, but the Speaker of the House was the next person in
the line of succession after the Vice President.61 He eventually repeated his
claim to the press after the Deputy Press Secretary was unable to say who
was in charge at the White House.62
The uncertainty over who was discharging presidential powers and duties
became even more significant when those in the Situation Room learned that
two Soviet submarines were patrolling “unusually close to the United States,”
reducing their nuclear missile range by two minutes.63 The nuclear football
had already been brought into the Situation Room,64 but there was confusion
over who, if anyone, had authority to launch nuclear missiles. Secretary of
when there is not an able Vice President, (2) the Vice President unable, and (3) an Acting
President unable. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 31–34. We focus on presidential
prospective declarations as a part of planning for emergencies and further explore the legal
issues that their use presents.
56. See ABRAMS, supra note 48, at 48–54.
57. See id. at 62–63.
58. See id. at 94; DEL QUENTIN WILBER, RAWHIDE DOWN: THE NEAR ASSASSINATION OF
RONALD REAGAN 164 (2011). Additionally, many officials were either not aware of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment or did not have a detailed understanding of it. White House
Counsel Fred Fielding remembers seeing Cabinet members’ “eyes glaze[] over” when he
mentioned the Amendment. See Fred F. Fielding, An Eyewitness Account of Executive
“Inability,” 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 827 (2010).
59. ABRAMS, supra note 48, at 83–90. The line of communication with Air Force Two
was neither secure nor strong enough for verbal communication. See WILBER, supra note 58,
at 132.
60. WILBER, supra note 58, at 167 (quoting Secretary of State Haig as stating, “[s]o the
helm is right here . . . [a]nd that means right here in this chair for now, constitutionally, until
the Vice President gets here”).
61. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012).
62. WILBER, supra note 58, at 174–75.
63. Id. at 175.
64. Id. at 161. The football contains plans for launching nuclear missiles. Id. at 12.
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Defense Casper Weinberger asserted that he had command authority in
Bush’s absence, but Haig disagreed, arguing that they had sufficient ability
to communicate with Bush.65 However, since the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
had not been invoked and there was ambiguity about the devolution of the
command authorities, it was unclear if Bush had the authority.66
Twenty years later, on September 11, 2001, technological limitations
aboard Air Force One impaired President George W. Bush’s ability to
communicate with key officials as the government scrambled to respond to
the terrorist attacks.67 Bush recalled that he was able to instruct Vice
President Cheney, who was at the White House, to authorize the military to
shoot down hijacked airliners.68 But other communications were limited; he
was not able to reach some senior officials, including the Defense Secretary,
and his line to the White House “kept cutting off.”69 Additionally, he relied
on spotty local television signals as primary sources of information about the
attacks.70 Bush later said the “woeful communications technology on Air
Force One” was one of his “greatest frustrations on September 11.”71
Several Cabinet members were also traveling on 9/11. Secretary of State
Colin Powell was traveling back to the United States from Peru and did not
have reliable communications for nearly the entire flight.72 Treasury
Secretary Paul O’Neill was in Japan and Attorney General John Ashcroft,
who was travelling domestically, was blocked from landing in Washington,
D.C., by air traffic control.73
Unlike with the Reagan assassination attempt, the need to transfer
presidential power was less clear on September 11. But both crises illustrate
the challenges that exist when the President is incapacitated or hard to reach
during emergencies. Profoundly consequential decisions might be impeded
or made by individuals who are not clearly authorized to do so.

65. Id. at 177.
66. Id. at 177 (“We can get the [V]ice [P]resident any time we want.”).
66. See Kiron K. Skinner, Governing During a Time of Crisis: The Reagan Presidency,
in WHEN LIFE STRIKES THE PRESIDENT: SCANDAL, DEATH, AND ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE
257, 272–75 (Jeffrey A. Engel & Thomas J. Knock eds., 2017).
67. See Garrett M. Graff, ‘We’re the Only Plane in the Sky,’ POLITICO (Sept. 9, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/were-the-only-plane-in-the-sky-214230
[https://perma.cc/VA8C-YJC4].
68. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 40–41 (2004).
69. Id. at 40.
70. See GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 130 (2011); GRAFF, supra note 49, at 352.
71. BUSH, supra note 70, at 130.
72. GRAFF, supra note 49, at 352.
73. William M. Arkin & Robert Windrem, Secrets of 9/11: New Details of Chaos, Nukes
Emerge, NBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/9-11-anniversary/
secrets-9-11-new-details-chaos-nukes-emerge-n645711 [https://perma.cc/T9UX-YD87].
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2. Prospective Declarations as
Part of White House Contingency Planning
Prospective declarations would fit within the larger plans for uses of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which historically have involved predrafted
letters and agreements between the President and Vice President. This
planning has become increasingly extensive over the fifty years since the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification. The Reagan assassination attempt
may have been an impetus for expanding the planning. About six years
earlier, the White House Counsel’s Office produced a memorandum for
President Ford outlining gaps and ambiguities that executive action could
address,74 but the memorandum’s recommendations were not
implemented.75 The memorandum indicated that the only previous planning
for uses of the Amendment consisted of a “verbal agreement” between Vice
President Ford and President Nixon.76
In the early days of the Reagan administration, White House Counsel Fred
Fielding drafted letters for invoking Sections 3 and 4.77 Although not used
after the assassination attempt, the letters have become a key aspect of
Twenty-Fifth Amendment contingency planning. The letters are kept in
various places, including the White House Counsel’s office, presidential
emergency facilities, Air Force One and Two, and inside the nuclear football,
which travels with the President and Vice President.78
In the first months of President George H.W. Bush’s term, he called a
meeting with his wife, Vice President Dan Quayle, the White House
Physician, the Chief of Staff, the White House Counsel, and several others to
discuss how and when the Twenty-Fifth Amendment should be invoked.79
The Bush administration ultimately implemented a mostly secret plan that
was later adopted by the Clinton administration.80
74. Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg, White House Assoc. Counsel, to the
President Regarding the 25th Amendment (Aug. 21, 1975), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=twentyfifth_amendment_executive_materials
[https://perma.cc/M6EU-GJXB].
75. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 340.
76. See Memorandum from Bobbie Greene Kilberg to President Ford, supra note 74, at 4.
77. Fielding, supra note 58, at 828.
78. Id. at 828–29; Interview with Dr. Connie Mariano, former Dir., White House Med.
Unit, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Apr. 25, 2017) (stating that the letters were carried in the nuclear
football during her tenure in the White House Medical Unit between 1992 and 2001); Robert
Windrem & William M. Arkin, Donald Trump Is Getting the Nuclear Football, NBC NEWS
(Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/donald-trump-getting-nuclearfootball-n709006 [https://perma.cc/26W8-YDWF] (noting that the Vice President and
Secretary of Defense “get their own ‘footballs’”).
79. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 200. A year earlier, the
Miller Center’s Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had
recommended a similar meeting. See MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 5 (1988). In
1995, the Working Group on Presidential Disability echoed the Miller Commission,
recommending that “[a] formal contingency plan for the implementation of the Amendment
should be in place before the inauguration of every president.” See PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY,
supra note 48, at 529.
80. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 200–02.
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An aspect of the plan involved “secret letters of understanding” between
the President and Vice President “indicating their intentions for transfer of
power in case of illness.”81 Whether the same plan was adopted by the
administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama is unclear,
but it is known that both had comprehensive contingency plans.82 One
significant aspect of the Bush administration’s contingency planning
involved a resignation letter presigned by Vice President Dick Cheney, who
instructed his counsel to give the letter to President Bush to decide whether
to submit it if Cheney became disabled.83
3. How Prospective Declarations Would Work
If a prospective declaration of inability is not part of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment contingency plans, the White House should consider including
it. A prospective declaration would encompass situations where the
President is unable to communicate his inability, including as a result of
unconsciousness, kidnapping, technological failure, or cyberattack.
The President should execute the prospective declaration pursuant to
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment because the Amendment provides
the only legal means for transferring presidential powers and duties. To make
the declaration effective under Section 3, the President must sign it. He
should do so at the start of his term. The declaration would be similar to the
declarations that President George W. Bush used to invoke Section 384 but
would list in advance the situations requiring its use. The Vice President’s
Office should hold copies of the declaration for transmission to the Speaker
of the House and Senate President pro tempore on behalf of the President if
a situation detailed in the letter occurs. The President might also consider
giving copies of the letter to other parties, such as the Chief of Staff and
White House Counsel.
The White House should inform the public if the President creates a
prospective declaration. The best way to announce the arrangement would
be for the President and Vice President to publicly describe how the

81. Gustafson, supra note 40, at 477.
82. See ABA Division for Public Services, supra note 24 (providing comments of former
White House Counsel Robert Bauer and discussing Twenty-Fifth Amendment planning during
the Obama administration at timestamp 24:45); Presidential Succession, supra note 49; The
Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in the 21st Century, Part 2, FORDHAM L.
ARCHIVE SCHOLARSHIP & HIST. (Apr. 16, 2010), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth
_amendment_photos/4/ [https://perma.cc/4LBQ-RB2V] (providing the comments of former
Senator Birch Bayh and describing a conversation with a top advisor to President Obama
regarding the plan for uses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment at timestamp 1:19:00).
83. DICK CHENEY WITH LIZ CHENEY, IN MY TIME: A PERSONAL AND POLITICAL MEMOIR
319–22 (2011).
84. See Discharge Letter from President George W. Bush to Congressional Leaders (July
21, 2007), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75568 [https://perma.cc/K4Q7
-VG9N]; Discharge Letter from President George W. Bush to Congressional Leaders (June
29, 2002), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/acting_presidents.php [https://perma.cc/34359Q33].
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prospective declaration works. Awareness of the declaration would
encourage the public to view uses of it as legitimate.85
4. Legal Basis for Prospective Declarations
Prospective declarations of inability pursuant to Section 3 are consistent
with the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s provisions and purposes. The
Amendment is predicated on the need to “always [have] someone authorized
to exercise presidential powers and duties.”86 John Feerick, who assisted in
the Amendment’s drafting, said its “goal [is] providing a framework for
succession and inability without unduly binding the hands of those officials
who may have to confront those incidents.”87 Prospective declarations
leverage the Amendment’s flexibility to serve its purpose of promoting
continuity.
During the congressional hearings on the amendment in 1965, Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach opined that prospective declarations under the
proposed section 3 were consistent with the text of the amendment and that
they would essentially continue the “letter agreement[s]” between the
President and Vice President.88 He also indicated that interpreting the
amendment to bar arrangements like the letter agreements might discourage
the President and Vice President from “work[ing] out a system of
continuity.”89 John Feerick has also supported prospective declarations,
asserting that they “can survive constitutional scrutiny and are consistent with
the legislative history of the Amendment.”90
Although the Clinic agrees with this assessment, there are noteworthy
arguments that prospective declarations are not compatible with the TwentyFifth Amendment. The declarations strain the language of Section 3 in two
ways, as Adam R.F. Gustafson has observed.91 First, the Amendment uses
the present tense, stating that the President’s declaration of inability should
state that “he is unable to discharge the powers” of the office.92 Present tense
language could imply that the President must declare his disability when it
happens, not prospectively.93 However, the temporal component of the text
can be resolved by evaluating the declaration as it is transmitted to Congress,
not as it was signed—meaning the President is not declared incapacitated

85. The Miller Commission and the Working Group on Presidential Disability
emphasized the importance of public awareness of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and plans
for its use. See MILLER COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 79, at 2; PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra
note 48, at 535.
86. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 982.
87. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 293.
88. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 98 (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
Att’y Gen.).
89. See id. at 96.
90. John D. Feerick, Presidential Inability: Filling in the Gaps, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall
2014, at 11, 24.
91. See Gustafson, supra note 40, at 479.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3 (emphasis added).
93. See Gustafson, supra note 40, at 479.
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until the declaration is transmitted to the Speaker and President pro
tempore.94
Second, the text states that the President is to transmit the letter, creating
some difficulty with a third party, even the Vice President, submitting a letter
on his behalf.95 However, the President can arguably use a designated proxy
to submit the letter on his behalf as he is unlikely to personally submit the
declaration under any circumstance.96
The Miller Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment recommended against using prospective declarations because,
the Commission concluded, “Section 4 provides the exclusive means for
determining a presidential inability once the President loses the capacity to
make that determination for himself.”97 An invocation of Section 3 through
a prospective declaration would require the Vice President “at least to
confirm that the President’s current condition fits within the description of
inability provided in the President’s prospective declaration.”98 The Vice
President’s exercise of this discretion comes close to unilaterally declaring a
presidential disability, something the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not
explicitly authorize the Vice President to do.
But, as the Miller Commission acknowledged, prospective declarations are
not necessarily unconstitutional.99 The Clinic submits that they are
consistent with the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring
executive branch continuity. To ensure that there is always someone capable
of legitimately exercising presidential powers, the executive branch must be
empowered to engage in comprehensive contingency planning for a wide
range of exigencies.100 Prospective declarations provide the only means for
transferring power under certain emergency circumstances.
Furthermore, prospective declarations find support in the President’s broad
latitude to determine how Section 3 is used. As discussed, the President can
declare himself unable in a wide range of circumstances that extends beyond
94. See id. at 479 n.85 (stating “the tense of the verb ‘be’ is not, considered alone,
dispositive” (quoting Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 125 (1964))).
95. See id. at 477–78.
96. See, e.g., Scott Conroy, Polyps Found in Bush Colonoscopy, CBS NEWS (July 21,
2007, 9:18 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/polyps-found-in-bush-colonoscopy/
[https://perma.cc/EA34-83ES] (noting that the letters invoking Section 3 were sent via
facsimile).
97. MILLER COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 79, at 7.
98. Gustafson, supra note 40, at 478.
99. MILLER COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 79, at 7 (“The Commission regards the
constitutionality of such agreements as an open question since there is no definitive authority
on the point.”).
100. President George H.W. Bush’s contingency plans exemplified this approach by
planning “for implementing the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment under every
conceivable circumstance . . . so that [his] approval as to how to deal with a situation could be
gotten before the situation actually presented itself.” FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT,
supra note 16, at 230; see also Mohr, supra note 48, at 104 (“I am confident in stating that the
authors of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment wanted to ensure that there is appropriate opportunity
for both judgment and flexibility in implementing the provisions of the Amendment in any
given situation.”).
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the narrower set of circumstances in which Section 4 is appropriate.101
Additionally, the President has flexibility to determine the manner in which
Section 3 is invoked. Although Section 3’s text suggests that invocation
occurs when the President’s inability declaration is signed or transmitted, at
least some of the Amendment’s framers intended Section 3 to allow the
President “to name the hour when the Vice President is to begin as Acting
President.”102 This is the approach President Reagan took when he invoked
Section 3 in 1985; his inability declaration stated that power would be
transferred when he went under anesthesia for surgery.103 The President also
is likely able to specify the period of time during which the Vice President
will act as President.104
Finally, there is an inherent protection against abuse built into the
prospective declaration system. Because the transfer of power occurs under
Section 3, the President can simply reclaim power at any time without
challenge.105 Abuse of prospective declarations is unlikely due to the close
working relationships between recent Presidents and Vice Presidents106 and
the prospect of negative political consequences for a usurping Vice President.
Accordingly, prospective declarations provide efficient transfer of power and
continuity of government in the event of an emergency with minor risk of
abuse.
B. Providing for Mental Healthcare in the White House
Mental illness might be cause for invoking the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
More than half of Americans will develop some form of mental illness during
their lives, even if that illness is short term.107 Sometimes even physical
illnesses will trigger psychological distress.108 Presidents have not been
immune from this reality. One study estimated that nearly a third of the
nation’s first thirty-seven Presidents suffered some form of mental illness
while in office.109

101. See supra Part I.B.1.
102. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 113.
103. See Discharge Letter from President Ronald Reagan to Congressional Leaders (July
13, 1985), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38883 [https://perma.cc/
3QP9-U9JA].
104. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 113.
105. See Gustafson, supra note 40, at 478.
106. See JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY: THE PATH TO
SIGNIFICANCE, MONDALE TO BIDEN 4 (2016).
107. Benedict Carey, Most Will Be Mentally Ill at Some Point, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/07/health/most-will-be-mentally-ill-atsome-point-study-says.html [https://perma.cc/6NT4-TAN4].
108. See ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY: ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE
WHITE HOUSE 255 (1998) (discussing the possible impact of President Reagan’s cancer
surgery on his decision-making abilities). President Dwight D. Eisenhower became depressed
after having a heart attack in 1955. See Robert E. Gilbert, Eisenhower’s 1955 Heart Attack:
Medical Treatment, Political Effects, and the “Behind the Scenes” Leadership Style, POL. &
LIFE SCI., June 2008, at 2, 3–4. President Chester A. Arthur suffered depression as an effect
of Bright’s disease. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 10.
109. See GILBERT, supra note 108, at 255.

938

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

A President suffering an acute episode of mental illness, such as clinical
depression, may use Section 3. Invocation of Section 4 might be appropriate
where a President experienced mental illness or cognitive decline without
realizing it or where a President recognized his mental illness but refused to
step aside.110 Even if the President suffers a mental health episode that is not
serious enough to merit use of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, his ability to
carry out his duties could be impaired.111
Given the possible impact of mental illness on the presidency, the White
House Medical Unit should add a mental health professional to assess
whether the President is experiencing mental illness or impairment, and,
where possible, to provide treatment.
1. Mental Illnesses and Impairments in Presidents
The history of mental illness in the White House provides a compelling
case for the addition of a mental health professional. President Calvin
Coolidge is among the Presidents who seem to have suffered mental illness.
His time in office provides a particularly dramatic lesson on the dangers of
untreated mental illness.
President Coolidge’s son passed away suddenly in 1924, which created
ripples throughout Coolidge’s presidency.112 The once decisive and active
President withdrew from his responsibilities after his son’s death. He stopped
engaging with Congress, delegated near total authority to his Cabinet,
displayed frighteningly little knowledge of serious issues, and slept for as
long as fifteen hours a day.113 Although Coolidge was never formally
diagnosed, scholars like Robert Gilbert have observed that he exhibited all of
the hallmarks of major depression set out by the American Psychiatric
Association.114
Coolidge’s depression left the country without an involved President in a
time when domestic and international turmoil demanded a strong leader.115
110. See ROSE MCDERMOTT, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, ILLNESS AND DECISION MAKING
33–44 (2008).
111. Alex Thompson, The President Needs a Psychiatrist, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/presidential-psychiatrist-mental-healthcongress-214597 [https://perma.cc/EZ5Y-MWXX].
112. Jack Beatty, President Coolidge’s Burden, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2003),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/president-coolidges-burden/303175/
[https://perma.cc/C23F-QS2B].
113. Robert E. Gilbert, Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The
Difficulties Posed By Psychological Illness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 863 (2010) [hereinafter
Gilbert, Difficulties Posed By Psychological Illness]; see also Robert H. Ferrell, Calvin
Coolidge, the Man and the President, in CALVIN COOLIDGE AND THE COOLIDGE ERA 132, 140–
41 (John Earl Haynes ed., 1998). See generally Robert E. Gilbert, The Dysfunctional
Presidency of Calvin Coolidge, 4 WHITE HOUSE STUD. 371 (2004) [hereinafter Gilbert, The
Dysfunctional Presidency] (discussing the troubled presidency of Calvin Coolidge).
114. Robert E. Gilbert, Calvin Coolidge’s Tragic Presidency: The Political Effects of
Bereavement and Depression, 39 J. AM. STUD. 87, 93–94 (2005); see also supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
115. Gilbert, supra note 114, at 100–07.
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His “abandonment” of the presidency included a failure to confront the
economic instability that preceded the Great Depression.116
Other Presidents have struggled psychologically at trying times for the
nation. President Franklin Pierce lost his son in a train accident shortly before
he took office, resulting in a depression that may have hindered attempts to
defuse the tensions precipitating the Civil War.117 During the Civil War,
President Abraham Lincoln fell “into deep depression” after losing his
eleven-year-old son, but, having wrestled with depression for most of his life,
Lincoln avoided the crippling effects experienced by Coolidge and Pierce.118
A century later, President Lyndon B. Johnson was so paranoid during the
Vietnam War that he carried fake statistics on the war in his pocket,
prompting two aides to secretly consult psychiatrists.119
Given the prevalence of substance abuse in the United States,120 it is not
surprising that several Presidents may have suffered from such disorders.
President John F. Kennedy received regular injections from a doctor known
to give patients his own cocktail of steroids and amphetamines.121 At the
height of Watergate, President Richard Nixon, who was known for his low
alcohol tolerance,122 reportedly drank so heavily that he was unable to
respond to at least one international crisis.123 Even without drinking, Nixon
was sometimes paranoid and exhibited other signs of psychological
distress.124 Days before Nixon’s resignation, his Defense Secretary became
“so worried that Nixon was unstable that he instructed the military” to
disregard certain orders from the President, especially those involving
nuclear weapons.125

116. Gilbert, Difficulties Posed By Psychological Illness, supra note 113, at 864–65.
117. Id. at 855–60.
118. Id. at 869–70. See generally JOSHUA WOLF SHENK, LINCOLN’S MELANCHOLY: HOW
DEPRESSION CHALLENGED A PRESIDENT AND FUELED HIS GREATNESS (2005) (discussing
President Lincoln’s depression and his coping mechanisms).
119. Evan Osnos, How Trump Could Get Fired, NEW YORKER (May 8, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/08/how-trump-could-get-fired
[https://perma.cc/PH8R-23WR].
120. See Nationwide Trends, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (June 2015),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/nationwide-trends
[https://perma.cc/M72A-43BL].
121. See Rose McDermott, The Politics of Presidential Medical Care: The Case of John
F. Kennedy, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, at 77, 84.
122. See WALTER ISAACSON, KISSINGER: A BIOGRAPHY 263 (1992).
123. See Daniel J.T. Schuker, Burden of Decision: Judging Presidential Disability Under
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30 J.L. & POL. 97, 107–17 (2014); see also MCDERMOTT, supra
note 110, at 186. One of Nixon’s advisors said he was “ranting and raving—drunk in the
middle of [a] crisis.” SEYMOUR M. HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON
WHITE HOUSE 88 (1983).
124. See Jeremi Suri, A Depressed and Self-Destructive President: Richard Nixon in the
White House, in WHEN LIFE STRIKES THE PRESIDENT: SCANDAL, DEATH, AND ILLNESS IN THE
WHITE HOUSE, supra note 66, at 233, 233–55; John A. Farrell, The Year Nixon Fell Apart,
POLITICO (Mar. 26, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/john-farrellnixon-book-excerpt-214954 [https://perma.cc/EQ3Z-CXKN].
125. Robert D. McFadden, James R. Schlesinger, Willful Aide to Three Presidents, Is Dead
at 85, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/us/politics/james-rschlesinger-cold-war-hard-liner-dies-at-85.html [https://perma.cc/N9UX-UFPJ].
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Whether President Reagan, who was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease
after leaving office, experienced cognitive impairment during his time in
office has been the subject of significant speculation. In 1987, several White
House aides believed Reagan was “so depressed, inept and inattentive” that
invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might be appropriate.126 Others
at the White House then have flatly rejected that Reagan was impaired,127
and mental status examinations that Reagan took beginning in 1990 showed
no signs of Alzheimer’s until 1993.128 However, a 2015 study of Reagan’s
public comments found evidence of cognitive decline.129 And Reagan’s son,
Ron, wrote in a 2011 book that the question of whether his “father suffered
from the beginning stages of Alzheimer’s while in office more or less
answers itself,”130 though he later said he was referring to the disease’s
organic aspects.131
Following cancer surgery in 1985, Reagan may have experienced
cognitive impairment that impacted decisions leading to the Iran-Contra
scandal. Robert Gilbert has opined that Reagan may have prematurely
resumed power after the surgery and that the aftereffects of anesthesia and
the traumatic nature of cancer surgery could have diminished his faculties as
key decisions leading to the scandal were made.132
2. Monitoring and Treating Mental Illness in the White House
Mental health issues fall within the ambit of the White House Medical Unit
(WHMU), which manages the President’s healthcare.133 Military medical
personnel staff the WHMU, except for rare occasions when Presidents

126. Jack Nelson, Removal of Reagan from Office Suggested to Baker: Report Said Aides
Described President As Depressed, Inept in Wake of Iran-Contra Crisis, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15,
1988),
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-09-15/news/mn-2825_1_president-reagan
[https://perma.cc/JPR3-JTBD].
127. See Lawrence K. Altman, While Known for Being Forgetful, Reagan Was Mentally
Sound in Office, Doctors Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/
05/us/while-known-for-being-forgetful-reagan-was-mentally-sound-in-office-doctorssay.html [https://perma.cc/WLY5-4NYW]; A.B. Culvahouse, Bill O’Reilly’s ‘Killing Reagan’
Revives Debunked Myth, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2015, 10:01 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/2015/10/09/b-culvahouse-shameful-reagan-myth-making-resurgescolumn/73612714/ [https://perma.cc/CJL5-SSS9].
128. Lawrence K. Altman, When Alzheimer’s Waited Outside the Oval Office, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
21,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/health/views/22reagan.html
[https://perma.cc/LBJ6-YGPU].
129. See Lawrence K. Altman, Parsing Ronald Reagan’s Words for Early Signs of
Alzheimer’s, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/health/
parsing-ronald-reagans-words-for-early-signs-of-alzheimers.html [https://perma.cc/WS2Q2Q6N].
130. Robert E. Gilbert, The Politics of Presidential Illness: Ronald Reagan and the IranContra Scandal, POL. & LIFE SCI., Fall 2014, 58, 69 (quoting RON REAGAN, MY FATHER AT
100: A MEMOIR 218 (2011)).
131. See Altman, supra note 128.
132. See Gilbert, supra note 130.
133. See Mariano, supra note 26, at 90–91.
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choose private physicians to lead the unit.134 The WHMU is also responsible
for the health of White House staff, the Vice President, and the President’s
and Vice President’s families. Whenever necessary, the WHMU consults
with specialists,135 including psychologists.136
These consultations are not necessarily for the President’s treatment. The
WHMU frequently encounters mental health issues in treating staff members.
For example, Dr. Connie Mariano, a retired Navy Rear Admiral who led the
WHMU during the Clinton administration, recalled that staffers commonly
suffered ailments like anxiety and insomnia,137 but some even became
suicidal.138
Although it is publicly unknown whether Presidents have joined the ranks
of those seeking mental health treatment through the WHMU, the unit’s
personnel are well positioned to recognize any behavioral issues affecting the
President. White House physicians, particularly the doctor who leads the
WHMU, have frequent contact with the President. The WHMU has an office
in the White House, and its physicians and medics travel with the
President.139 Dr. Mariano observed that she was “one of only a small number
of doctors in America who actually got to observe a patient doing his job.”140
The WHMU plans extensively for uses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
including providing input on when invocation is required.141 Additionally,
commissions on presidential inability have emphasized the importance of the
President’s physician having a prominent role in the White House, reasoning
that it would help to ensure that information about the President’s health will
There are
reach the Twenty-Fifth Amendment decision-makers.142
indications that administrations have been receptive to these suggestions.143
Finally, White House physicians have indicated that they are well aware of
the political nature and sensitivities of their role,144 an especially important
consideration when dealing with mental health issues.

134. Dr. Lawrence K. Altman, For the White House Physician, a Sensitive Role with a
Public Patient, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/08/science/
doctor-s-world-for-white-house-physician-sensitive-role-with-public-patient.html
[https://perma.cc/6UTA-2WLU].
135. Interview with Dr. Lawrence Altman, Glob. Fellow, Wilson Ctr., in N.Y.C., N.Y.
(Oct. 19, 2016).
136. Interview with Dr. Connie Mariano, supra note 78.
137. CONNIE MARIANO, THE WHITE HOUSE DOCTOR 212–13 (2010).
138. See id. at 233; Jerrold M. Post, Broken Minds, Broken Hearts, and the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment: Psychiatric Disorders and Presidential Disability, in MANAGING CRISIS, supra
note 26, at 111, 114–15.
139. See White House Doctors: The President’s Shadow, CNN (Sept. 24, 2004),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/09/23/wh.doctors/ [https://perma.cc/6G2F-XG4J].
140. MARIANO, supra note 137, at 192.
141. See id. at 123–25; Mariano, supra note 26, at 92–93.
142. See MILLER COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 79, at 2; see also PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY,
supra note 48, at 254–56.
143. See Mariano, supra note 26, at 92 (noting that the Clinton administration’s plans for
using the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gave the President’s physician “a significant role . . . in
determining medical disability and in advising the administration about the president’s
health”).
144. See, e.g., Mohr, supra note 48, at 107.
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However, White House physicians have not always been appropriately
consulted. For example, Dr. John Hutton did not evaluate President Reagan
before he reassumed his powers following his 1985 surgery.145 Hutton later
stated it was “absurd” to allow Reagan to retake power so quickly without
consultation.146 When President George W. Bush used Section 3 before
undergoing colonoscopies, the WHMU took an improved approach. Bush
completed neurological baseline testing before and after the procedures to
ensure that he was not impaired before retaking power.147
Despite the lack of permanent mental health professionals at the White
House, Presidents are not without emotional support. Their families and staff
surely provide valuable advice and companionship. Additionally, Presidents
have historically relied on religious figures for guidance and counseling,
especially during times of turmoil.148
President Kennedy and his wife had a long-lasting relationship with
Cardinal Richard Cushing, who presided over their wedding and the funeral
for their infant son, Patrick, while President Kennedy was in office.149 In
1998, after President Clinton admitted to an “inappropriate relationship” with
White House intern Monica Lewinsky, he assembled “a circle of two or three
ministers to serve as a team of personal spiritual advisers.”150 One of the
ministers said they would focus on helping Clinton understand “what went
wrong with him personally.”151 President Obama had a group of five
religious leaders that he called upon at various times.152 President Donald
Trump had televangelist Paula White, who he had known for fifteen years,
deliver the invocation at his inauguration.153

145. See Gilbert, supra note 130, at 60.
146. See id.
147. Interview with Dr. Connie Mariano, supra note 78 (summarizing statements made to
her by Dr. Richard Tubb, the Physician to the President when President Bush underwent the
procedures).
148. God
in
America:
God
in
the
White
House,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/godinamerica/god-in-the-white-house/
[https://perma.cc/6PSS-AL67]
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017). See generally RANDALL BALMER, GOD IN THE WHITE HOUSE: A
HISTORY (2008) (exploring how President George W. Bush’s faith interacted with his
presidency).
149. Kevin Cullen, Jackie Kennedy and Her Priests, BOS. GLOBE (May 16, 2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/05/15/jackie-kennedy-other-favoritepriest/b5ykBQGdDTdUI3aeEiDhkJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/6MSB-NWU3].
150. Laurie Goodstein, Testing of a President: The Counselors; Clinton Selects Clerics to
Give Him Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/15/us/
testing-president-counselors-clinton-selects-clerics-give-him-guidance.html
[https://perma.cc/29HA-A8QA].
151. Id.
152. Laurie Goodstein, Without a Pastor of His Own, Obama Turns to Five, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar.
14,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/us/politics/15pastor.html
[https://perma.cc/LH4W-RSCZ].
153. Jane C. Timm, Who Is Paula White, Trump’s Spiritual Advisor Praying at His
Inauguration?, NBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2017, 6:39 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/who-paula-white-trump-s-spiritual-adviser-praying-his-inauguration-n708036
[https://perma.cc/T4FB-DJ4U].
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3. Discussion of Recommendations
The existing approaches to recognizing, diagnosing, and treating mental
illness in the White House would be improved by the addition of a full-time
mental health professional to the WHMU. If the ability to make a rational
decision is central to the determination of presidential inability,154 then it is
critical to consider the insights of mental health professionals.155 Whereas
physicians are best equipped to diagnose physical illness, a psychiatrist or
psychologist is best equipped to diagnose psychological impairment. A
mental health professional in the WHMU is preferable to the outside mental
health professionals consulted by the White House. The sensitivities
surrounding the President’s psychological health could discourage external
consultations and a staff mental health professional might have more frequent
interactions with the President.
While a mental health professional in the WHMU could provide critical
insight into whether invocations of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment are
appropriate, perhaps just as importantly he or she could treat the President.
A transfer of power would be needlessly disruptive if treatment could address
the President’s malady.156 And, often, untreated psychological struggles do
not require invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,157 but treatment
could improve the President’s well-being and performance.158 Furthermore,
a mental health professional could assist in treating White House staff
members who experience psychological challenges. The White House’s
willingness to appoint a mental health professional could also help
destigmatize mental illness in society.
Realistically, however, Presidents and their advisors would probably resist
the addition of a mental health professional to the WHMU out of concern that
154. See supra Part I.B.2.
155. Assessment always takes social and contextual factors into consideration. Every
individual is embedded in a complex set of social networks, beginning with the family of
origin and continuing into adolescence and adulthood. These networks play a significant role
in the development of intelligence, social judgment, and prosocial orientation.
Neuropsychological evaluation can accurately assess core domains of cognitive functioning,
insight, and judgment at a single time point of evaluation and over time but findings are always
interpreted in light of social contexts, including race, class, ethnicity, gender, and other forms
of social membership. See Interview with Dr. David Marcotte, Assistant Professor of
Psychology, Fordham Univ., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Nov. 11, 2016).
See generally
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROPSYCHIATRY OF NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS (Manuel
Menéndez-González & Tania Álvarez-Avellón eds., 2016) (discussing neuropsychology
language, visuospatial functions, and neuropsychiatry such as the emotional or motivational
spheres, and the interphases between them).
156. There are a number of empirically supported, short-term treatments that can improve
symptoms of clinical disorders, but substantial change requires longer-term therapies. Side
effects of psychiatric medicines remain a significant source of noncompliance with treatment.
However, experienced providers with psychopharmacological skill and supportive
psychotherapies can have a significant effect on symptom presentation. See Interview with Dr.
David Marcotte, supra note 155.
157. In fact, scholars have argued that President Abraham Lincoln likely suffered from
clinical depression but that this did not impair his ability to serve as President and may even
have contributed to his strength in office. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
158. Thompson, supra note 111.
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it would raise questions about the President’s mental health. There are
several possible approaches to addressing such concerns. First, the White
House could consider adding a mental health professional without
announcing it to the public.159 But, if word of the addition leaked, it may
raise more suspicions than a public announcement would have. Second, the
White House could describe a mental health professional as a “performance
coach” or “consultant,” a common practice in the business world.160 Third,
the sitting President could sign an executive order or Congress could pass
legislation providing for the addition of a mental health professional to the
WHMU at the start of the next presidential term to avoid the public
interpreting the move as a reflection of the current President’s mental health.
Finally, if the White House finds it infeasible to place a mental health
professional in the WHMU, officials should take alternative measures to
ensure that mental health issues are addressed. Those steps could include
bolstering the current policy of consulting outside psychologists and
psychiatrists and facilitating communication between the WHMU and the
President’s staff and family regarding the President’s health needs.
III. THE LINE OF SUCCESSION
Planning for presidential succession and inability in the executive branch
is essential, but there are significant limitations on the unilateral actions of
those in the White House. As discussed in this and the following two Parts,
Congress must act to bolster key aspects of the presidential succession
system.
This Part addresses steps Congress should take to reform the line of
presidential succession. It first discusses the history that led to the current
line of succession. Next, this Part describes potential weaknesses in the line
of succession’s composition. The following Part outlines the Clinic’s
proposal to remove legislators and some lower-ranked Cabinet officials from
the line of succession and add four “Standing Successors” nominated by the
President and confirmed by Congress. Given the political challenges of
implementing this proposal, some alternative recommendations are also
discussed. This Part concludes by advancing other reform proposals relating
to the line of succession, including steps to address the vulnerability to the
line of succession on Inauguration Day.

159. See Interview with Robert E. Gilbert, Professor of Political Sci. Emeritus, Ne. Univ.,
in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Sept. 28, 2016).
160. See generally Bernard Liebowitz & John Blattner, On Becoming a Consultant: The
Transition for a Clinical Psychologist, 67 CONSULTING PSYCHOL. J. 144 (2015) (noting that
psychologists as consultants can have a large effect on political processes); Steven Berglas,
The Very Real Dangers of Executive Coaching, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 1, 2002),
https://hbr.org/2002/06/the-very-real-dangers-of-executive-coaching [https://perma.cc/FQ2FEWEP].
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A. History and Current Line of Succession Statute
Congress has used its constitutional authority in Article II, Section 1,
Clause 6 to appoint presidential successors after the Vice President on three
occasions. The first line of succession Congress created, the Presidential
Succession Act of 1792, included only two officials: the Senate President
pro tempore followed by the Speaker of the House.161 A proposal to place
Cabinet members in the line of succession had been thwarted by partisan
politics.162 Federalists in the Senate blocked the proposal because it would
have placed Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, a Democratic-Republican,
first in the line.163
Nearly one hundred years later, President James A. Garfield’s
assassination in 1881 exposed a major flaw in the Act of 1792. When Vice
President Chester A. Arthur succeeded to the presidency, there was no
President pro tempore or Speaker of the House, leaving the country without
any presidential successors.164 The line of succession was also vacant after
Vice President Thomas A. Hendricks’s death in 1885.165 Those incidents
and concerns that legislators are not constitutionally eligible successors led
Congress to pass the Presidential Succession Act of 1886.166 This Act
removed legislators and listed only Cabinet members in the order of the
creation of their respective departments.167
After President Harry S. Truman succeeded to the presidency in 1945
following President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s death, he called on Congress to
return legislators to the line of succession.168 His succession left the vice
presidency vacant, making the Secretary of State the first successor to the
presidency.169 The prospect of the Secretary of State’s succession troubled
Truman because he believed that unelected officials should not become
President.170 He also opposed the President handpicking his successors, as
happens with Cabinet succession.171
Congress acted on Truman’s concerns, passing the Presidential Succession
Act of 1947. The statute creates a line of succession that begins with the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, followed by the President pro
tempore of the Senate, and then the Cabinet secretaries.172 The Speaker was
161. Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).
162. See JAMES M. RONAN, LIVING DANGEROUSLY 123 (2015) (“The inherent flaws of a
legislative line of succession are not surprising considering its origins . . . . [T]he idea of
placing congressional leaders after the Vice President [in the line of succession] was born not
out of logic, but partisanship.”); see also Feerick, supra note 90, at 12–13.
163. See RONAN, supra note 162, at 123–24.
164. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 38.
165. Id. at 40.
166. See id. at 40–42.
167. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1, 1 (repealed 1947).
168. RONAN, supra note 162, at 129–30.
169. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 42–43.
170. See Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Succession to the
Presidency
(June
19,
1945),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12201
[https://perma.cc/87X5-8MTJ].
171. See id.
172. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2012).
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placed first in the line of succession largely because President Truman
suggested that members of the House, who choose the Speaker, are closer to
the people than Senators.173 The Act of 1947, which Congress has updated
to include Cabinet secretaries whose departments were created after 1947, is
the current line of succession law.174
B. Problems with the Composition
of the Line of Succession
This Part discusses the problems raised by the inclusion of legislators and
some lower-ranked Cabinet secretaries in the line of succession.
1. Problems Posed by Legislators in the Line of Succession
a. Preparedness of Legislators
Legislators may not be well equipped to immediately assume the powers
and duties of the presidency.175 The Speaker of the House is among the
“Gang of Eight” congressional leaders who receive classified intelligence
briefings from the executive branch.176 Additionally, Speakers are typically
members who have had long tenures in the House and have developed
significant knowledge of domestic and international policy matters. But the
Speaker’s responsibilities of crafting and promoting legislation and engaging
in various political activities, particularly fundraising, may often be all
consuming. These responsibilities could prevent the Speaker from focusing
on the wide range of international affairs and executive branch functions that
would likely be relevant if the Speaker succeeded to the presidency, as his
succession would probably result from a crisis, such as a major terrorist
attack.
The Senate President pro tempore, who is the longest serving Senator of
the majority party,177 might be less qualified than the Speaker to serve as
President. Like the Speaker, the President pro tempore almost necessarily
173. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 41.
174. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1). The Cabinet secretaries are listed in the line of succession in
the following order: (1) Secretary of State, (2) Secretary of Treasury, (3) Secretary of Defense,
(4) Attorney General, (5) Secretary of the Interior, (5) Secretary of Agriculture, (6) Secretary
of Commerce, (7) Secretary of Labor, (8) Secretary of Health and Human Services, (9)
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, (10) Secretary of Transportation, (11)
Secretary of Energy, (12) Secretary of Education, (13) Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and (14)
Secretary of Homeland Security. Id. Successors still need to meet constitutional qualifications
for the Presidency. If a cabinet member were a naturalized citizen or under thirty-five, for
example, he or she would not be eligible for succession. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
175. See John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 945 (2011).
176. See Mark Hosenball, FBI’s Comey Meets with Top U.S. Congressional Leaders,
REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-documents-idUSKB
N16G2PY [https://perma.cc/F6EJ-3BDL].
177. Glossary, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/president_
pro_tempore.htm [https://perma.cc/6PYE-RMUC] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (defining
President pro tempore).
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has developed a wealth of policy knowledge, but the President pro tempore
is not part of the “Gang of Eight,” which leaves him less informed on
significant national security matters. Additionally, the President pro
tempore, while a distinguished legislator, is typically in the twilight of his
career. For example, the current President pro tempore, Orrin Hatch, is
eighty-three years old and has been considering retirement.178 From the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification in 1967 until 2015, the President pro
tempore has, on average, been seventy-seven and a half years old at the start
of his term and more than eighty-three years old at the end of his term.179
Twelve Senators have held the position during this period.180
b. Perverse Incentives
There are a number of perverse incentives that may influence legislators in
scenarios in which their succession to the presidency is possible. In some
cases, their status as successors could motivate them to improperly support
the President’s impeachment181 or temporary removal under Section 4 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.182 The risk of legislators abusing their
impeachment powers may have increased in the modern era because the close
partnerships between recent Presidents and Vice Presidents make it more
likely that both would be implicated in the same scandals, allowing
legislators to attempt to remove them at the same time.183 While such a coup
is unlikely,184 the incentive will remain so long as legislators remain part of
the line of succession.
Conversely, and more likely, a legislator may be reluctant to temporarily
act as President because he or she would have to resign from legislative
office. The Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause and the line of succession
statute require legislators to resign from Congress before assuming the
presidency.185 In cases of temporary disability or incapacitation, the Speaker
or President pro tempore may be unwilling to resign to be the Acting
178. See Rebecca Savransky, Hatch: I May Retire If Romney Runs to Replace Me, HILL
(Mar. 29, 2017, 8:43 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/326263-hatch-i-may-retire-ifromney-runs-to-replace-me [https://perma.cc/Z9R3-8CA3].
179. RONAN, supra note 162, at 127.
180. Id.
181. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 122 (1995) (“The structure of the Constitution simply
does not permit participants in the impeachment process to have such a direct, immediate,
personal stake in the outcome.”).
182. See id. at 127–28.
183. See Whet Smith & Mark J. Rozell, American Presidential Succession Is a Ticking
Time Bomb, HILL (Aug. 1, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/theadministration/344824-american-presidential-succession-is-a-ticking-time-bomb
[https://perma.cc/HNA3-T5JS].
184. This would not be unprecedented. During President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment
in 1868, President pro tempore Benjamin Wade, who would have become President upon
Johnson’s removal, had already selected his new Cabinet when he voted to remove Johnson.
Id. at 123.
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”); 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b)
(2012).
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President for a short time. This leads to the troubling potential of successors
refusing the presidency in times of crisis, creating further unpredictability
during a time when stability is important.
c. Party Continuity
With legislators in the line of succession, there is a possibility for a
destabilizing change in party control of the White House if there is neither an
Beginning with the Nixon
able President nor Vice President.186
administration in 1969 “and continuing through the end of the Obama
administration, every President except Jimmy Carter” has spent at least some
of his term with Congress controlled by the opposing political party.187
Between 1969 and 2016, the President and Speaker have been of different
parties for thirty-four of the forty-seven years, more than 70 percent of the
time.188 Accordingly, under this succession statute, voters might elect a
President of one party but end up with a President from the other party.
d. Democratic Legitimacy
Some argue that having legislators as successors promotes democratic
values because legislators are elected.189 As discussed, President Truman
feared that a line of succession of only Cabinet secretaries allowed the
President to undemocratically nominate his “immediate successor in the
event of [his] own death or inability to act.”190 But Cabinet members are not
without democratic legitimacy; the President, who is nationally elected,
unlike legislators, appoints them. The President’s national election makes
him the most politically representative figure of the national constituency.191
Additionally, Cabinet members must be confirmed by the Senate,192 which
allows input from the people through their Senators. In contrast, local
constituencies choose the Speaker and President pro tempore. The House
selects the Speaker,193 but the President pro tempore automatically receives
the position based on seniority within the party.194 Furthermore, President
Truman only advocated for including legislators with the assumption that a
special election would occur shortly after a legislator’s succession in the

186. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE
CONTINUITY OF THE PRESIDENCY 39 (2009).
187. See RONAN, supra note 162, at 128.
188. Id.
189. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 45.
190. See Truman, supra note 170.
191. Amar & Amar, supra note 181, at 130 (citing Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative
Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 58–70 (1995))
192. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
193. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
194. Glossary, supra note 177.
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event of death, resignation, or removal of the President,195 but the current
statute does not provide for a special election.196
e. Questionable Constitutionality
The Clinic did not focus its analysis of the line of succession on the
constitutional eligibility of legislators because others have considered the
issue in detail.197 However, there are compelling arguments that legislators
are not among the “Officer[s]” whom Congress is authorized to appoint as
On the one hand, as the first Clinic summarized,
successors.198
“Congressional leaders and scholars have interpreted the term ‘Officer’ to
mean ‘Officer of the United States,’ which refers only to executive branch
officers nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.”199 On the
other hand, Professor Joel K. Goldstein has argued that evidence that the
Constitution bars legislators from being successors is inconclusive.200 Given
these opposing arguments, it is clear that legislators’ constitutional status in
the line of succession is at least questionable, which is another mark against
their inclusion. Officials whose succession would not be unambiguously
legitimate should not be part of the line of succession.
f. The Bumping Provision
The line of succession’s “bumping” provision prevents a Cabinet member
from acting as President if there is an able Speaker or President pro tempore.
If one of those officials is selected or becomes able after suffering an
inability, a Cabinet member acting as President must step aside to allow the
Speaker or President pro tempore to act as President.201
The bumping provision is flawed on constitutional and practical grounds.
It may be unconstitutional because it calls for multiple successors in certain
situations despite language in the Constitution’s Succession Clause that
seems to contemplate only one successor.202 The practical problems are
threefold. First, multiple successors over a short period could sow further
instability during a crisis.203 Second, the provision could allow legislators
effectively to elect the President by choosing a new Speaker or President pro
tempore.204 Third, if the President’s party did not control the House and
195. Truman, supra note 170 (“No matter who succeeds to the Presidency after the death
of the elected President and Vice President, it is my opinion he should not serve any longer
than until the next Congressional election or until a special election called for the purpose of
electing a new President and Vice President.”).
196. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012).
197. See, e.g., First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 36–40.
198. Id. at 37.
199. Id.
200. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 1019–22.
201. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(2).
202. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 42.
203. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 16, at 268–69 (noting that the bumping
procedure could result in several Presidents within a short period of time).
204. Amar & Amar, supra note 181, at 135 (citing William F. Brown & Americo R.
Cinquegrana, The Realties of Presidential Succession: “The Emperor Has No Clones,” 75
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Senate, either chamber could initiate a shift in party control by selecting a
Speaker or President pro tempore.
2. Qualifications of Cabinet Members in the Line of Succession
There are a number of qualities that the Clinic believes make an official
well suited to assume the presidency: awareness of executive branch
activities, familiarity with administrative activities, knowledge of foreign
affairs, a working relationship with the President and the rest of the Cabinet,
legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and an ability to command worldwide
respect. While this is not an exhaustive list, it is fair to expect successors to
satisfy these qualifications to some degree. While Cabinet secretaries are
undoubtedly qualified for their specific posts, the Clinic’s study suggests that
some may lack necessary qualifications to assume the presidency.
After studying the secretaries of the last several administrations, it is clear
that looking at resumes of officials who have held Cabinet positions provides
limited insights into which Cabinet secretaries are suited for the line of
succession. The backgrounds of the individuals who have held certain
Cabinet posts vary widely, with some, but not others, holding clearly
sufficient qualifications to succeed to the presidency. For example, President
Obama’s first Secretary of Commerce, Gary Locke, had held several
positions that likely equipped him to serve as a President if the need arose.
He had served in the Washington House of Representatives, as King County
Executive, and as Governor of Washington.205 In contrast, the next official
President Obama nominated to the post, John Bryson, did not have similar
experience in elected office. He helped found the Natural Resources Defense
Council, held leadership positions in California’s water and utility agencies,
and served as director of several major corporations.206 While he was
inarguably qualified to be Secretary of Commerce, Secretary Bryson had no
governing experience.
Because of the difficulty predicting Cabinet officials’ qualifications based
on their predecessors’ backgrounds, the Clinic focused on evaluating the
expertise of each department.207 The current line of succession statute’s
approach of ordering Cabinet secretaries by when their departments were
created enhances predictability, but it is not necessarily the best order for
effective governance. For example, the system places the Secretary of

GEO. L.J. 1389, 1437–40, 1448–50 (1987) (arguing that the political gamesmanship that could
have occurred after President Reagan’s assassination attempt supports the idea that the
bumping provision should be reformed)).
205. See Secretary Gary Locke, U.S. DEP’T COM., http://2010-2014.commerce.gov/aboutcommerce/commerce-leadership/secretary-gary-locke.html [https://perma.cc/T9J8-G3BW]
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
206. See Secretary John Bryson, U.S. DEP’T COM., http://2010-2014.commerce.gov/aboutcommerce/commerce-leadership/secretary-john-bryson.html [https://perma.cc/TBC5-F2WS]
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
207. Telephone Interview with John Fortier, former Dir., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n
(Nov. 9, 2016) (suggesting a focus on the Cabinet departments’ expertise).
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Homeland Security last, far behind the Secretary of Agriculture.208 This
current order means that in the event of a catastrophic attack on Washington,
D.C., the Secretary of Agriculture is more likely to succeed to the presidency
than the Secretary of Homeland Security, despite the latter’s expertise in
combating security threats.
To evaluate the expertise of each department, the Clinic emphasized four
areas of expertise: foreign relations, economics, military, and security.
These areas were selected considering that succession beyond the Vice
President is unlikely absent a catastrophic event. In addition to specializing
in issues that would be relevant in a crisis, the leaders of the departments that
focus on these areas receive regular security briefings, which lower ranking
Cabinet members are not provided.209 Frances Townsend, a former White
House Homeland Security Advisor, stressed to the Clinic that security
briefings are far more important than events like Cabinet meetings for
preparing department heads for succession.210 Additionally, the Clinic
considered how frequently various department heads interact with the
President, finding that Cabinet secretaries whose departments specialize in
foreign relations, economics, military, and security met more frequently with
the President.
Based on these considerations, the Clinic concludes that the heads of the
Departments of State,211 Defense,212 Justice,213 Treasury,214 and Homeland
Security215 are best equipped to succeed to the presidency in a crisis.
3. Geographic Vulnerability
Further, the current line of succession does not adequately provide for the
possibility of a catastrophic attack in the Washington, D.C., area, where
208. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2012) (stating that the Secretary of Agriculture is sixth in the line
of succession while the Secretary of Homeland Security is last at fifteenth).
209. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 45.
210. Interview with Frances F. Townsend, former Assistant to the President for Homeland
Sec. & Counterterrorism, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct. 26, 2016).
211. See What We Do, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/whatwedo/
[https://perma.cc/7KZ2-G936] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (stating that “Arms Control &
International Security” and “Economics, Energy & Environment” are among the State
Department’s areas of expertise).
212. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/ [https://perma.cc/F8QV-7P6F]
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (“The mission of the Department of Defense is to provide the
military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country.”).
213. See
About
DOJ,
U.S.
DEP’T
JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/about
[https://perma.cc/KB2X-7Y4F] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (stating the department’s mission
“[t]o enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to
ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic”).
214. See Role of Treasury, U.S DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-oftreasury/ [https://perma.cc/N5AF-6S5A] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (stating the department’s
mission to “maintain a strong economy . . . , strengthen national security by combating threats
and protecting the integrity of the financial system, and manage the U.S. Government’s
finances and resources effectively”).
215. See About DHS, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs
[https://perma.cc/6LGT-G8CA] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (“The Department of Homeland
Security has a vital mission: to secure the nation from the many threats we face.”).
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legislators and Cabinet members in the line of succession are frequently
located.216 For example, a nuclear or biological attack when Congress is in
session would threaten to leave the country without any clear successors to
the presidency.
The danger posed by concentrating successors in the Washington, D.C.,
area is addressed by the lines of succession for several executive branch
agencies including at least two of the top four Cabinet departments.217 The
Secretary of State’s successors include numerous ambassadors218 and the
Attorney General’s successors include U.S. Attorneys in Virginia, Illinois,
and Missouri.219
C. Recommended Composition of the Line of Succession
The Clinic recommends removing legislators and several Cabinet
members from the line of succession and adding four officials, or “Standing
Successors,” outside of Washington, D.C. The line of succession should be
populated as follows: (1) Secretary of State, (2) Secretary of Defense, (3)
Attorney General, (4) Secretary of Homeland Security, (5) Secretary of the
Treasury, (6) Standing Successor 1, (7) Standing Successor 2, (8) Standing
Successor 3, and (9) Standing Successor 4.220
1. Standing Successors
To address the geographic vulnerability problem and to lengthen the
proposed line of succession, the Clinic recommends the creation of an Office
of Standing Successors. Four individuals located outside of Washington,
D.C., would be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to
properly qualify as eligible “Officers” under the Succession Clause.221 These
officials should be placed at the end of the line of succession.
The recommendation for Standing Successors was initially proposed by
the Continuity of Government Commission, which suggested creating four
or five new federal offices to which the President would appoint figures to be
confirmed by the Senate.222 The Clinic largely agrees with the Commission’s
recommendation but recommends the creation of only one new office,
instead of one for each Standing Successor, for simplicity and efficiency.
The Clinic also envisions a wider range of officials who could be appointed
as Standing Successors than the Commission recommended.
The
Commission suggested that the President appoint “former high government
216. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 39.
217. As discussed in Part III.E.1, successors in the executive departments might also be
part of the presidential line of succession, but the statute does not explicitly include them.
218. See Exec. Order No. 13,251, 3 C.F.R. §§ 1841–1842 (2001).
219. See Exec. Order No. 13,775, 82 Fed. Reg. 10,697 (Feb. 14, 2017).
220. The first Presidential Succession Clinic also recommended removing legislators from
the line of succession but did not propose removing any Cabinet secretaries. See First Clinic
Report, supra note 8, at 46.
221. See supra Part III.B.1.e.
222. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 45.
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officials” such as “former presidents, former secretaries of state, former
members of Congress, [or even] sitting governors.”223 Past Presidents,
former Secretaries of State, and former members of Congress would make
excellent Standing Successors. However, the Clinic believes that this list
should be expanded to include other individuals with public service
experience and expertise in the areas of foreign affairs, economics, military,
or security. Examples include past Vice Presidents and former Cabinet
members, particularly former heads of the Defense, Justice, Treasury, and
Homeland Security departments.
The Twenty-Second Amendment’s two term limit for Presidents does not
prevent past Presidents from being part of the line of succession. The
Amendment states “no person shall be elected to the office of the President
more than twice.”224 Because succession does not involve a past President
being elected to another term, it would not violate the Constitution. Although
some might argue that including former two-term Presidents violates the
spirit of the Amendment, the Clinic contends that in a time of crisis where
many other successors are not available, expertise and stability in the White
House is critical.225
The Clinic does not recommend sitting governors as Standing Successors
to avoid possible conflicts of interest or violations of dual-office-holding
laws in certain states.226
The President’s discretion to appoint Standing Successors would be
limited by the constitutional presidential eligibility requirements227 and
possibly limited by Congressional requirements imposed pursuant to
Congress’s authority under the Succession Clause to designate presidential
successors.228
The Clinic recommends that Standing Successors follow the Cabinet
members’ line of succession to the presidency, as secretaries’ work in the
executive branch—particularly frequent security briefings—would likely
better prepare them for succession. However, to ensure that the Standing
Successors are aware of critical information, they should attend periodic
security briefings.229

223. See id.
224. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (emphasis added).
225. Interview with Akhil Reed Amar, Professor of Law, Yale Univ., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct.
5, 2016).
226. See Dual Office Holding: Restrictions on Legislators, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/restrictions-on-holding-concurrentoffice.aspx [https://perma.cc/NAS4-445B].
227. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
228. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
229. The Continuity of Government Commission recommended that the White House
include appointed successors “in regular (at least monthly) national security briefings.”
CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 45; see also Interview with Frances F.
Townsend, supra note 186 (suggesting that appointed successors periodically attend meetings
of the National Security Council or Homeland Security Council); cf. Interview with John O.
Brennan, supra note 49 (stating that successors should receive training to prepare for their
roles).

954

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

2. Alternatives to Removing Legislators
The Clinic is convinced that the drawbacks of including legislators in the
line of succession weigh heavily against any benefits of their inclusion.
However, the political reality is that members of Congress might resist
removing their own leaders from the line of succession. If Congress declines
to remove legislators, the Clinic recommends three alternative reforms.
a. Remove Legislators from the Line of Succession
in Cases of Temporary Disability
or Removal from Office
If legislators are not removed from the line of succession, Congress should
only designate them as successors in cases where the President dies or resigns
not where he is disabled or removed from office.230 Preventing legislators
from succeeding during disabilities protects legislators from being forced to
resign to act as President temporarily. Similarly, preventing succession after
the President has been removed through the impeachment process would
avoid the conflict of interest inherent in the Speaker or President pro tempore
taking action that could result in his own succession to the presidency.
b. Reorder Legislators to the End of the Line of Succession
Congress might also consider moving legislators to the end of the line of
succession. This change would make their succession less likely, reducing
the probability that a succession event would change party control of the
White House.
c. Remove the Bumping Provision
Congress should eliminate the bumping provision to prevent multiple
Presidents in a short period of time and increase the public legitimacy of
successors during a crisis.
D. Other Line of Succession Reforms
In addition to changing some of the officials in the line of succession, there
are several other steps that Congress should take to address vulnerabilities
related to the line of succession.
1. Statutory Ambiguity About Acting Secretaries
The current statute is unclear as to whether acting Cabinet secretaries are
in the line of succession.231 Acting secretaries are the officials who lead

230. The first Presidential Succession Clinic also advanced this alternative proposal. See
First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 46–47.
231. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 40–41.
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executive branch departments in the absence of officials confirmed by the
Senate to head the agencies. Comparison of the language of the 1947 Act
and the 1886 Act suggests that acting secretaries are included in the current
line of succession.
The 1886 Act explicitly excluded acting secretaries by enumerating the list
of Cabinet secretaries who were included in the line of succession and stating
that the list only applied to officials confirmed to “the offices therein
named.”232 The current statute—the 1947 Act—is not as clear. It provides,
in relevant part, that “the officer of the United States who is highest on the
following list [of Cabinet secretaries], and who is not under disability to
discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as
President.”233 The statute states that the list of Cabinet successors includes
only “officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.”234 Many officials who serve as acting secretaries receive Senate
confirmations for deputy-level posts. There is no language in the 1947 Act
limiting succession to Cabinet secretaries confirmed for those positions.
However, it is also possible that the exclusion of this language was not
purposeful as there is no discussion of acting secretaries in the 1947 Act’s
legislative history.235
This lack of clarity might result in chaos in extraordinary circumstances.
It permits the possibility of an acting secretary in a higher-listed department
becoming Acting President ahead of a lower-listed, confirmed Cabinet
secretary. For example, it could be unclear whether an Acting Secretary of
State would succeed before the Secretary of Defense. Ambiguity about
successors’ legitimacy is problematic in itself, but a further issue is that
acting secretaries are not ideal successors. They are often more obscure than
their displaced superiors and may be from the opposing party.236 While the
inclusion of acting secretaries expands the line of succession, it amplifies the
Clinic’s concerns about the qualifications and legitimacy of the individuals
who could assume the presidency. Addressing issues involving acting
secretaries in the line of succession has become more urgent in recent years
because the time that it takes for the Senate to confirm Cabinet secretaries
has steadily increased,237 increasing acting secretaries’ tenures.
Accordingly, Congress should at least clarify the ambiguity about whether
acting secretaries are in the line of succession. The Clinic recommends that
Congress enact a new statute mirroring the language of the Presidential

232. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1, 1 (repealed 1947).
233. 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1) (2012).
234. Id. § 19(e).
235. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 43 (discussing the Act’s legislative history).
236. Olga Pierce, Who Runs Departments Before Heads Are Confirmed?, PROPUBLICA
(Jan. 22, 2009, 4:13 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/who-runs-departments-beforeheads-are-confirmed-090122 [https://perma.cc/6JCN-7TPQ].
237. See John W. Schoen, No President Has Ever Waited This Long to Get a Cabinet
Approved, CNBC (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/24/trumps-cabinetwaiting-for-confirmation.html [https://perma.cc/8CPE-W34V].
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Succession Act of 1886 to remove acting secretaries from the line of
succession.238
2. Inauguration Day Vulnerability
A particular point of vulnerability for the line of succession comes on
Inauguration Day, when most of the outgoing Cabinet secretaries have
resigned and the incoming secretaries have not yet been confirmed.239 The
line of succession is nearly empty as most of the remaining successors—the
Speaker of the House, President pro tempore, and incoming and outgoing
Presidents and Vice Presidents—gather within feet of one another for the
inauguration ceremony. An attack or some other catastrophic event at the
inauguration ceremony could leave the country without a clear successor to
the presidency.
Before President Obama’s first inauguration, a credible threat of attack on
the ceremony led officials to prepare for the worst.240 President Bush’s and
President Obama’s respective national security advisors met in the White
House Situation Room on the morning of the inauguration to discuss the
threat.241 President Obama was even given a statement to read in place of
his inaugural address if an attack occurred.242
On Inauguration Day, both the Speaker of the House and President pro
tempore are in place, having assumed their positions when Congress
convenes seventeen days prior on January 3.243 While the outgoing Cabinet
members’ terms do not technically end with the outgoing President’s term at
noon on Inauguration Day, typically most, if not all, have resigned at that
point. Their resignations leave acting secretaries in charge of the
departments, and, as discussed, the current statute leaves acting secretaries’
eligibility as successors unclear.244
Until a President-Elect’s Cabinet members are confirmed, they are not in
the line of succession. By the time of the inauguration, the Senate will have
held hearings for some of the nominees but will not have confirmed any of
238. The first Presidential Succession Clinic recommended that Congress clarify the status
of Acting secretaries and, if it decided to explicitly include acting Secretaries, place them at
the end of the line of succession. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 47.
239. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 41; John Fortier, President
Michael Armacost?: The Continuity of Government After September 11, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Sept. 1, 2003), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/president-michael-armacostthe-continuity-of-government-after-september-11/ [https://perma.cc/X2G8-UFNZ].
240. See Peter Baker, Obama’s War over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 4, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.html
[https://perma.cc/4MXBY34S].
241. Interview with John O. Brennan, supra note 49 (stating that he attended the meeting
and briefed President-Elect Obama the night before the inauguration about the threat).
242. See Michael D. Shear, Obama Had Statement to Read If Terror Halted Inauguration,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2015, 10:38 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/02/
10/obama-had-statement-to-read-if-terror-halted-inauguration/
[https://perma.cc/9JHMERB8].
243. See U.S. CONST. amend XX, § 1.
244. See supra Part III.C.1.
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them.245 Many of the picks will typically be ready for immediate votes on
the Senate floor as soon as the new President takes office and formally
nominates them. The process can be done quickly but will nonetheless take
at least several hours and potentially a few days.246
One approach to addressing this succession gap is delaying the outgoing
Cabinet members’ resignations until after the inauguration or having the
Speaker of the House or President pro tempore stay away from the ceremony.
This approach was followed for the 2017 inauguration when outgoing
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson stayed at his post and President
pro tempore Orrin Hatch did not attend the ceremony.247 But this solution is
problematic when the incoming President and the successors are from
different political parties because succession could cause a disruptive shift in
party control.
A better solution is coordination between the incoming and outgoing
administrations to allow for the confirmation of some incoming Cabinet
secretaries before the inauguration. In advancing this recommendation, the
Clinic concurs with the Continuity of Government Commission, which
recommended that the outgoing President nominate and the Senate confirm
some of the incoming Cabinet secretaries.248
At least four of the President-Elect’s chosen Cabinet members should be
submitted for nomination to the Senate prior to Inauguration Day. Ideally,
these nominees would then be confirmed on the day before or the morning of
the inauguration. It would be preferable for the Senate to confirm as many
of these nominees as possible in the time before the inauguration.
Preconfirmed Cabinet secretaries would lengthen the line of succession and
reduce the likelihood of an outgoing Cabinet secretary or acting secretary
succeeding to the presidency.249
The possibility of partisan conflict impeding a swift preinauguration
confirmation process cannot be ignored. For practical reasons, the PresidentElect should therefore put forth his least controversial nominees. The
President-Elect should prioritize the expeditious confirmation of nominees
for the positions of Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary
of Defense, Attorney General, and Secretary of Homeland Security.
Additionally, at least one of the newly confirmed Cabinet members should

245. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 42.
246. See id. (“In 1989, the Senate did not meet to consider [the new cabinet] nominations
until six days after the inauguration.”).
247. See Jordan Fabian, Jeh Johnson Is Designated Survivor for Inauguration, HILL (Jan.
20, 2017, 12:07 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/315274-jeh-johnson-isdesignated-survivor-for-inauguration [https://perma.cc/DXV3-DSFF]; Press Release, Office
of Senator Orrin Hatch, At the Request of President Trump, Hatch Serves as Designated
Survivor During Inauguration (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/2017/1/at-the-request-of-president-trump-hatch-serves-as-designatedsurvivor-during-inauguration [https://perma.cc/BCE6-USTA].
248. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 186, at 49. The first Presidential
Succession Clinic also endorsed this recommendation. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8,
at 60–61.
249. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 60–61.
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not attend the inauguration and be outside of Washington, D.C., at the time
of the ceremony.
3. Preparing for Succession
The White House should plan for scenarios where the statutory line of
succession is reached, particularly by ensuring that the successors are
prepared. Planning for succession beyond the vice presidency is already in
place. The Central Locator System, an executive branch office created
during the Cold War, tracks successors to the presidency twenty-four hours
a day.250 The system is only one part of extensive plans for continuity of
government.251
However, moments such as Secretary of State Haig’s inaccurate statement
about his position in the line of succession following the Reagan
assassination attempt underscore the importance of preparing successors for
their roles.252 A similar lack of preparedness seemed evident on 9/11. After
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert was evacuated from Washington, D.C.,
he was unable to communicate with the White House.253 Eighty-three-yearold Senate President pro tempore Robert Byrd stood outside the Capitol
talking with reporters before simply going home254 and Vice President
Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld refused to move to secure
locations.255 Comprehensive planning with awareness and cooperation of
successors is critical to avoiding chaos during crises.
IV. DUAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
The Clinic’s proposed reforms to the line of succession would help to
ensure that there are always successors who are prepared to lead the country.
Still, a separate set of reforms is needed to allow those successors to act as
President in certain situations. If the President and Vice President are
disabled simultaneously, there is no legal method to trigger their succession
because an unable Vice President cannot participate with the Cabinet to
invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Similarly, if the Vice President is
disabled, the President cannot use Section 3 to transfer his powers and duties
250. See GRAFF, supra note 49, at xvii–xviii; see also OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK FOR CENTRAL
LOCATOR SYSTEM (1973), https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2010081-umissdoc30.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HFH-M246] (explaining the Central Locator System).
251. See, e.g., Directive on National Continuity Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 547, 547 (May 9,
2007) (calling for a “comprehensive and integrated national continuity program” including
coordination between executive and legislative branches on succession planning); Interview
with John O. Brennan, supra note 49 (stating that tremendous resources have been dedicated
to continuity-of-government planning).
252. See supra Part II.A.I.; see also Richard V. Allen, When Reagan Was Shot, Who Was
“In Control” at the White House?, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/AFJlrfYB_story.html [https://perma.cc/9TA9-Y7BE].
253. See Arkin & Windrem, supra note 73.
254. See GRAFF, supra note 49, at 338.
255. See Arkin & Windrem, supra note 73.
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to the next person in the line of succession.256 This problem is worsened by
the absence of procedures for declaring the Vice President unable.
The prospect of “dual inabilities” of the President and Vice President
lurked behind two of the four presidential assassinations. Vice President
Andrew Johnson was targeted as part of the Lincoln assassination plot in
1865.257 When President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, Vice President
Lyndon Johnson was “in an open convertible” two cars behind the
Kennedys.258 Beyond these historical illustrations, the danger of a dual
inability is evident from the fact that all Presidents and Vice Presidents are
frequently in close proximity to one another, including when they are
working in the West Wing.259
Additionally, many Vice Presidents have suffered debilitating health
problems. One analysis found that “20 of the 47 individuals who have served
as vice president have suffered from apparent incapacity or experienced a
‘near miss’ that could have resulted in their incapacity.”260 And seven Vice
Presidents have died in office.261
The Clinic recommends that Congress pass legislation with procedures for
declaring (1) a dual inability of the President and the Vice President,
including where there is no Vice President and (2) a sole inability of the Vice
President. These procedures should be modeled on the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment’s inability procedures.
This Part first describes the Clinic’s proposed dual inability statute. It then
discusses the Clinic’s proposed vice presidential inability statute.262
A. Proposed Statute for Dual Inability
The Clinic recommends the following statute, modeled after Section 4 of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, to provide for scenarios in which both the
President and the Vice President are unable.263
256. Congress considered including provisions for dual and vice presidential inability in
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. However, those provisions were excluded in light of concerns
that adding complexity to the Amendment would decrease its chances of ratification. See
Feerick, supra note 175, at 909; see also Letter from John D. Feerick to Rep. Richard Poff,
FORDHAM
L.
ARCHIVE
SCHOLARSHIP
&
HIST.
(Feb.
7,
1965),
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=twentyfifth_amend
ment_correspondence [https://perma.cc/EZ25-49DS] (suggesting a provision to cover
simultaneous inabilities).
257. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 16, at 109–10.
258. Id. at 4–5.
259. See The Vice President’s Residence & Office, WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/vp-residence [https://perma.cc/L4Q3-W8PH] (last visited
Nov. 19, 2017).
260. Roy E. Brownell II, Vice Presidential Inability: Historical Episodes That Highlight
a Significant Constitutional Problem, 46 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 434, 452 (2016).
261. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 31. No Vice Presidents have
died in office since 1912. Id. at 313–14.
262. The Clinic believes that the statute designed to fill the gaps posed by a dual disability
scenario and the statute designed to fill the gaps of a vice presidential inability could be
implemented individually or as one consolidated statute.
263. The first Presidential Succession Clinic also proposed a statute modeled after the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to address dual inabilities. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at
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Definition of Statutory Successor—
For purposes of this statute, a “Statutory Successor” shall be defined as
the highest-ranking official in the line of succession after the Vice
President, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 19.
Dual Inability of a President and a Vice President—
Whenever the Statutory Successor and a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress
may by law provide, transmit to the majority and minority leaders of
both Houses of Congress their written declaration that the President and
the Vice President are both unable to discharge the powers and duties
of their offices, the Statutory Successor shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the presidency as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the majority and minority
leaders of both Houses of Congress a written declaration that his
inability does not exist, the President shall resume the powers and
duties of his office. Alternatively, when the Vice President transmits
to the majority and minority leaders of both Houses of Congress a
written declaration that his inability does not exist, the Vice President
shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President. However, following either a declaration by President or
Vice President, if the Statutory Successor and a majority of the
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the majority
and minority leaders of both houses their written declaration that both
the President and the Vice President are unable to discharge the powers
and duties of their offices, Congress shall decide the issue, assembling
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days
after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote
of both Houses that the President and the Vice President are unable to
discharge the powers and duties of their offices, the Statutory Successor
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
Presidential Inability with a Vacancy in the Office of the Vice President—
Whenever there is no Vice President, and the Statutory Successor and
a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments
or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the
majority and minority leaders of both Houses of Congress their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Statutory Successor shall immediately assume
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

27–31. We add to that recommendation by proposing statutory language for these
contingencies. In Roy Brownell’s article in this issue, he outlines an approach for policymakers to follow if a dual inability occurs in the absence of statutory procedures for handling
it. See generally Roy E. Brownell II, What to Do If Simultaneous Presidential and Vice
Presidential Inability Struck Today, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1027 (2017).
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Thereafter, when the President transmits to the majority and minority
leaders of both Houses of Congress a written declaration that his
inability does not exist, the President shall resume the powers and
duties of his office unless the Statutory Successor and a majority of the
Cabinet or of such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit within four days to the majority and minority leadership of
both houses their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress
shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that
purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after
receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session,
within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble,
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Statutory
Successor shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President;
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his
office.

The proposed statute follows the framework of Section 4 of the TwentyFifth Amendment to cover three dual inability scenarios: (1) dual inability
of both the President and the Vice President; (2) a presidential inability when
there is no Vice President; and (3) a situation in which the Vice President
becomes disabled while serving as Acting President. The third contingency
is a dual inability scenario because, under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the
President would remain President as the Vice President is serving as Acting
President.
The proposed statute has two key provisions. First, it provides that the
Statutory Successor, the highest official in the statutory line of succession,
shall declare when a dual inability exists before serving as Acting President
in consultation with the Cabinet or another body appointed by Congress.
Although the Speaker of the House is the first official in the line of
succession, the proposed statute does not explicitly designate the Speaker to
participate in a dual inability declaration. It is likely that the Speaker would
carry out that function, but the phrase “Statutory Successor” provides for a
scenario where the Speaker is unable to participate. In such a scenario, the
next eligible successor to the presidency would be the Statutory Successor.
Second, the proposed statute provides that the President or Vice President
can declare an end to their inabilities. However, if the Statutory Successor
and a majority of the Cabinet disagree, Congress will “decide the issue”
within twenty-one days. This provision protects against usurpations of
presidential power while providing a check on disabled Presidents and Vice
Presidents who do not recognize that they are incapacitated.
The statute follows a slightly different notification procedure than Section
4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Instead of notifying the Speaker of the
House and Senate President pro tempore of the dual inability and transfer of
power,264 the Statutory Successor and Cabinet notify the majority and
minority leaders of both houses of Congress. Because the Speaker of the
264. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
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House and President pro tempore are the first two officials in the line of
succession,265 one would likely fill the role of the Statutory Successor in a
dual disability scenario. It would make little sense for the Statutory
Successor to send notification to himself.
B. Constitutional and Practical Justification
for Dual Inability Statute
Congress has constitutional authority to enact the Clinic’s proposed
statute, and the procedure that the statute provides has a firm practical basis.
1. Constitutional Basis
The Succession Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause support
Congress’s authority to create procedures for determining dual inabilities.
a. The Succession Clause
The Succession Clause is the principal constitutional source of
congressional authority to enact legislation relating to presidential
succession. In addition to designating the Vice President as the first
successor to the presidency, the Clause provides that Congress “may by Law
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President.”266 Although the Clause does not explicitly authorize Congress to
establish procedures to declare a dual inability, that power is arguably
implicit in the power to designate a successor in the event of a dual
inability.267
Congress broadly exercised this power in the three acts dealing with the
line of presidential succession.268 In all three statutes, Congress went beyond
the textual mandate to declare an official to act as President in the event of a
dual vacancy or inability. The Presidential Succession Act of 1792, for
example, provided for a special election to fill dual vacancies that occurred
more than a year before the expiration of the President’s term.269 The
Presidential Succession Act of 1886 implemented protocols for dealing with
inabilities when Congress was not in session. It provided that a successor
should issue a proclamation calling Congress to convene for an extraordinary
session.270 Finally, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 addressed
separation of powers concerns by imposing a resignation requirement on any
legislator who becomes Acting President.271

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b) (2012).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 1033.
See Feerick, supra note 90, at 20.
RONAN, supra note 162, at 8.
Id. at 24; RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 120–21 (1951).
RONAN, supra note 162, at 34.
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b. The Necessary and Proper Clause
The interaction between the Succession Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause provides additional support for Congress’s authority to create
procedures for determining a dual inability.272 The Necessary and Proper
Clause empowers Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or any
Department or Officer thereof.”273 The Clause has been interpreted as
granting Congress broad discretion to enact laws in furtherance of other
provisions in the Constitution.274
In McCulloch v. Maryland,275 the U.S. Supreme Court described the power
granted to Congress by the Necessary and Proper Clause as contingent on
means that are “plainly adapted to [their] end.”276 Laws enacted under the
Clause’s authority must be incidental or implied by another provision in the
Constitution.277 Unless otherwise inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution, any law that is appropriate to carry into effect any of the powers
of the federal government is valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause.278
The power to provide a way to declare a dual inability is arguably implied
from the Succession Clause.
2. Practical Basis: The Contingent Grant-of-Power Theory
and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
Prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification, legal scholars debated
who had the authority to determine whether a presidential inability existed,279
with some believing that the Vice President had the power to make this
determination.280 This view relied, in part, on the contingent grant-of-power
theory, which holds that implied in the power to act under certain
contingencies is the power to declare when such contingencies exist.281
272. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 29.
273. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
274. See William Baude, Sharing the Necessary and Proper Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV.
39, 42–43 (2014). Scholars have interpreted the Necessary and Proper Clause as vesting in
Congress the sole authority to affirm any ancillary powers of other branches that are not
provided in Articles II or III or necessarily implied by the nature of the duties of those
departments. See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental
Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of
“The Sweeping Clause,” 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788, 807 (1975).
275. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
276. Id. at 421.
277. Id.
278. Id. (“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”).
279. See Participation of the Vice President in the Affairs of the Exec. Branch, 1 Op. O.L.C.
Supp. 214, 214 (1961).
280. See id.; SILVA, supra note 270, at 101; Herbert Brownell Jr., Presidential Disability:
The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68 YALE L.J. 189, 197 (1958).
281. See Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 89 (1961); FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH
AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 323–33; Feerick, supra note 175, at 913–14.
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Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is rooted in the contingent
grant-of-power theory. Because the Vice President has the power to act as
President in the case of inability, he is a judge of that inability. However,
Congress imposed an additional restraint by requiring the Vice President to
coordinate with the Cabinet or another body to make the inability
determination.282 The restraint serves many purposes, including encouraging
the Vice President to take appropriate action by providing him with
additional political support283 and preventing attempts to usurp presidential
power.
The Clinic’s proposed statute reflects the rationale behind Section 4 by
extending the contingent grant of power to the next highest official in the line
of succession. It incorporates a check on that official by requiring the
participation of the Cabinet or a congressionally created body.
C. Proposed Statute for Vice Presidential Inability
The Clinic’s proposed vice presidential inability statute mirrors Sections 3
and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, providing mechanisms for both a
voluntary and involuntary declaration of vice presidential inability.284 The
proposed statute provides as follows:
Definition of Statutory Successor
For purposes of this statute, a “Statutory Successor” shall be defined as
the highest-ranking official in the line of succession after the Vice
President, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 19.
Voluntary Declaration of Inability; Office of Vice President
Whenever the Vice President transmits to the President and to the
majority and minority leaders of both Houses of Congress his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until the Vice President transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, the powers and duties of his office pursuant
to Sections Three and Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment shall be
discharged by the Statutory Successor.
Involuntary Declaration of Inability; Office of Vice President
Whenever the President and a majority of either the principal officers
of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by
law provide, transmit to the majority and minority leaders of both
Houses of Congress their written declaration that the Vice President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall immediately cease to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, and until the Vice President transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties of his office under
282. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
283. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 989.
284. The first Presidential Succession Clinic declined to recommend a statute to address
vice presidential inability out of concern that there was not a sufficient constitutional basis for
such a statute. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 34–35.
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Sections Three and Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment shall be
discharged by the Statutory Successor.
Thereafter, when the Vice President transmits to the majority and
minority leaders of both Houses of Congress his written declaration
that no inability exists, the Vice President shall resume the powers and
duties of his office unless the President and a majority of either the
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the majority
and minority leaders of both Houses of Congress their written
declaration that the Vice President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue,
assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session.
If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter
written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one
days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds
vote of both Houses that the Vice President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the powers and duties of his office
under Section Three and Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment shall be
discharged by the Statutory Successor; otherwise, the Vice President
shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

The proposed statute’s voluntary declaration provision is modeled after
Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and could be used in a similar
manner to temporarily transfer the Vice President’s powers and duties powers
and duties under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. However, brief transfers of
power for routine surgical procedures, such as President George W. Bush’s
uses of Section 3,285 may not be necessary or wise absent a need for the
Statutory Successor to act as President.
The involuntary inability declaration provision is nearly identical to
Section 4, except that the President takes the Vice President’s role in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment process. While granting the President the power
to determine vice presidential inability raises concerns that he might abuse
his authority over the Cabinet to influence their decision, the Clinic believes
that public accountability and the secondary check of Congress will provide
sufficient balance, just as in Section 4.
When power is transferred under the proposed statute, the Statutory
Successor assumes the Vice President’s powers and duties under Sections 3
and 4: the power to serve as Acting President after a voluntary declaration
of inability by the President and the power to participate in declaring a
presidential inability. The Statutory Successor’s discharge of these
responsibilities would, in essence, allow for the use of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment’s inability provisions, which require an able Vice President.
The Clinic does not believe that the Statutory Successor should exercise any
of the Vice President’s other responsibilities.
The Statutory Successor would likely be either the Speaker of the House
or the Senate President pro tempore, the top two officials in the current line
of succession. Both are required by the Incompatibility Clause and the line285. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 202–03.
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of-succession statute to resign their positions to act as President.286 They
would not be required to resign from Congress to participate in the proposed
statute’s process of declaring the President unable. The Incompatibility
Clause prohibits legislators from holding an “Office,”287 but participating in
the inability process does not involve holding any such “Office.” If the
inability process resulted in a determination that the President was unable,
the Statutory Successor, if he or she were a member of Congress, would have
to resign to act as President.
1. Constitutional Basis
The constitutional authority for this proposed legislation is based on the
Succession Clause the principle that a continually functioning executive
branch must be maintained, and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
a. The Succession Clause
The Succession Clause supports Congress’s authority to create procedures
for declaring vice presidential inabilities. The Clause states, in relevant part,
“Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation
or Inability, both of the President and Vice President.”288 The Clinic submits
that the phrase “both of the President and Vice President” includes authority
for Congress to act in the case of inability of the President and Vice
President—individually—because it would be impossible to declare a dual
inability without declaring each individual disabled.
Furthermore, Congress’s authority under the Succession Clause to
“provide” for dual inabilities arguably includes the power to prevent dual
inabilities from occurring. As discussed, if the Vice President is disabled,
there is no other official empowered to participate with the Cabinet to declare
the President disabled.289 Without the ability to transfer the Vice President’s
duties under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, any type of presidential inability
could paralyze the executive branch.
b. Executive Continuity Principle
That the framers envisioned the presidency to be a continually functioning
part of the government provides a compelling structural argument for
Congress’s authority to pass a vice presidential inability statute.290 The
286. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)–(b) (2012).
287. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
288. Id. art. II, §. 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
289. See Brownell, supra note 260, at 436.
290. Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential SelfPardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 793 n.87 (1996) (“Constitutional structuralists . . . look at text
and context, stressing the ways in which various provisions (explicit and implicit) interrelate.
Instead of treating the Constitution as a series of disjointed, unrelated clauses, they treat it as
a whole, looking to the structure of constitutional government, stressing its internal
consistency and recurring themes.”).
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continuous nature of the presidency is clear from the lack of any recess or
adjournment provisions, such as those pertaining to Congress.291
Additionally, the Constitution includes three distinct measures for ensuring
executive continuity in the Constitution: the Succession Clause, the vice
presidency, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
The Succession Clause provides Congress with the legislative power to
ensure that there is always an able President.292 The provision facilitates a
transition to a successor in the absence of a capable President. The language
“the same shall devolve” immediately vests the powers and duties of the
presidency in the successor.293 In contrast, vacancies in the legislative and
judicial branches are filled through more elaborate, slow-moving processes,
such as special elections for congressional vacancies and presidential
nomination and congressional confirmation for judges.294 The executive
branch is also unique in that the President is the only official with a
constitutionally designated successor, the Vice President.295
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment furthered the Constitution’s emphasis on
continuity of the executive branch by providing procedures designed to
ensure that there is always someone able to discharge the powers and duties
of the presidency.296
Continuity of the executive branch is a structural principle that is inherent
in the Constitution, and the advancement of this principle supports
congressional action to provide for vice presidential inability. The Vice
President serves two roles that are critical to ensuring continuity of the
executive branch: he is the first successor to the presidency and
indispensable to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s inability procedures.
Accordingly, Congress has the authority to pass a statute to ensure that there
is someone to carry out these functions, which may become essential to
maintaining executive branch continuity.
c. Necessary and Proper Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause supports the enactment of a vice
presidential inability statute. Such a statute furthers Congress’s power under
the Succession Clause because declaring the Vice President unable could be
essential to allowing the next person in the statutory line of succession to act
as President.297 Additionally, addressing vice presidential inability is
important to ensuring that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s provisions can
function in practice, as an able Vice President is essential to Sections 3 and
291. Interview with Akhil Reed Amar, supra note 225.
292. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
293. Id.
294. See id. art. II, § 2; id. amend. XVII.
295. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. The Constitution requires the Senate to choose a President
pro tempore “in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of
President of the United States,” but does not designate a specific official to succeed to the
position. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
296. See id. amend. XXV.
297. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 34–35.
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4. Finally, as with a dual-inability statute, a vice presidential inability statute
furthers the general constitutional imperative to maintain the functioning of
the federal government.
2. Precedential Authority
Congress has previously implemented mechanisms for fulfilling
constitutional duties in the absence of an express constitutional mandate. For
example, there is no provision in the Constitution that specifically grants
Congress investigatory powers or contempt powers.298 Yet the Supreme
Court has consistently held that these powers are inherently necessary to
effectuate Congress’s duty to legislate.299 To pass laws, Congress must
gather and analyze information.300 Thus, Congress must have the power to
conduct investigations.301 Similarly, any request for information to a third
party would be an empty request without the power to enforce compliance.302
It is similarly appropriate for the most democratically representative
branch of government to provide procedures that fill gaps necessary to
effectuate the spirit of the Constitution. The enactment of a statute to fill a
vacancy in another branch of government is consistent with this notion. For
example, the statute entitled “Vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice;
disability”303 allows the most senior Associate Justice to occupy the position
of Chief Justice if the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties.304 While
there is no explicit grant of such power in the Constitution, the statute is an
appropriate means of ensuring continuity within the judicial branch. A
statute providing for vice presidential inability would similarly promote
continuity within the executive branch.
3. Alternatives
The Clinic considered various alternatives to address vice presidential
inability, including prospective declarations of inability, impeachment, and a
range of parties other than the Cabinet and President who could possibly
determine a Vice President’s inability.

298. ALISSA M. DOLAN & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34114, CONGRESS’S
CONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: A SKETCH 2
(2014).
299. See id. at 2 n.11 (“In short, there can be no question that Congress has a right—derived
from its Article I legislative function—to issue and enforce subpoenas, and a corresponding
right to the information that is the subject of such subpoenas. Several Supreme Court decisions
have confirmed that fact.” (quoting Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 84
(D.D.C. 2008))).
300. Id. at 2.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. 28 U.S.C. § 3 (2012).
304. Id.
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a. Prospective Declarations
of Inability and Resignation
Prospective declarations of inability, like those the Clinic recommends the
President create,305 and letter agreements, like those between Presidents and
Vice Presidents before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,306 would be difficult
to use to address vice presidential inability.307 While prospective
declarations addressing a President’s inability are consistent with Section 3
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, there is no clear constitutional authority for
prospective letters drafted by the Vice President. At most, such declarations
are informal mechanisms that lack the force of law. Letter agreements would
also have a tenuous legal basis. When Presidents used the agreements to
authorize their Vice Presidents to declare them unable, the Vice Presidents
arguably had the authority to make such declarations under the contingent
grant-of-power theory.308 There is no similarly situated individual in a vice
presidential inability scenario.
Prospective resignation letters, like those drafted by Vice President Dick
Cheney, may encounter legal and practical difficulties.309 Cheney’s
arrangement gave his counsel and President Bush the authority to determine
whether to submit the presigned resignation letter.310 The statute that
describes the procedure for vice presidential resignations does not require the
Vice President or any specified person to submit the Vice President’s
resignation letter.311 But it would be unreasonable to interpret that
unaddressed detail as allowing the Vice President to designate the authority
to determine when to trigger his resignation. The statute allows someone to
carry out the ministerial task of delivering the Vice President’s letter at the
Vice President’s instruction; a grant of discretion to determine whether
prospective resignation letter arrangements should be executed, however,
may require explicit statutory or constitutional authorization, which does not
currently exist.312
b. Impeachment
Impeachment is not an appropriate response to vice presidential or dual
inabilities.313 The Constitution envisions impeachment as the remedy for
serious misconduct by the President, Vice President, other executive branch
officials, and federal judges, and its use to address inability may prove
305. See supra Part II.A.
306. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 31–32.
307. Interview with Roy E. Brownell II, Washington, D.C., Attorney, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct.
24, 2016); see FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 79.
308. See Feerick, supra note 175, at 914.
309. Interview with Roy E. Brownell II, supra note 307.
310. See, e.g., FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 203–04.
311. See 3 U.S.C. § 20 (2012) (“The only evidence of . . . a resignation of the office of . . .
Vice President, shall be an instrument in writing, declaring the same, and subscribed by the
person . . . resigning, . . . and delivered into the office of the Secretary of State.”).
312. Interview with Roy E. Brownell II, supra note 307.
313. See First Clinic Report, supra note 8, at 35.
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challenging.314 Two judges who appeared to be alcoholics have been
impeached (and one removed),315 but at least one of those impeachments was
still tied to misconduct, not necessarily to alcoholism in and of itself.316
Impeachment should be based on intentional conduct, not physical or mental
disabilities.
c. Alternative Parties
The Clinic considered whether individuals other than Cabinet members
should participate with the President in declaring the Vice President disabled.
i. Senate
The Vice President’s constitutional relationship with the Senate, as
President of that chamber,317 led the Clinic to consider involving Senators in
the disability process. Unlike Cabinet members, Senators do not serve at the
pleasure of the President, so they might be more likely to exercise
independent judgment if they worked with the President to declare the Vice
President unable.
However, Senators could politicize and prolong the process. Their
involvement would also raise separation of powers concerns. Concerns about
the President placing undue influence are addressed through the proposed
statute’s provision for the Vice President to appeal to Congress.
ii. Vice President’s Staff
The Vice President’s staff could bring firsthand knowledge of the Vice
President’s condition to the process that the Cabinet does not have. But staff
members lack the public accountability of Cabinet members, whom the
Senate confirms.318 Cabinet members are also better known to the public.
Accordingly, a determination by the Cabinet is likely to carry more
legitimacy.

314. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”); Interview with Roy E. Brownell
II, supra note 307 (stating that inability may fall outside of the parameters of the power to
impeach). See generally Charles L. Black Jr., The Impeachable Offense, LAWFARE (July 20,
2017, 2:00 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/impeachable-offense [https://perma.cc/L5RDJLWJ].
315. Interview with Roy E. Brownell II, supra note 307; see also Impeachments of Federal
Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/impeachments-federal-judges
[https://perma.cc/9N4E-ZMC2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017) (stating that Judges John
Pickering and Mark W. Delahay were impeached, in part, for “intoxication”).
316. See WM. HOLMES BROWN ET AL., HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES,
PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 593 (2003) (stating that Judge Pickering was
also impeached for “errors in a trial” and for “using profane language”).
317. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
318. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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V. CONGRESS’S ROLE UNDER SECTION 4
OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
While dual and vice presidential inability are “gaps” left unaddressed by
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Clinic also addressed gaps within the
Amendment itself, particularly Section 4. The Amendment’s framers
envisioned that Section 4 would cover “the most difficult cases of inability—
when the President cannot or does not declare his own inability.”319 If the
President disputes a declaration by the Vice President and a majority of the
Cabinet that he is unable, Section 4 tasks Congress with “decid[ing] the
issue” within twenty-one days.320 The Clinic recommends a joint committee
procedure that will govern any congressional action under Section 4.
The Amendment’s legislative history indicates that Congress has the
discretion to create its own procedures for a Section 4 scenario.321 Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach testified to the Senate that Congress should
address these procedural issues “at a time when [a Section 4 dispute is] not
before it, providing in advance for this problem and providing for the most
expeditious procedure.”322
Despite this suggestion, Congress has not yet created such procedures,
likely because Section 4 has never been invoked. If a Section 4 dispute were
before Congress, however, it could not afford to take up much, if any, of its
twenty-one days debating the procedure it would follow.323 Given the high
stakes,324 Congress should provide a Section 4 procedure as soon as
possible—before such a dispute occurs.
The Clinic’s proposal for a Section 4 procedure is not merely academic.
Disagreements in the executive branch over presidential disability have
occurred.325 For example, after a stroke incapacitated President Woodrow

319. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 115.
320. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
321. See S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 3–4 (1965) (“[T]he proceedings in the Congress prescribed
in section [4] would be pursued under rules prescribed, or to be prescribed, by the Congress
itself.”); see also id. at 24.
322. Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearing on S.J.
Res. 1 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 22 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearing].
323. The risk of failing to plan for invocations of the Amendment is illustrated by the first
implementation of Section 2’s vice presidential nomination process in the wake of Vice
President Spiro Agnew’s 1973 resignation. Debate erupted in the Senate over how it would
consider Gerald Ford’s nomination, leading one Senator to lament, “we have proven to the
country that we are the kind of body that, in many of their minds, they think we are.” FEERICK,
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 141.
324. Conjuring the challenges of a Section 4 dispute, Richard E. Neustadt stated, “Think of
Capitol Hill in those three weeks, to say nothing of after; the factions, the hearings, and the
rival medical teams could create a circus for the media. Think of the Executive Office of the
President, with its rival staffs working against one another.” Richard E. Neustadt, The TwentyFifth Amendment and Its Achilles Heel, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 427, 432 (1995).
325. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 4–24 (discussing
Presidents who suffered disabilities). There are also examples of executive disability on the
state level. See FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 16, at 286–91. For example, when
Louisiana Governor Earl K. Long displayed signs of mental illness in 1959, his wife, cousin,
and doctor committed him to a Texas psychiatric hospital. He was later brought to a Louisiana
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Wilson for the final year and a half of his term, Wilson, his wife, and closest
associates concealed his condition and rejected suggestions that he should
step aside. Wilson even fired Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who had
suggested that the Vice President should act as President and convened
Cabinet meetings to conduct government business.326
This Part first discusses guiding principles that the Clinic considered in
drafting its proposal. It then outlines the recommended procedure and
justifications for it. This Part concludes with an exploration of legal issues
that could arise during a Section 4 dispute.
A. Guiding Principles
There are five principles that a congressional procedure implementing
Section 4 should satisfy. An ideal procedure will maximize informed
deliberations with efficiency, democratic legitimacy, fairness to the
President, and constitutional morality. These principles are distilled from the
text of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment itself and its legislative history.
1. Informed Deliberations
Congress’s mandate to “decide” a disagreement between the President and
the Vice President suggests that any congressional procedure under Section
4 must utilize Congress’s core attribute: making collective decisions through
reasoned deliberation. Moreover, the Amendment’s legislative history
makes clear that members of Congress would vote on the issue only after
informed debate and an opportunity to persuade each other.327 Any
procedure should preserve the opportunity for members of Congress to
meaningfully participate in the process and ensure they can access the best
information available to aid in their deliberation.
2. Urgency and Efficiency
A competing consideration is the need for efficiency required by the
circumstances and, in particular, Section 4’s twenty-one-day time frame.
Even before the twenty-one-day limit was added, Senator Birch Bayh
testified that “the purpose and intent of [the congressional review provision]
is for Congress to decide the issue as quickly as possible.”328 The urgency
informed some members’ reluctance to assign the decision to Congress at all,

hospital but secured his release by replacing the superintendent of hospitals with a political
ally. See id. at 289–91.
326. FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 15–16.
327. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 46 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh)
(warning that a time limit for Congress to make a decision could lead to an undesirable
situation where “a decision [is made] without any debate whatsoever”); 1965 Senate Hearing,
supra note 322, at 21 (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska); see also infra Part V.B.2 (discussing
the filibuster, which implies awareness of congressional debate).
328. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 42 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
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as the process of taking testimony and debating is “cumbersome.”329
Consequently, the process should avoid procedural mechanisms that risk
unnecessary delay.
3. Democratic and Procedural Legitimacy
The Amendment’s legislative history also prioritizes the legitimacy of a
disability determination in the eyes of the public. The Amendment’s framers
made Congress the arbiter of a dispute over the President’s capacity to instill
confidence in the outcome by lending the people a voice through their
representatives.330 Any congressional procedure should aspire to a fair and
reasonable determination of the President’s disability that engenders public
confidence.
4. Fairness to the President
In crafting Section 4, Congress acknowledged that the President, carrying
the electoral mandate of the people, deserves “every advantage in any action
or contemplated action.”331 Congress expressed this deference by allowing
the President to challenge involuntary removal, establishing a two-thirds vote
requirement in each house to remove the President from the powers and
duties of the office, and providing for the President’s automatic resumption
of powers and duties if Congress does not decide the issue in twenty-one
days.332 Consequently, any congressional proceeding under Section 4 should
ensure a fair process for the President and respect his or her democratic
legitimacy.
5. “Constitutional Morality” and Deterring Partisanship
Finally, Section 4’s success depends on every stakeholder working for the
best interests of the country with “a sense of ‘constitutional morality,’” free
from partisanship and self-interest.333 The Clinic acknowledges that even
those congressional actions that carry a heightened expectation for

329. See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 322, at 21–23 (statement of Sen. Roman
Hruska) (warning that time would not be served by having Congress in the picture of a
presidential disability because of the inherent delay of congressional debate).
330. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 47 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (“[T]he
powers which have been given to the President by all the people [should not] be taken away
from him without the representatives of the people having a voice.”); 111 CONG. REC. 7943
(1965) (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (stating that “the elected representative[s] of the
people . . . share the greatest trust of the people”).
331. See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearings on
S.J. Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 4–5 (1964) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) [hereinafter 1964 Senate
Hearings]; 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler) (“The [Amendment]
shall . . . be in favor of the President because he is the elected representative of the people,
the first officer of the land, and he shall be favored without doubt.”).
332. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 987–89, 988 n.159.
333. See S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965).
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nonpartisanship are increasingly susceptible to partisan brinksmanship.334
As the 1965 Senate Judiciary Committee Report on presidential inability
noted, however, “[n]o . . . procedural solution will provide a complete answer
if [it is derived from] hypothetical cases in which most of the parties are
rogues . . . .”335 Any Section 4 process should minimize the possibility of
political mischief but presume that even the best efforts to deter partisanship
will ultimately rely upon faith in government leaders.336
B. Recommendation for a Congressional
Procedure Under Section 4
In light of these guiding principles, the House of Representatives and the
Senate should pass a concurrent resolution and amend their standing rules to
allow for the establishment of a joint committee to evaluate presidential
disability pursuant to Section 4.
1. Format of the Proceedings
a. Proposal for a Joint Committee
Following a declaration to Congress by the Vice President and a majority
of the Cabinet (“or by such other body as Congress may by law provide”)
that the President is unable to discharge his duties pursuant to Section 4,
Congress shall immediately establish a joint select committee (the “Joint
Committee”) to determine the President’s ability to discharge the powers and
duties of his office. The Joint Committee shall operate as a cohesive unit
with a unified staff and a single budget,337 review the necessary
documentation, and conduct the necessary hearings to determine whether the
President is unable.
The Joint Committee shall consist of twelve members: six members from
the Senate Rules Committee and six members from the House Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice.338 The
Joint Committee shall consist of six Republicans and six Democrats. The
334. See Telephone Interview with M. Douglass Bellis, Senior Counsel, Office of the
Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 11, 2017) (observing that even
purportedly “solemn” congressional actions are shaped by political pressures).
335. See S. REP. NO. 89-66, 13; see also 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 322, at 64
(statement of Herbert Brownell, former Att’y Gen.) (arguing that the risk of filibuster in a
Section 4 scenario was “unrealistic” because presidential disability “would be a national
crisis” in which Congress “always rise[s] to [its] best heights”).
336. Moreover, the partisan lines in this instance are likely unclear, as a Section 4 scenario
only arises when a politician of the President’s own party—the Vice President—and Cabinet
officials of the President’s own choosing initiate the process in the first place.
337. The Joint Committee will also have access to the appropriate resources, including
physicians and medical experts, to assist it in making a determination.
338. The Clinic recommends that the members of both Committees and their staff receive
special training on their responsibilities in the event that they are appointed to the Joint
Committee. Staff members should also conduct periodic meetings aimed at refining the
congressional response to a Section 4 dispute.
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members from the House Judiciary’s Subcommittee shall be chosen by the
Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, and the members from the Senate
Rules Committee shall be chosen by the Senate Majority and Minority
Leaders in consultation with the Chairmen and ranking members of the
respective committees.339 The Joint Committee shall have two cochairs, one
from the Senate and one from the House, each from a different party.
Additionally, Senators or Representatives not participating in the inquiry
shall have the opportunity to submit questions to the Joint Committee before
and during its proceedings.
Upon completing its inquiry, the Joint Committee shall vote on whether
the President is able to discharge his powers and duties. Irrespective of the
vote, the Joint Committee shall report its determination, accompanied by a
report of the committee’s findings and recommendations, to both houses of
Congress for debate and a final vote.
b. Justifications for a Bipartisan Joint Committee Established
from the Senate Rules and House Judiciary Committees
The proposed Joint Committee is supported by precedent and practical
considerations.
i. Joint Committee
Although Congress typically operates via committees working
independently in each house of Congress, there is clear historical precedent
for a joint committee of this kind. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, for
example, Congress investigated the incident by establishing a ten-member
joint committee composed of three Democrats and two Republicans from
each house of Congress.340 A joint congressional action was also utilized
during the investigation of the Iran-Contra affair,341 where special select
committees were established in the Senate and the House to investigate the
scandal, and both committees “agreed to combine their investigations and
hearings.”342
Joint congressional action also draws from previous recommendations for
congressional procedures under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
which requires confirmation of the President’s nominee from both houses of
Congress to fill a vacancy in the vice presidency.343 When Congress was
tasked with considering Gerald Ford’s nomination in 1973, a strong minority
of the Senate Rules and Judiciary Committees supported creating a joint
339. To incorporate the House Rules and Senate Judiciary Committees as much as possible,
the Clinic advises that the majority and minority leaders in each House appoint the Chairmen
and ranking members of each committee to the Joint Committee.
340. See generally Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Pearl
Harbor.htm [https://perma.cc/2W8L-PZS2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
341. LEE H. HAMILTON ET AL., REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
INVESTIGATING THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR 683–84 (1987).
342. Id. at 684.
343. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
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committee.344 Similarly, in 1975, the American Bar Association’s Special
Committee on Election Reform (the “ABA Committee”) recommended that
future Section 2 confirmation proceedings consist of joint hearings conducted
by the Senate Rules and House Judiciary Committees.345 To support its
recommendation, the ABA Committee cited the redundant process by which
the House and Senate committees conducted hearings, independent of each
other, to confirm Vice Presidents Gerald Ford and Nelson D. Rockefeller.346
Historical precedent aside, the proposed Joint Committee best conforms to
the guiding principles set forth above. First, the Joint Committee would
satisfy Congress’s intent that it “decide the issue as quickly as possible”347
by avoiding duplicative hearings in each House of Congress.348 Second, the
Joint Committee would enhance the legitimacy of the process: departing
from routine, a single committee process sends a message to the public that
Congress is aware of the gravity of the situation.349 Third, hearings before
the Joint Committee would maintain fairness to the President by reducing the
burden on him to argue his case twice. Fourth, the Joint Committee’s unified
record would enhance the deliberative process by ensuring that each House
of Congress is making decisions based on a common set of facts.
ii. Bipartisan Members from the Senate Rules
and House Judiciary Committees
Practical considerations also support the conclusion that Joint Committee
members should be drawn from the Senate Rules and House Judiciary
Committees, since those Committees have jurisdiction over matters of

344. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 139–40. The idea
acknowledged the House members’ concerns that they would be overshadowed by the Senate.
Id.
345. Examination of the First Implementation of Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment: Hearing on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 142–43 (1975) (statement of the American Bar
Association) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearing].
346. See id. at 143 (noting that the Senate Rules and House Judiciary Committees “each
drew on [the same] investigatory arms of the government and covered much of the same
ground,” resulting in a fifty-five-day absence of a Vice President before Congress confirmed
Gerald Ford under Section 2); id. at 144 (statement of John D. Feerick) (“[H]ad a single joint
hearing been in effect at the time of the Rockefeller nomination, it might have [proceeded]
with more expedition.”).
347. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 42 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
348. See 1975 Senate Hearing, supra note 345, at 143–44 (statement American Bar
Association) (“A joint inquiry . . . would eliminate duplication of effort . . . [and] increase the
effectiveness of the inquiry, since the resources of both Houses would be combined,
coordinated and utilized to best advantage.” (emphasis added)).
349. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 140 (outlining the
argument that joint hearings under Section 2 would “lift the nomination ‘out of normal
legislative procedures’ and put ‘it on a higher plane of constitutional prerogative’” (quoting
119 CONG. REC. 33,793 (1973) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)); id. at 141 (noting Senator
Joseph Biden’s concern that “we must impress upon the American people that we do not think
[a Section 2 proceeding] is business as usual”).
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presidential succession.350 Allowing legislators and staff members with
expertise in this area would make the process more efficient and effective.351
There is also precedent for bipartisan committees. For example, the Senate
Select Committee on Ethics is divided evenly between the parties.352
Additionally, a bipartisan committee increases legitimacy by guarding
against the appearance and effect of political motives. Finally, even if the
gravity of the situation alone cannot do this, public scrutiny will likely
minimize any gridlock that could arise from the evenly divided committee.
iii. Noncommittee Members Submitting
Questions to the Joint Committee
Allowing other members of Congress to submit questions for the Joint
Committee to ask witnesses, at the cochairs’ discretion, has a close analogue
in the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on
Impeachment.353 The ability to submit questions to the cochairs would likely
help satisfy concerns that the procedure is shutting noncommittee members
out of the fact-finding process.354
2. Expedited Procedures for the Committee’s Work
and for Consideration in Both Houses
Given Section 4’s twenty-one-day time frame, the Joint Committee should
conduct its inquiry as quickly as possible to provide the full Congress enough
time to evaluate its findings. Therefore, the Joint Committee shall be
established in the first two days of the twenty-one-day period. The Joint
Committee should also complete its inquiry and vote within the first sixteen
days, allowing the full Congress five days to debate and vote. During this
five-day period, Senators shall be prohibited from filibustering and all other
attempts to delay a vote shall be discouraged.

350. About the Committee, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMM.,
https://judiciary.house.gov/about-the-committee/ [https://perma.cc/7WXT-8AYM] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2017); About the Committee, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN.,
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PurposeJurisdiction
[https://perma.cc/RQ2Y-SSC7] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017); see also ROBERT KATZMANN,
JUDGING STATUTES 12 (2014) (emphasizing the need for Congress “to develop procedures so
that its members would develop specialized competence and experience”).
351. See KATZMANN, supra note 350, at 14 (“The committee system . . . channel[s] the
pursuit of the individual interest to the good of Congress itself.”).
352. See Committee Members, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS,
http://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/committee-members [https://perma.cc/AA5657BH] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). This tradition also finds support in the Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction. See 2 U.S.C. § 900 note sec. 401(b)(4) (2012) (Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction) (establishing a twelve-member committee with six members
from each party to recommend a budget for congressional approval).
353. See S. DOC. NO. 113-1, at 227 (2014) (“If a Senator wishes a question to be put to a
witness . . . it shall be reduced to writing, and put by the Presiding Officer.”).
354. See Interview with Roy E. Brownell II, supra note 307 (outlining potential practical
and policy concerns that members of Congress might raise regarding the Clinic’s proposal).
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Removing the filibuster finds strong support in the legislative history355
and its guiding principles. Senators have long utilized the tradition of
unlimited debate to thwart legislation or the confirmation of nominees.356
Precluding this delay tactic helps to ensure that a determination on the
President’s competence is completed within twenty-one days. It also
enhances the legitimacy of the process by blocking an avenue for political
gamesmanship.
Precedent for such expedited rules can be found in the Budget Control Act
of 2011, which mandated that recommendations of the bipartisan Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction receive expedited votes.357 The Act
removed the opportunity for objection or filibuster and restricted the total
debate on the floors of each house.358
3. Subpoena Powers
The Joint Committee shall have broad authority to request any and all
documents and testimony it deems necessary. A cochairman may issue a
subpoena with either the concurrence of the other cochairman or the support
of a majority of the Joint Committee. If an individual refuses to comply with
a subpoena, the Joint Committee may find that individual in contempt of
Congress.359
The Amendment’s framers likely contemplated congressional authority to
compel testimony and the production of documents.360 At the very least, they
anticipated the need to hear from the President, the Vice President, the
Cabinet, medical experts, and those aides “[who] can compare how the
355. The time limit might imply a ban on filibuster. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note
38, at 236 (statement of Rep. Richard Poff) (observing that the proposal for a time limit on
congressional deliberations was motivated by a fear that “a filibuster might develop in the
other body[,] which might not be altogether pure in its motivation”); see also 111 CONG. REC.
3276 (1965) (statement of Sen. Pastore).
356. See Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 467, 477–79 (2011) (surveying the bipartisan “flood” of filibusters over
the past twenty years that has imposed an effective supermajority requirement for the passage
of legislation and the confirmation of presidential appointees).
357. See Budget Control Act of 2011, 2 U.S.C. § 900 note sec. 402(c)(3) (2012) (Expedited
Consideration of Joint Committee Recommendations).
358. See id.
359. Ideally, Congress and the White House would work to avoid subpoenas because
proceedings to enforce subpoenas, such as declaring subpoenaed individuals in contempt of
Congress, might be infeasible in the twenty-one-day time frame. However, congressional
subpoenas may become necessary. See Telephone Interview with Bernard Nussbaum, former
White House Counsel to President Bill Clinton (Sept. 15, 2016) (suggesting that the lack of
cooperation in a Section 4 proceeding could give rise to an impeachable offense).
360. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 46 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh)
(emphasizing the importance of “the opportunity to call on medical witnesses [and] to consult
with the members of Cabinet and the Vice President who had made this important decision”);
see also 111 CONG. REC. 3279 (1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin). The standing rules of both
the House and the Senate provide that their committees may exercise subpoena authority. See
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 113–181, r.
XI, at 571–78 (2015); STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113–18, r. XXVI, at 31
(2013).

2017]

IMPROVING PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

979

President is acting now with how he acted yesterday or a month ago.”361
Similarly, there was likely an assumption that Congress would have access
to documents like the President’s medical records362 and any other
information that the Vice President and Cabinet relied upon to make their
determination.363
The rule aims to ensure that Congress will have access to the information
it needs to conduct informed deliberations, especially in situations where a
disabled President refuses to testify or provide records.364 It also enhances
efficiency if the President tries to “run out” the twenty-one days by
stonewalling.
4. Due Process to the President
The President shall be given fair and adequate notice of Section 4
congressional proceedings and shall have the opportunity to testify before the
Joint Committee. The President shall also have the opportunity to submit the
results of his own medical examination and to recommend witnesses to the
committee who can then be called upon for a hearing at the discretion of the
cochairs.
As discussed in further detail below, the guarantees of fair notice,
opportunity to be heard, and the opportunity to recommend witnesses satisfy
procedural fairness. Moreover, those guarantees respect the President’s
constitutional legitimacy and improve public confidence in the integrity of
the proceeding without impairing the efficiency of the process. These
guarantees also enhance Congress’s deliberation by affording the President
adequate time to prepare his argument.
5. Information and Publicity
Generally, the documents and hearings before the Joint Committee shall
be open to the public. However, the Joint Committee may determine by a
majority vote that documents or hearings shall be kept behind closed doors.
A Section 4 scenario would likely lend itself to open hearings given the
intense public interest in this issue. Brownell, for example, envisioned that
361. 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 322, at 29 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); see also
1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 251 (statement of Herbert Brownell, former Att’y
Gen.); id. at 143 (statement of Rep. Byron Rogers) (discussing the possibility of questioning
the President’s doctor and inquiring into his or her medical history). Accordingly, the staff
members most likely to be subpoenaed are those who interact with the President on a daily
basis. While this list would include prominent figures like the Chief of Staff, guests of the
Clinic have raised several lesser-known possibilities. See, e.g., Interview with John O.
Brennan, supra note 49 (discussing the White House photographer); Interview with Dr.
Connie Mariano, supra note 78 (discussing presidential valets); Interview with Frances F.
Townsend, supra note 210 (discussing White House gardeners and housekeepers).
362. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 46 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
363. Indeed, Congress intended that the Vice President and Cabinet would invoke Section
4 “only after adequate consultation with medical experts who were intricately familiar with
the President’s . . . condition.” S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965).
364. See supra note 361 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of the executive
branch resisting inquiries into the President’s mental health).
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“there would be hourly bulletins from the medical [professionals], and
statements would be made in the press, television, radio [such that] the
problem would be present in the minds of everybody in the United States.”365
Moreover, transparency is essential to the process’s legitimacy—it ensures
that the public knows just as much as their representatives about the
President’s health before those representatives make an ultimate
determination. It also guards against any perception of a “star chamber”366
proceeding and preempts allegations of back-room deals.367
Just as significantly, public scrutiny will likely incentivize more informed
deliberations and a fairer process for the President. Members of Congress
will feel greater pressure to deliberate objectively and to treat an allegedly
ailing President with respect when they know that their constituents are
watching.368
National security concerns raised by a dispute over the President’s fitness
might weigh in favor of closed proceedings.369 Dragging the President
through such an intrusive procedure could erode the President’s ability to
project an image of strength and stability at home and abroad, even after the
disability ends.370 An interest in closed proceedings under Section 4 is also
furthered by the privacy concerns implicated by an inquiry into a President’s
health.371 However, granting the Joint Committee discretion to close any

365. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 247 (statement of Herbert Brownell, former
Att’y Gen.). During the same hearings, Senator Bayh maintained that “[t]here is going to be
public debate [with respect to the President’s disability] no matter to which body you give the
final power of decision,” citing the “great deal of congressional debate” that “was done in the
open” concerning the alleged disability of President Wilson as precedent. Id. at 93. Similarly,
Representative Basil Whitener of North Carolina envisioned a proceeding where “Congress
could . . . invite [the President] over here to speak to the Congress and appeal. It could be
televised and the people of the Nation could look at it, and if the man was competent, . . . it
would not only be apparent to Members of the Congress but would be apparent to the Nation.”
Id. at 147.
366. See id. at 148 (statement of Rep. Basil Whitener).
367. See id. at 189 (statement of Rep. Charles Mathias Jr.) (acknowledging the danger of
removing the President from his powers and duties without public accountability).
368. See id. at 147 (statement of Rep. Basil Whitener) (“There would be very few Members
of Congress, no matter how politically motivated they were, who would stand up and say the
[President] was . . . unable to carry on his work if the millions of people . . . who looked on
him on television as he spoke to the Congress decided he was all right.”).
369. See Interview with John O. Brennan, supra note 49.
370. See Robert E. Gilbert, Coping with Presidential Disability: The Proposal for a
Standing Medical Commission, POL. & LIFE SCI., Mar. 2003, at 2, 10–11 (emphasizing the
significance of “aura” and “image” to presidential power); see also 1965 House Hearings,
supra note 38, at 92–93 (statement of Rep. Charles Mathias Jr.) (warning that any
congressional procedure to resolve a dispute over presidential disability could be very
demoralizing and damaging to the public opinion of the presidency); id. at 163 (statement of
Marion Folsom, Chairman, Committee for Improvement of Management in Government,
Committee of Economic Development).
371. See, e.g., Neustadt, supra note 324, at 430 (noting that Section 4 raises the issue of
whether “a doctor h[as] a duty to breach the confidentiality of the physician-patient
relationship in favor of the public’s right to know”); see also Interview with Frances F.
Townsend, supra note 210.
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proceedings addresses concerns regarding national security, presidential
privacy, and the President’s public image.
C. Legal Issues
Several legal issues could arise if Congress were to implement the
proposed procedure. A court may need to decide (1) whether a President is
protected by executive and attorney-client privileges, (2) whether a challenge
by the President to the recommended procedure would be justiciable, and (3)
whether the President could have a meritorious due process challenge if
Congress decides he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office.
1. Privileges
There are at least two legal issues that a court may need to decide regarding
the Joint Committee’s access to evidence: (1) whether the White House
could successfully assert executive privilege over its staff and documents
against a Congressional subpoena and (2) whether attorney-client privilege
prevents Congress from accessing documents and receiving testimony from
executive branch attorneys working with the President.
a. Overriding Executive Privilege Against Subpoenas
for Documents and Testimony Related to
the President’s Ability to Serve
It is arguably against the President’s interests to refuse congressional
demands for documents and testimony, as Congress and the public may view
such resistance as evidence of the inability.372 Nonetheless, the President
may assert executive privilege, and a court may have to decide the scope of
Congress’s subpoena power in a Section 4 proceeding.
Although federal courts have recognized a strong presumption of
executive privilege, a court is likely to find that any claims of privilege will
yield to the specific need for Congress to fulfill its constitutional duty to
determine the President’s capacity.373 Federal courts have shown a
willingness to override executive privilege when there is a strong showing of
specific need for information by a coequal branch of government executing
a core function. For example, in United States v. Nixon,374 the Supreme
Court rejected the President’s claims of privilege over tape recordings of
White House conversations when they were subpoenaed by a special
prosecutor for use in a criminal trial.375 The Court held that “[t]he
372. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 144 (statement of Rep. Willard
Curtin) (“[T]he refusal of the President could be in such manner as to very well indicate . . .
that he is mentally incapacitated.”).
373. See Telephone Interview with Bernard Nussbaum, supra note 359 (observing that the
public interest in determining a president’s inability would likely overcome executive
privilege).
374. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
375. See id. at 713.
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generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific
need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.”376
By contrast, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon,377 the D.C. Circuit ruled that subpoenas of the tapes
issued by a special committee of the Senate did not override claims of
executive privilege.378 The court concluded that the subpoenaed materials
were “too attenuated” to Congress’s legislative or oversight functions to
override the presumption of executive privilege.379 This was especially the
case because the tapes were already in the possession of the House Judiciary
Committee as part of its impeachment proceedings.
b. Maintaining Attorney-Client Privilege
for Records and Testimony by White House Attorneys
Congress may seek information from White House attorneys in a Section
4 scenario. The Supreme Court has generally recognized a broad privilege
for attorney-client relationships.380 However, members of Congress have
argued that attorney-client privilege should not apply in the context of
Congressional proceedings.381
Federal courts have rarely addressed this issue and in the few instances
where they have, they have reached different conclusions. In cases relating
to the criminal and congressional investigations into the “Whitewater
Controversy,” the Eighth and D.C. Circuits both came down on the side of
disclosure.382 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,383 a divided
Eighth Circuit panel held that the independent counsel could obtain attorney
notes prepared by White House attorneys in connection with the
investigation.384 The majority emphasized that “the strong public interest in
honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be

376. Id.
377. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
378. Id. at 733.
379. Id.
380. See generally Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (protecting
attorney-client privileges for a deceased client); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981) (recognizing the public policy interests for an attorney-client relationship with
corporate clients).
381. See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi, No Secrets Allowed: Congress’s Treatment and
Mistreatment of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Protection in
Congressional Investigations and Contempt Proceedings, 25 J.L. & POL. 145, 178 (2009)
(stating that several members of Congress have argued that the privilege does not apply to
particular congressional activity).
382. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997).
383. 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
384. Id. at 921. One additional question that a court may consider is whether a Section 4
determination would rise to the same level of public interest as a criminal investigation to
warrant an override of an assertion of privilege.
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ill-served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege
applicable in criminal proceedings.”385
However, a dissenting opinion insisted that “[t]he President’s justifiable
need for confidentiality is . . . ever present no matter what other governmental
interests are asserted by a prosecutor.”386 The dissent emphasized the
importance of the White House receiving effective legal counsel387 and
advocated balancing “the governmental privilege asserted by the White
House against the competing governmental interest asserted by the
[independent counsel], the ultimate goal being to promote the ‘public
interest.’”388
In In re Lindsey,389 the D.C. Circuit granted the independent counsel’s
request to compel grand jury testimony from a Deputy White House
Counsel.390 The court held that “it would be contrary to tradition, common
understanding, and our governmental system for the attorney-client privilege
to attach to White House Counsel in the same manner as private counsel.”391
By contrast, in In re Grand Jury Investigation,392 the Second Circuit held
that a governor could assert attorney-client privilege over communications
with government attorneys in connection with a criminal investigation.393
The court reasoned that
the traditional rationale for the privilege applies with special force in the
government context. It is crucial that government officials, who are
expected to uphold and execute the law and who may face criminal
prosecution for failing to do so, be encouraged to seek out and receive fully
informed legal advice.394

Based on the sparse precedent, a court is unlikely to override attorneyclient privilege in a Section 4 proceeding absent an extremely high showing
of need. Indeed, the Clinic anticipates that a Section 4 proceeding would
likely increase the need to protect the President’s legal representation and
consultation. Allowing Congress to access these records would likely put the
President at a legal disadvantage and chill the President’s willingness to
exchange information with government attorneys.
Any balancing of the public interest will depend on the factual
circumstances before the court. A court will likely look to whether the
President is asserting attorney-client privilege to hinder the congressional
inquiry, as in In re Lindsey,395 or to protect legitimate legal advice, as in In
re Grand Jury Investigation.396
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Id.
Id. at 927 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
Id. at 930.
Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707–13 (1974)).
158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
Id. at 1278.
Id.
399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 536.
Id. at 534.
See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1263.
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 535.
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2. Justiciability: The Political Question Doctrine
If the President filed suit to challenge the process Congress followed to
evaluate his capacity, a court would need to decide whether the case is
justiciable. A case is justiciable when a court finds that it is capable of
resolving the dispute at hand.397 Conversely, a case is not justiciable when
it involves a request for an advisory opinion or a political question.398
A President’s challenge of the congressional procedures under Section 4
would likely implicate the political question doctrine. In Baker v. Carr,399
the Supreme Court set forth six “formulations” to guide courts in determining
whether a case involves a nonjusticiable political question.400 A case is
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine where (1) there is a
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue [at hand] to
a coordinate political department”; (2) there is a “lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving” the issue at hand; (3)
a court cannot decide a case “without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion”; (4) a court cannot decide a case “without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government”; (5)
there is an “unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made”; or (6) there is “the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”401
The Court applied the Baker “formulations” in Nixon v. United States,402
a case involving a federal judge whom Congress had impeached and
removed.403 The judge argued that his trial before a Senate committee,
instead of the full Senate, violated the Constitution’s Impeachment Trial
Clause.404
The Court examined the extent to which the Impeachment Trial Clause
commits the responsibility of trying impeachments to the Senate.405 Because
the Clause states that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments”406 and outlines specific procedural requirements that the
Senate must follow, the Court held that the Constitution “committed” the role
of trying impeachments to the Senate alone.407 Thus, the judge’s challenge
to the impeachment trial procedures was a nonjusticiable political
question.408

397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1968).
Id. at 95.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See id. 217.
Id.
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
See id. at 226–28.
Id. at 226.
See id. at 228–29.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–37.
See id. at 237–38.
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Applying precedent to any challenge of the proposed Joint Committee
procedure, a court would likely hold that there is a “textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment” in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment devolving the
power to manage Section 4 disputes to Congress,409 as Section 4 states that
“Congress shall decide the issue.”410
One possible argument a President may make is that Section 4, in contrast
to the Impeachment Trial Clause, does not explicitly say that Congress has
the “sole” power to determine whether he is able to discharge the powers and
duties of his office. In addition, the President may contend that the
Amendment’s silence regarding judicial review counsels in favor of such
review.
Yet, in context, Section 4 does not seem to contemplate any sort of judicial
appellate review. The legislative history reflects Congress’s intent that a
disability inquiry would be a political question not subject to judicial
review.411 Moreover, a Section 4 dispute would likely trigger an
overwhelming need for finality.412 Any appeal by the President to the
judiciary would undermine the legitimacy of the Vice President’s service as
Acting President.413
3. Due Process
In the unlikely event that a court does hold a challenge to be justiciable,
the Clinic analyzed whether a President may have a meritorious claim under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Procedural due process
violations occur when the government interferes with legitimate liberty or
property interests without following constitutionally sufficient procedures.414
Before a court can determine whether the government has violated procedural
due process, it must determine whether the government has “deprived [the
plaintiff] of . . . liberty[] or property.”415
a. Property Interest in the Presidency
If a President raised a due process challenge against Congress’s procedures
under Section 4, he may claim that Congress deprived him of his property
interest in the presidency itself. However, it is well settled that an elected

409. See id. at 228–29 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
410. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
411. See 111 CONG. REC. 15,588 (1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“In my view [the
question whether a President is capable of performing or discharging the powers of his or her
office] would be a political question and for that reason the Court would not be called upon to
pass upon it.”).
412. Cf. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236 (noting that the “legitimacy of any successor, and hence
[his or her] effectiveness, would be impaired severely, not merely while the judicial process
was running its course, but during any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might
conduct if its first judgment of conviction were invalidated”).
413. See id.
414. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
415. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 490 U.S. at 459–60.
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office is not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause.416 The
principle that the office of the President is entrusted to a given President by
the people would likely undercut a President’s claimed property interest in
the presidency.
After the Supreme Court held in two cases that political offices are not
property,417 it evaluated whether there is a property interest in government
employment more generally.418 In Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth,419 the Court noted that one could have a property interest in his or her
employment but held that the plaintiff, an assistant professor at a state
university, lacked any such property interest because “[his] appointment
secured absolutely no interest in re-employment [after the end of the
contractual term].”420 In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,421 the
Court held that the plaintiff, a security guard for Cleveland public schools,
did have a property interest in his employment because an Ohio statute gave
him a right to retain his position absent malfeasance.422
In a due process challenge, the President could argue that the Court should
reassess its holdings in Snowden and Taylor in light of Roth and Loudermill.
However, such an outcome is unlikely, as the Court treats elected office as
categorically different from other government employment.
b. Liberty Interest in One’s Reputation
The President may also contend that the recommended procedure under
Section 4 deprived him of his liberty interest in his reputation. The Supreme
Court has held that such an interest is protected under the Due Process
Clause.423
In the D.C. Circuit,424 a plaintiff can establish a reputation-based due
process claim in two ways.425 First, under the “reputation-plus” theory, a
plaintiff must show that there was (1) “an adverse employment action, such
as [an] involuntary loss of government employment,” (2) “a stigmatizing or
defamatory act by the government closely connected with that adverse
416. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944) (“More than forty years ago this Court
determined that an unlawful denial by state action of a right to state political office is not a
denial of a right of property or of liberty secured by the due process clause.”); Taylor v.
Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 (1900) (“The decisions are numerous to the effect that public
offices are mere agencies or trusts, and not property as such.”).
417. See supra note 416 and accompanying text.
418. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–41 (1985); Bd. of
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–79 (1972).
419. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
420. Id. at 578.
421. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
422. See id. at 538–39.
423. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (“Where a person’s good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.”).
424. This Part discusses case law from the D.C. Circuit and its lower court under the
assumption that the President would file a challenge there.
425. See O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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action,” and (3) a subsequent negative effect on future employment
prospects.426
Second, a plaintiff may articulate a “stigma” theory of reputational harm,
which “differs from the [reputation-plus theory] in that it does not depend on
official speech, but on a continuing stigma or disability arising from official
action.”427 Under this theory, a plaintiff can show that the government’s
actions exclude him from future government employment or that the actions
prevent him from pursuing his chosen career.428
Under the reputation-plus framework, a President may be able to establish
that a congressional determination of presidential inability damaged his
reputation as a healthy executive. This reputational damage could in turn
negatively affect a President’s future employment prospects. However, the
temporary nature of the removal contemplated by Section 4 undermines the
“adverse employment action” prong of the theory. Even if Congress were to
determine that the President suffers from an inability, the President would
nonetheless resume the powers and duties of the Office if the Vice President
and Cabinet elect not to challenge a President’s subsequent declaration that
he is able. The “employment action” is thus not truly “adverse.”
Similarly, under the “stigma” theory, any congressional determination of
presidential inability would likely not keep the President from engaging in
government work in the future. Moreover, such a decision could hardly be
said to preclude the President from continuing in his chosen line of work—
as an elected office with a two-term limit, the presidency is not a profession
where one can expect to spend an entire career.
c. The Process That Is Due
Despite the limited prospects of a due process challenge, Congress should
implement procedures under Section 4 that afford the President due process.
Affording due process to a President under Section 4 bolsters its legitimacy.
If it appears that a President is being disadvantaged, the public could view
any Section 4 determination as erroneous or politically motivated.
Accordingly, the Joint Committee should provide the President with
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard.429 Once the Vice President and
a majority of the Cabinet trigger a Section 4 dispute through written
disagreement, Congress should transmit a letter to relevant executive branch
officials, including the President, to inform them of the initiation of the
process. The Joint Committee should then allow the President to present his
case by testifying as to his ability to discharge the powers and duties of the
office and responding to the Vice President and Cabinet’s arguments.

426. Jefferson v. Harris, 170 F. Supp. 3d 194, 205 (D.D.C. 2016).
427. O’Donnell, 148 F.3d at 1140.
428. See Kartseva v. Dep’t of State, 37 F.3d 1524, 1527–28 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
429. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“[T]here
can be no doubt that at a minimum [the Due Process Clause] require[s] that deprivation of life,
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.”).
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VI. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES’ HEALTH DISCLOSURES
Planning for uses of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is not the only step that
policy-makers should take to help ensure that the country always has an able
president. A clear approach to the disclosure of information about
presidential candidates’ health is needed to guarantee that voters have enough
information to decide whether candidates are fit to serve. Improved
disclosure requirements may also have the added benefit of reducing political
attacks based on unfounded speculation about candidates’ health.
Currently, there is no legal requirement for presidential candidates to
disclose any information about their health. However, many recent
candidates have disclosed some information voluntarily, though sometimes
only after pressure from journalists or their opponents.430 There is no single
accepted model for campaign health disclosure and, in the past few decades,
these disclosures have trended toward providing less information.431 This
must change.
This Part reviews the history of issues relating to presidential candidates’
health in modern presidential campaigns. Next, it reviews various
approaches to improving the procedures for disclosing candidates’ health
information. Finally, it describes the Clinic’s proposal to create a
commission charged with creating guidelines for presidential candidates to
follow when releasing health information.
A. Health Issues in Modern Presidential Campaigns
Over the past century, several candidates have failed to disclose serious
health problems, others have seen their health become a significant focus of
campaigns, and candidates’ approaches to disclosing health information
generally have evolved and devolved.432
1. Cover-Ups
Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy are among the candidates in the twentieth
century who covered up serious health conditions.
President Wilson had a history of cerebrovascular disorders and strokes
dating back to 1896, sixteen years before he was elected.433 A neurologist
who examined him around the time of his election in 1912 opined that he was

430. See Meghan Keneally, Notable Precedents for Presidential Candidates’ Health
Disclosures, ABC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2016, 3:49 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/notableprecedents-presidential-candidates-health-disclosures/story?id=42029842
[https://perma.cc/28GS-B8HS].
431. See id.
432. See id.
433. See generally EDWIN A. WEINSTEIN, WOODROW WILSON: A MEDICAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL BIOGRAPHY (1981) (discussing President Wilson’s health and its affect upon
his presidency).
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unlikely to live through his first term.434 Yet Wilson kept his health from the
public.435 In October 1919, Wilson suffered a stroke that left him unable to
carry out many basic presidential responsibilities for the final year and a half
of his second term.436
When President Roosevelt ran for a fourth term in 1944, the public knew
the wheelchair-bound chief executive suffered from polio.437 He had
addressed the issue openly during his first campaign in 1931 by participating
in a magazine interview about his health and submitting to an examination
by three physicians.438 But voters in the 1944 election did not know that he
had subsequently been diagnosed with congestive heart failure.439 His doctor
had issued a note saying he was in remarkably good health440 and, when
rumors about Roosevelt’s health persisted, several other doctors verified that
assessment.441 But one of those doctors wrote a confidential memo stating
that he doubted the President could survive another four years.442 On April
12, 1945, just months into his fourth term and in the midst of World War II,
Roosevelt died of a cerebral hemorrhage.443
Ten years after Roosevelt’s death, another incumbent presidential
candidate faced a serious heart condition. In September 1955, a little more
than a year before the 1956 election, President Eisenhower suffered a massive
heart attack.444 His medical challenges continued in June 1956 when he
suffered an obstruction of his small intestine that required surgery under
general anesthesia.445
Through much of 1956, Eisenhower led the press to believe that he was
not running for reelection, which discouraged close scrutiny of his health.446
Eisenhower’s doctors told the public on multiple occasions that Eisenhower’s
health was not a concern, and one said on the eve of the election that he gave

434. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Cautionary Tale, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 585,
587 (1995).
435. See Jeremy Hsu, The Secret Medical Records of Presidential Candidates,
LIVESCIENCE (May 20, 2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.livescience.com/2556-secret-medicalrecords-presidential-candidates.html [https://perma.cc/J5VJ-HB56].
436. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 16, at 180; FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH
AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 14–15.
437. See generally JAMES TOBIN, THE MAN HE BECAME: HOW FDR DEFIED POLIO TO WIN
THE PRESIDENCY (2013) (discussing the progression of FDR’s condition and its effect on his
presidency); see also Jennie Cohen, Memo from 1944 Warned FDR Would Likely Die in
Office, HISTORY (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.history.com/news/memo-from-1944-warnedthat-fdr-would-likely-die-in-office [https://perma.cc/8D2C-6LLS].
438. See BEN SHAPIRO, PROJECT PRESIDENT: BAD HAIR AND BOTOX ON THE ROAD TO THE
WHITE HOUSE 47 (2007).
439. See TOBIN, supra note 437.
440. See id.
441. See id.
442. See Cohen, supra note 437.
443. See Merriman Smith, Roosevelt Dies of Stroke at Little White House, UPI (Apr. 12,
1945), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1945/04/12/Roosevelt-dies-of-stroke-at-Little-WhiteHouse/6802441123641/ [https://perma.cc/DT58-C99X].
444. Gilbert, supra note 108, at 2 n.3.
445. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 19–22.
446. See Gilbert, supra note 108, at 7–8.
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“every appearance of being in excellent health.”447 Yet Eisenhower had
experienced several health problems in the lead up to the election, including
abdominal pain, dizziness, an irregular pulse, and elevated blood pressure.448
The day before the election, Eisenhower’s opponent, Adlai Stevenson,
bluntly charged that Eisenhower would not survive another term.449
Eisenhower still won by a landslide,450 but a year later he suffered a stroke
that briefly affected his ability to speak.451
Eisenhower’s successor brought his own health problems to the White
House. President John F. Kennedy suffered from Addison’s disease and
chronic back pain, but he did not disclose either ailment.452 In fact, he and
at least one of his doctors flatly denied rumors that he suffered from
Addison’s disease.453 While in office, Kennedy grappled with his conditions
through extensive use of medications, particularly steroids and
amphetamines.454 His treatment required a “tremendous allocation of time
and attention,”455 and some have argued that the medications “impaired
Kennedy’s subsequent health and behavior.”456
In addition to candidates who won the presidency, at least one unsuccessful
candidate may have concealed significant health information. In 1992,
Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas was a leading candidate for the
Democratic nomination457 following treatment several years prior for a form
of lymph-node cancer, or lymphoma.458 Tsongas’s doctors, one of whom
was “an ardent personal and financial backer of the campaign,”459 told
reporters that the candidate was cured in 1986 when, in fact, they had detected
447. Id. at 10, 14.
448. Id. at 14.
449. Id.
450. See id. at 14 n.15.
451. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 23.
452. See Robert Dallek, The Medical Ordeals of JFK, ATLANTIC (Fall 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/08/the-medical-ordeals-of-jfk/309469/
[https://perma.cc/43QZ-KEWQ].
453. In 1959, Kennedy said, “No one who has the real Addison’s disease should run for the
presidency, but I do not have it.” ROBERT H. FERRELL, ILL-ADVISED: PRESIDENTIAL HEALTH
AND PUBLIC TRUST 152 (1992).
454. See McDermott, supra note 121, at 78.
455. Id.
456. MCDERMOTT, supra note 110, at 119.
457. George J. Annas & Frances H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How Culture and
Economics Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 357,
385 (1994).
458. See id. (stating that the doctor was very confident that Tsongas was fine); see also
Herbert L. Abrams, The Vulnerable President and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, with
Observations on Guidelines, Health Commission, and the Role of the President’s Physician,
30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453, 472 n.168 (1995).
459. Lawrence K. Altman, Many Holes in Disclosures of Nominees’ Health, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Altman, Many Holes in Disclosures], http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/10/20/us/politics/20health.html [https://perma.cc/G7Z7-8Z3A]; Lawrence K. Altman,
Tsongas’s Health: Privacy and the Public’s Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 1993) [hereinafter
Altman, Tsongas’s Health], http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/17/us/tsongas-s-healthprivacy-and-the-public-s-rights.html [https://perma.cc/B6VM-MXGP].
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more lymphoma the following year.460 Tsongas lost in the primaries and
announced several months later that his cancer had returned.461 He died two
days before the end of the presidential term for which he had run.462
2. Candidates’ Health as a Campaign Issue
Candidates’ health has become a prominent feature of several campaigns,
often through political attacks.
The 1972 presidential election was briefly consumed by the revelation that
Democratic vice presidential candidate Thomas Eagleton had been treated
for depression. George McGovern had chosen Eagleton as his running mate
with little information about his health history.463 The revelation about
Eagleton’s depression and his prior electroshock therapy treatment triggered
enormous pressure from party leaders, campaign contributors, and even
McGovern campaign staff,464 ultimately forcing Eagleton to step down after
only eighteen days on the ticket.465
During the final months of the 1988 presidential campaign, rumors
circulated that Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis “in the distant past . . .
had suffered some kind of serious psychological breakdown.”466 Dukakis
largely ignored the unsubstantiated rumors until they became front-page
news after President Ronald Reagan called Dukakis “an invalid.”467
Although he ultimately apologized,468 Reagan’s comment gave credence to
the rumors. Dukakis’s doctor appeared on television and released a full
report stating that Dukakis was in “excellent health.”469 But Dukakis

460. See Abrams, supra note 458, at 472 n.168.
461. See id.
462. See Karen De Witt, Paul Tsongas, Who Made Presidential Bid, Dies at 55, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
20,
1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/20/us/paul-tsongas-who-madepresidential-bid-dies-at-55.html [https://perma.cc/CTA3-FYKR].
463. Joel K. Goldstein, Depression and Public Service: The Eagleton Lessons, MINNPOST
(Jan. 12, 2010), https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2010/01/depression-andpublic-service-eagleton-lessons [https://perma.cc/Y4W4-NGT3].
464. Adam Clymer, Thomas F. Eagleton, 77, a Running Mate for 18 Days, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/washington/05eagleton.html
[https://perma.cc/L3BT-2KN2].
465. Id. See generally JOSHUA M. GLASSER, THE EIGHTEEN-DAY RUNNING MATE:
MCGOVERN, EAGLETON, AND A CAMPAIGN IN CRISIS (2012) (discussing Eagleton’s rise and fall
as a national candidate).
466. Michael S. Dukakis, Campaigns and Disability: When an Incumbent President
Questions His Potential Successor’s Mental Health Status During the Campaign, POL. & LIFE
SCI., Fall 2014, at 88, 90.
467. See Reagan on Dukakis: ‘I Won’t Pick on Invalid’: ‘Just Trying to Be Funny,’
President Later Says of His Answer to Question on Medical Records, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3,
1988),
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-08-03/news/mn-6862_1_medical-records
[https://perma.cc/3QAQ-QKBU].
468. Id.
469. Dukakis, supra note 466, at 90; Andrew Rosenthal, Dukakis Releases Medical Details
to Stop Rumors on Mental Health, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 1988),
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/04/us/dukakis-releases-medical-details-to-stop-rumors-onmental-health.html [https://perma.cc/XRR9-2567].
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dropped eight points in polls that week, hurting the substantial lead he had
held before the incident.470
The health of 2016 Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton also
received extensive attention. Throughout her candidacy, corners of the
internet and media were rife with speculation that she was concealing serious
health problems.471 This speculation was fueled in part by a December 2012
incident in which Clinton suffered a concussion caused by a potentially lifethreatening blood clot near her brain.472
Her opponent in the 2016 race, Donald Trump, consistently asserted that
she was not physically fit to serve as President. For example, in one tweet in
January 2016, he flatly claimed, “Hillary Clinton doesn’t have the strength
or stamina to be president.”473
The focus on Clinton’s health intensified on September 11, 2016, when
she fell ill at a ceremony marking the fifteenth anniversary of 9/11.474 As
Clinton left the ceremony early, she appeared to fall while getting into a
van.475 Her campaign initially stated that Clinton had felt “overheated” but
revealed the next day that she was suffering from pneumonia.476 She had
known of her condition for several days but did not disclose it for fear of
opponents exploiting it.477 Later that week, Clinton’s doctor released a letter

470. Dukakis, supra note 466, at 91.
471. See, e.g., Robert Farley, Fake Clinton Medical Records, FACTCHECK.ORG (Aug. 16,
2016), http://www.factcheck.org/2016/08/fake-clinton-medical-records [https://perma.cc/
L3XU-TJHX] (debunking documents that purported to be medical records diagnosing Clinton
with complex partial seizures and dementia); Alex Swoywer, Law Enforcement Officials,
Medical Professionals: There’s Something Seriously Wrong with Hillary Clinton’s Health,
BREITBART (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2016/01/06/lawenforcement-officials-medical-professionals-theres-something-seriously-wrong-hillaryclintons-health/ [https://perma.cc/E65U-AT6K].
472. See Susan Donaldson James, Hillary Clinton’s Blood Clot Could Have Been Life
Threatening, ABC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/hillary-clintonblood-clot-life-threatening-medical-experts/story?id=18101213
[https://perma.cc/N27TBYHY].
473. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 2, 2016, 12:00 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/683377290282156032 [https://perma.cc/8CYW9YC4].
474. See Jonathan Martin & Amy Chozick, Hillary Clinton’s Doctor Says Pneumonia Led
to Abrupt Exit from 9/11 Event, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
09/12/us/politics/hillary-clinton-campaign-pneumonia.html [https://perma.cc/8YCB-R7ZR].
475. Id.
476. Amy Chozick & Patrick Healy, Hillary Clinton Is Set Back by Decision to Keep Illness
a Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/us/hillaryclinton-pneumonia.html [https://perma.cc/AW9A-XULW]; Gabriel Debenedetti, Clinton
Abruptly Departs 9/11 Memorial Service After Feeling ‘Overheated,’ POLITICO (Sept. 11,
2016,
7:00
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/
clinton-abruptly-departs-9-11-memorial-service-after-feeling-overheated-228005
[https://perma.cc/C4TN-LEP9].
477. See Chozick & Healy, supra note 476.
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describing her treatment for pneumonia and concluding that she was “healthy
and fit to serve as President of the United States.”478
Then-candidate Trump seized on the incident in the remaining weeks of
the campaign. During one of multiple rallies where he called attention to the
incident, he ridiculed Clinton for being unable to “make it [fifteen] feet to her
car” and imitated Clinton falling.479 Additionally, the Trump campaign
released a television ad that used video of the incident as a narrator stated,
“Hillary Clinton doesn’t have the fortitude, strength, or stamina to lead in our
world.”480 After the second presidential debate, Trump, without evidence,
suggested Clinton had used drugs to energize herself.481
3. Recent Candidate Health Disclosures
Since the 1976 presidential campaign, all major party candidates have
released information about their health, although the thoroughness and
truthfulness of these disclosures has varied. This modern era of candidate
health disclosure was ushered in by an attitude of “post-Watergate
candor.”482 A desire to avoid “embarrassing surprises” about medical issues,
such as those that led to vice presidential nominee Thomas Eagleton’s
withdrawal from the 1972 race, also likely encouraged candidates to disclose
more health details.483
Candidates’ openness about their health in the eleven campaigns between
1976 and 2016 has been shaped by various forces, particularly pressure from
opposing candidates and journalists. The ages and health histories of
candidates also seem to have impacted disclosures. In 1976, major party
candidates Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter released statements from their
doctors about their most recent examinations.484 Ronald Reagan, the
Republican nominee in 1980, took his health disclosures further by partaking
in an interview with New York Times reporter Lawrence K. Altman, a
physician. The sixty-nine-year-old candidate said he granted the interview

478. See Letter from Lisa Bardack, Chair of Internal Med., CareMount Med. (Sept. 14,
2016),
https://m.hrc.onl/secretary/10-documents/05-physician-letter/HRC_physician_
letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LC7-QS9B].
479. See Tim Hains, Donald Trump Mocks Hillary Clinton’s Fall at 9/11 Ceremony,
REALCLEARPOLITICS (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/10/03/
donald_trump_mocks_hillary_clintons_fall_at_911_ceremony.html [https://perma.cc/WUJ6BZ7P]; Gideon Resnick, Trump Mocks Clinton for Her 9/11 Memorial ‘Medical Episode,’
DAILY BEAST (Sept. 28, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-mocks-clintonfor-her-911-memorial-medical-episode [https://perma.cc/QQR5-MHC5].
480. Donald Trump ‘Dangerous’ Campaign 2016, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2016, 11:37 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/46c09464-8fc9-11e6-bc00-1a9756d4111b_video.html
[https://perma.cc/GL2K-8SCM].
481. See Nick Corasaniti, ‘We Should Take a Drug Test’ Before Debate, Donald Trump
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/us/politics/donaldtrump-hillary-clinton-drug-test.html [https://perma.cc/XVG6-ELX2].
482. See Lawrence K. Altman, Presidential Health: How Much Should Be Public?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 31, 1976), http://www.nytimes.com/1976/10/31/archives/presidential-healthhow-much-should-be-public.html [https://perma.cc/5RSW-ZWCQ].
483. Id.
484. Id.
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“because the question of his age had arisen” in the campaign.485 Reagan’s
opponent, President Jimmy Carter, did not give an interview about his health,
but the White House doctor released a report on Carter’s health and answered
questions from Dr. Altman.486
In 1984, neither Ronald Reagan nor Walter Mondale gave interviews on
their health, instead allowing their doctors to speak with the press.487 But a
new high watermark for candidate health disclosure was reached in 1988
when both presidential candidates—Michael Dukakis and George H.W.
Bush—and their respective doctors gave health-related interviews.488 Some
of the interviews that Dukakis and his doctor gave were prompted by
unsubstantiated rumors about his alleged depression and Reagan’s “invalid”
comment.489
The 1992 campaign saw a temporary retreat from candidate interviews, as
only the candidates’ doctors spoke with the press.490 Bill Clinton, the
Democratic nominee, did not allow his doctors to give interviews or release
detailed information until the final weeks of the campaign, after the New York
Times charged that he had been “less forthcoming about his health than any
presidential nominee of the last 20 years.”491
While running for reelection in 1996, Clinton faced criticism from
Republican candidate Bob Dole for allegedly failing to release adequate
health information.492 He responded with statements from White House
physician Connie Mariano and other specialists attesting to Clinton’s good

485. Lawrence K. Altman, Reagan Vows to Resign If Doctor in White House Finds Him
Unfit, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1980, at A1.
486. Lawrence K. Altman, President Is “in Excellent Shape,” His Doctor Reports After
Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1980, at 21.
487. See Lawrence K. Altman, Mondale’s Health Termed Excellent by Physician, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 30, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/30/us/mondale-s-health-termedexcellent-by-physician.html [https://perma.cc/X2ZU-85ER].
488. See Lawrence K. Altman, Clinton, Citing Privacy Issues, Tells Little About His
Health, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/10/us/1992-campaigncandidate-s-health-clinton-citing-privacy-issues-tells-little.html
[https://perma.cc/6Y86N4KS].
489. See Dukakis, supra note 466, at 90; Rosenthal, supra note 469.
490. Lawrence K. Altman, Bush’s Doctor Terms President Strong and Fit, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 14, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/14/us/1992-campaign-candidate-s-healthbush-s-doctor-terms-president-strong-fit.html [https://perma.cc/8JPQ-Z9QT]; Lawrence K.
Altman, Doctors Call Clinton Healthy; Campaign Offers New Details, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15,
1992) [hereinafter Altman, Doctors Call Clinton Healthy], http://www.nytimes.com/1992/
10/15/us/1992-campaign-candidate-s-health-doctors-call-clinton-healthy-campaignoffers.html [https://perma.cc/2MXC-K42J].
491. Altman, Doctors Call Clinton Healthy, supra note 490.
492. Lawrence K. Altman, Responding to Dole, Clinton Releases More Health Data, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 15, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/15/us/responding-to-dole-clintonreleases-more-health-data.html [https://perma.cc/LHT9-T96F]; see also John M. Broder,
Questions on Health Records Dog Clinton, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1996),
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-13/news/mn-43551_1_medical-records
[https://perma.cc/BX7T-NK4V] (stating that Dole’s “chief spokesman hinted darkly that
[Clinton] was trying to conceal a medical ‘mystery’”).
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health.493 Additionally, Clinton and Dr. Mariano gave an interview to Dr.
Altman in the final weeks of the campaign.494 Dole, who was seventy-three
years old, and his doctors also gave an interview.495 During the 2000
campaign, both candidates and their doctors again gave press interviews.496
In 2004, Democratic candidate John Kerry was the only candidate to discuss
his health with a journalist.497
In the three campaigns since the 2004 race, candidates have mostly limited
their disclosures to letters from their doctors.498 Dr. Altman noted a trend
away from disclosure at the end of the 2008 campaign when he observed,
“The information that has been released is a retreat from the approach that
most campaigns took over the last 10 elections.”499 The physicians’ letters
that have characterized most post-2004 disclosures typically summarize the
candidate’s health histories, such as significant medical episodes, surgical
procedures, and family health histories. To provide a picture of the
candidate’s current health, the letters include the physicians’ general
impressions, medications taken by the candidate, and measures like heart
rate, blood pressure, and cholesterol.
The notable departures from the post-2004 trend toward physicians’ letters
came from John McCain in 2008 and Donald Trump in 2016. McCain was
seventy-two in 2008 and would have been the oldest President-Elect sworn
in for a first term as President. McCain underwent an extensive surgery eight
years earlier to remove a malignant melanoma.500 His campaign responded
to heightened scrutiny of his health by allowing twenty reporters to review
493. Altman, supra note 492.
494. Lawrence K. Altman, Clinton, in Detailed Interview, Calls His Health “Very Good,”
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/14/us/clinton-in-detailedinterview-calls-his-health-very-good.html [https://perma.cc/VD3J-9WTJ].
495. Lawrence K. Altman, Doctors Call Dole’s Health Excellent, N.Y. TIMES (July 21,
1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/21/us/doctors-call-dole-s-health-excellent.html
[https://perma.cc/S54J-HVEP].
496. Lawrence K. Altman, Gore Appears in Excellent Health, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/25/us/the-2000-campaign-the-fitness-report-gore-appearsin-excellent-health.html [https://perma.cc/V3H3-SXKP]; Lawrence K. Altman, Doctors Say
Republican Candidates Are in Good Health, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/02/us/2000-campaign-medical-histories-doctors-sayrepublican-candidates-are-good.html [https://perma.cc/C8F3-TERY].
497. Lawrence K. Altman, On Kerry’s Journey to Health, Stops for Shrapnel and Cancer,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/03/politics/campaign/on-kerrysjourney-to-healthstops-for-shrapnel-and-cancer.html [https://perma.cc/9L2V-Y7ZA].
498. During the 2008 presidential campaign, then-Senator Barack Obama’s doctor released
a letter to the public. See Letter from David L. Sheiner, Hyde Park Assocs. in Med., Ltd.,
http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images/05/29/scheiner.letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGK945CK]. During the 2012 campaign, then-Governor Mitt Romney’s physician released the
same. See Letter from Randall D. Gaz, Mass. Gen. Hosp. (Aug. 25, 2012),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/438470/physicians-letter-on-mitt-romneyshealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLB3-7D2G].
499. Altman, Many Holes in Disclosures, supra note 459.
500. McCain in “Excellent Health,” Doctor Says, CNN (May 23, 2008),
http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/05/23/mccain.health.records/index.html
[https://perma.cc/94Y7-SUWL]. Surgeries in 1993, 2000, and 2003 removed three other
malignant melanomas from McCain’s skin, which were less invasive and did not pose longterm concerns. Id.
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nearly 1200 pages of his medical records, though with some significant
restrictions.501 The reporters, three of whom were doctors, only had three
hours to review the records and were not allowed to make copies.502 In
addition to the temporary record release, several of McCain’s doctors
released a written health summary and answered reporters’ questions on a
forty-five-minute conference call.503 McCain did not submit to an extensive
media interview on his health.504
Before the start of the 2016 primaries, Trump released a physician’s letter,
but it had less detail than typical letters—and far more flourish. The letter
from Trump’s personal doctor, Harold Bornstein, stated that Trump’s
physical examination yielded “only positive results.”505 It also asserted that
Trump’s lab test results were “astonishingly excellent” without providing any
specific metrics other than Trump’s prostate-specific antigen score.506
Bornstein concluded that, if elected, Trump would be “the healthiest
individual ever elected to the presidency.”507 Months later, Bornstein gave
two seemingly impromptu television interviews,508 stating that he wrote the
letter in five minutes and that its hyperbolic claims were inspired by the way
Trump speaks.509 A day before Bornstein wrote the letter, Trump had
tweeted that the account of his health would show “perfection.”510
Following Clinton’s bout with pneumonia in September 2016, Trump
released a second letter from Bornstein that contained more detail, including
some specific results of laboratory tests.511 New York Times articles observed

501. See Marc Ambinder, McCain’s Health Records, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2008),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2008/05/mccains-health-records/53290/
[https://perma.cc/K5A3-N4DH] (discussing a journalist’s review of McCain’s medical
records).
502. See Altman, Many Holes in Disclosures, supra note 459.
503. See id.; Victor F. Trastek et al., Mayo Clinic, Statement of Health Status,
https://static01.nyt.com/packages/pdf/politics/JSM_HealthRecords_052308.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LW52-KYAR].
504. Altman, Many Holes in Disclosures, supra note 459.
505. Bornstein Letters of Health for Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/01/us/politics/document-Bornstein-Letter-ofHealth-for-Trump.html [https://perma.cc/TJ6J-GA7T] (containing letter of health, dated
December 4, 2015, from Dr. Harold N. Bornstein).
506. See id.
507. Id.
508. See Doctor Doubles Down on Donald Trump’s Health, CNN (Sept. 1, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2016/09/01/donald-trump-doctor-griffin-pkg-tsr.cnn
[https://perma.cc/2FM5-KDF4]; Anna R. Schecter et al., Trump Doctor Wrote Health Letter
in Just 5 Minutes As Limo Waited, NBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2016, 9:47 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-doctor-wrote-health-letter-just-5-minuteslimo-waited-n638526 [https://perma.cc/4A9R-X2DG].
509. See Schecter at el., supra note 508.
510. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 3, 2015, 5:08 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/672401996826206208 [https://perma.cc/Z3B8KGS6].
511. See Letter from Dr. Harold Bornstein, Lenox Hill Hosp. (Sept. 13, 2016),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3108782/Read-the-letter-from-Donald-Trumps-doctor.pdf [https://perma.cc/896Z-4JPU].
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that the letter revealed that Trump was overweight and had a blood sugar
level that was “‘quite close’ to being considered prediabetes.”512 Trump
discussed the updated letter and answered questions about his health on Dr.
Mehmet Oz’s television show.513 After the election, Bornstein revealed that
Trump was on two prescription medications that were not mentioned in his
letters or Trump’s interview.514
B. Past Proposals
The Clinic considered several approaches to improving candidates’ health
disclosures, including legislation, political party rules, and a commission to
evaluate and report on candidates’ health.
1. Legislation
Federal and state laws regulating candidates’ health disclosures would
likely raise practical and legal considerations.
a. Federal Law
Some members of Congress have raised the possibility of passing laws to
regulate presidential candidates’ health disclosures. In early 2017,
Republican Congressman Jason Chaffetz said he was working on legislation
to require presidential candidates to undergo an independent medical
examination, performed by a Navy doctor, the results of which would be
released to the public.515 Following the return of Paul Tsongas’s cancer in
1992, Senator Bob Kerrey, who was a rival of Tsongas in the Democratic
primary, said full disclosure of presidential candidates’ health information
“has to become part of our election law.”516 He suggested making disclosure
a condition of receiving federal campaign funds and Secret Service
protection.517
512. Maggie Haberman, New Doctor’s Note Describes Donald Trump’s Health as
‘Excellent,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/16/us/
politics/donald-trump-health.html [https://perma.cc/4SDV-UMBJ]; see also Maggie
Haberman, Donald Trump Checkup Said to Reveal He Is Overweight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/us/politics/donald-trump-health-dr-oz.html
[https://perma.cc/57GZ-KL2N].
513. See The Dr. Oz Show (Fox television broadcast Sept. 15, 2016),
http://www.doctoroz.com/episode/dr-oz-exclusive-one-one-donald-trump
[https://perma.cc/Z5JS-JKRB].
514. See Lawrence K. Altman, Donald Trump’s Longtime Doctor Says President Takes
Hair-Growth Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/
us/politics/trump-prostate-drug-hair-harold-bornstein.html [https://perma.cc/LR98-WSXW].
515. See Christina Marcos, GOP Lawmaker Considers Requiring Presidential Candidates
to Undergo Medical Exam, HILL (Feb. 17, 2017, 12:49 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/
house/320120-chaffetz-considering-bill-requiring-presidential-candidates-to-undergomedical [https://perma.cc/L6UQ-7YHL]. It appears that Chaffetz, who resigned from
Congress on June 30, 2017, never introduced such legislation. See Legislation Sponsored or
Cosponsored by Jason Chaffetz, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/member/jasonchaffetz/C001076 [https://perma.cc/65B9-KVNX] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
516. See Altman, Tsongas’s Health, supra note 459.
517. Id.
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Both of these proposals, however, might be difficult or unwise to enforce.
Kerrey’s suggested withholding of campaign funds is unlikely to be effective
because most recent candidates choose not to receive federal funds. The
suggestion of making Secret Service protection contingent on disclosure
might not be worth the risk; disclosure should not come at the cost of
decreasing candidates’ safety.518 Additionally, requirements that candidates
disclose medical records could discourage candidates, or potential
candidates, from seeking necessary medical treatment out of fear that doing
so could lead to the creation of damaging records.519
Chaffetz’s proposed requirement that candidates undergo a medical
examination might not be constitutional. Indeed, candidates who did not
want to be examined might claim that such an examination was a violation
of their Fourth Amendment rights.520
b. State Law
States may have unique leverage to enforce candidate health-disclosure
laws. The Clinic is unaware of any proposed state legislation regarding
candidate health, but lawmakers in several states have recently proposed
legislation that would require candidates to disclose other personal
information: the candidates’ tax returns.521 These proposed laws make
disclosure of tax returns a requirement for ballot access and eligibility for
support of presidential electors.
However, there are at least colorable arguments that such laws are
unconstitutional, and these arguments could be adapted to apply to
restrictions that mandate health disclosures. Vikram Amar has suggested that
tax disclosure laws might burden the associational rights of candidates’
supporters in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and create
impermissible extraconstitutional requirements for the presidency or
presidential electors.522
Because a campaign is an “effective platform” for expressing political
views, rules that exclude candidates might burden voters’ freedom of
association.523 However, not every rule that restricts ballot access is
constitutionally suspect; “there must be substantial regulation of elections if
518. See infra Part VII.A.3 (discussing attacks and plots against presidential candidates).
519. See Hanson O’Haver, Why Presidential Candidates Shouldn’t Have to Release Their
Health Records, BROADLY (Aug. 25, 2016, 10:50 AM), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/
8x49p3/why-presidential-candidates-shouldnt-have-to-release-their-health-records
[https://perma.cc/HF8G-9D4Z].
520. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
521. See Editorial, An Antidote to Donald Trump’s Secrecy on Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2016, 10:50 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/opinion/an-antidote-to-donaldtrumps-secrecy-on-taxes.html [https://perma.cc/P2X2-B2ZQ].
522. See Vikram David Amar, Can and Should States Mandate Tax Return Disclosure as
a Condition for Presidential Candidates to Appear on the Ballot?, VERDICT (Dec. 30, 2016),
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/12/30/can-states-mandate-tax-return-disclosure-conditionpresidential-candidates-appear-ballot [https://perma.cc/EBA8-6BM9].
523. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1983).
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they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is
to accompany the democratic processes.”524 Accordingly, courts balance the
asserted harm of a regulation against the state’s interests in advancing the
regulation.525
The Supreme Court has upheld rules that require candidates to demonstrate
that they have substantial support, such as by gathering signatures of
registered voters or by receiving the nomination of a party with a ballot line,
to reduce confusion and exclude frivolous candidacies.526 The Court has
ruled against some regulation including, in Anderson v. Celebrezze,527 a
registration deadline for independent candidates that the Court held was too
early.528
However, Anderson might suggest an opening for candidate-health
disclosure laws, as it specifically identifies voter education as a legitimate
state interest.529 States may legitimately attempt to foster informed and
educated participation in their elections, and the goal of health disclosure
requirements is to inform voters. Moreover, unlike an early filing deadline,
disclosure requirements are, at least, arguably necessary to further the interest
of voter education because voters typically will not learn information that has
been intentionally kept secret. The ballot access restriction in Anderson
excluded particular classes of candidates: those who did not belong to major
parties.530 In contrast, restrictions that require health disclosures would
burden all candidates without regard to their party or political group.
Candidates burdened by a state health-disclosure law or their supporters
could also challenge the law on the ground that it impermissibly establishes
extraconstitutional requirements for the presidency or presidential electors.
Article II of the Constitution requires that the President be a “natural born
citizen” who is at least thirty-five years old and a resident of the United States
for fourteen years before taking office.531 The Twenty-Second Amendment
expanded on those requirements by creating a two-term limit.532 Article II,
Section 1 states that presidential electors cannot be members of Congress or
officers of the United States.533
The Supreme Court has held that states cannot create their own
requirements for election to Congress. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton,534 the Court held that state laws that even “indirectly” create
“additional qualifications” for election to Congress are impermissible.535

524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.

Id. at 788 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
Id. at 789.
See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439–42 (1971).
460 U.S. 780 (1983).
Id. at 796.
Id.
See id. at 793.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
Id. amend. XXII.
Id. art. II, § 1.
514 U.S. 779 (1995).
Id. at 784, 836–38.
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The Court held that the qualifications set forth in the Constitution are only
subject to change through the Article V amendment process.536
Arguably, state health-disclosure laws could also create such
extraconstitutional requirements if they prevent candidates from appearing
on the ballot or if they prevent electors slated for certain candidates from
being chosen. But states could argue that U.S. Term Limits is confined to
interpreting the portions of the Constitution that provide qualifications for
members of Congress and not to the provisions relating to the President or to
presidential electors. The constitutional provisions relating to presidential
electors are very different than the provisions establishing the qualifications
for other offices. The Constitution does not establish any positive
qualifications for presidential electors, such as the age and residency
requirements established for members of Congress. Instead, the Constitution
provides only specific restrictions describing people who may not serve as
electors. Many states already require presidential electors to make a pledge
that they will cast their electoral votes for the candidates for President and
Vice President who received the most votes in a statewide contest.537 States
could possibly adopt similar statutes forbidding the appointment of electors
slated by a candidate who has not complied with health disclosure rules.
2. Political Party Rules
Political parties might have the authority to create health disclosure
requirements for the candidates who run in their primaries. Parties are
entitled to a certain degree of autonomy stemming from their associational
rights under the Constitution.538 But, if political parties impose health
disclosure requirements, candidates and their supporters might claim
constitutional violations, such as some of the possible challenges to the state
laws discussed above. Political parties’ actions are sometimes construed as
state action, which subjects them to constitutional challenges. Indeed, party
rules governing primaries can implicate constitutional rights when the
process of choosing general election candidates is particularly entangled with
the party’s primary process.
In Smith v. Allwright,539 the Supreme Court ruled that a primary that
banned nonwhite voters was unconstitutional.540 The Court held that the
“statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on the
536. Id. at 783; see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) (holding that the
House of Representatives could not, through exercise of its constitutional power to judge the
qualifications of House members, disqualify an elected member who was accused of using his
position as a committee chair to divert House funds for his personal use).
537. See Chris White, Our Complete List of States with Laws That Bind Votes of
Presidential Electors, LAWNEWZ (Dec. 19, 2016, 6:41 AM), http://lawnewz.com/highprofile/our-complete-list-of-states-with-laws-that-bind-votes-of-presidential-electors/
[https://perma.cc/A7B9-SDG4] (citing numerous state statutes that require electors to make
such pledges).
538. See generally Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
539. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
540. Id. at 663–64.
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general election ballot” made the party an agent of the state in its governance
of the party primary process.541 “When primaries become a part of the
machinery for choosing officials,” the Court ruled, “the same tests to
determine the character of discrimination or abridgement should be applied
to the primary as are applied to the general election.”542 Discrimination
against voters might easily be extended to discrimination against candidates.
Accordingly, party rules on health disclosures could implicate constitutional
rights.
Supporters of candidates prohibited from running in a primary because
they did not comply with health disclosure rules might argue that the rules
impaired their associational rights. The candidates might claim various
forms of discrimination, especially under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Disclosure rules would almost certainly impair the prospects of candidates
who suffered from certain disabilities. Those candidates could claim
discrimination on the basis of their disability. Additionally, because some
medical conditions are gender specific, candidates could potentially make
gender discrimination claims. Finally, candidates could make privacy claims
under the Fourth Amendment.
As an alternative to outright bans on candidates who fail to disclose health
information, political parties might use other forms of leverage to compel
disclosures. In particular, the parties could ban noncompliant candidates
from primary debates that the parties sponsor.543
3. Independent Medical Commission
Proposals for an independent commission to evaluate presidential
candidates’ health have been “kicked around medical conferences and
academic journals for years.”544 These proposals typically involve a
commission of physicians who examine candidates and report their findings
to the public.545 Similar commissions have been proposed for evaluating
Presidents to assist in determining whether the Twenty-Fifth Amendment

541. Id. at 663.
542. Id. at 664.
543. See, e.g., Press Release, Democratic Nat’l Comm., DNC to Sanction Six Presidential
Primary Debates (May 5, 2015), https://www.democrats.org/post/dnc-to-sanction-sixpresidential-primary-debates [https://perma.cc/RK6U-8FEF] (referencing criteria for
candidate participation in debates).
544. Dan Diamond, Is This the Way to Get Rid of the Ridiculous Health Conspiracies?,
POLITICO (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/donald-trumphillary-clinton-health-conspiracy-theories-214194 [https://perma.cc/X2L6-UM8B]; see also
Sandee LaMotte, Do Voters Have the Right to Know Presidential Candidates’ Health
Histories?, CNN (Dec. 15, 2015, 9:02 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/14/health/
presidential-candidate-health-disclosure/index.html [https://perma.cc/A7PS-E7HF].
545. See Diamond, supra note 544; see also Art Caplan & Jonathan D. Moreno, We Need
Unbiased Medical Exams for Presidential Candidates, CHI. TRIB. (May 17, 2016, 1:58 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-health-medical-exam-trumpclinton-president-perspec-0518-20160517-story.html
[https://perma.cc/NS8S-Q4E3]
(proposing independent examinations of candidates by a panel of physicians, possibly at
Walter Reed National Military Medical Center).
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should be invoked.546 Former President Jimmy Carter is among those who
have proposed presidential health commissions.547
Under many of those proposals, Congress would create the commission to
evaluate the President’s health.548 Congress could create a similar
commission for presidential candidates. Selection of a commission’s
members by the voters’ elected representatives or other governmental
officials, such as the Surgeon General or Secretary of Health and Human
Services, might add a level of credibility to the panel.549 But a
nongovernmental entity could also form a commission. Such proposals have
drawn analogies to the American Bar Association’s practice of rating the
Supreme Court nominees and the Commission on Presidential Debates, the
nonpartisan corporation that organizes presidential debates.550
Commission membership would not have to be limited to physicians.
Members may also include former Presidents, who understand the challenges
of the office; former journalists, particularly those with medical backgrounds;
current or retired elected officials who could evaluate political implications
of the commission’s work; and military officials, whose training might
encourage a nonpartisan approach. However, elected officials might create
a perception of partisanship and the involvement of military officials could
undermine the independence of the military.551
Independent medical commissions are not without flaws. First, it might be
difficult to secure candidates’ cooperation. A commission and its sponsors
could argue that participation would help candidates by preventing baseless
speculation about their health, but candidates might still worry that their
opponents and members of the public could use some of the commission’s
findings against them.552 Requiring candidates to submit to examinations
likely is not legal, regardless of whether Congress created the commission.
Second, it would be difficult to eliminate partisanship from a commission.
An absence of partisanship would be critical to encouraging candidate
participation and ensuring that the public viewed the commission’s findings
546. See Gilbert, supra note 370, at 5–6.
547. See Jimmy Carter, Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 272 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 1698, 1698 (1994).
548. Such a commission would be created under Section 4’s “other body” provision. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
549. See Herbert L. Abrams, Can the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Deal with a Disabled
President? Preventing Future White House Cover-Ups, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 115, 118
(1999) (advancing a proposal for Surgeon General or Secretary of Health and Human Services
to choose commission members); Gilbert, supra note 370, at 5 (“Unlike each Cabinet member
who has been approved for the position he or she occupied by the people’s representatives in
the United States Senate, a group of physicians would not be similarly sanctioned unless
Senatorial consent should be mandated by law, a process that would have an immediately
politicizing effect.”).
550. See Diamond, supra note 544; Our Mission, COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=about-cpd [https://perma.cc/85FA-PLWF] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2017).
551. Telephone Interview with Henry White, Retired Navy Rear Admiral (Apr. 21, 2017).
552. See Diamond, supra note 544.
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as credible. But it would be hard to excise partisan influences from the
process. Most people, including doctors, have at least some partisan
inclinations and interests. For example, physician groups like the American
Medical Association are often entangled in partisan causes.553 A candidates’
party should be irrelevant to determinations regarding the candidates’
health,554 but commission members’ candidate preferences could
consciously or unconsciously impact their conclusions.
Finally, it may be difficult for the commission to agree on an approach to
evaluating and drawing conclusions about candidates’ health. Without
unanimous conclusions, speculation about candidates’ health could increase,
the public could be left confused, and the commission approach might be
undermined. Dr. Burton Lee, a former White House physician, has observed
that a committee would likely produce “the lowest common denominator of
medical decision-making[,]”555 and former Senator Birch Bayh has said “it
is impossible to diagnose by committee.”556
C. Recommendation:
A Commission to Create Disclosure Guidelines
The Clinic recommends the creation of a commission to set nonbinding
guidelines for what presidential candidates should disclose about their
health.557 The commission’s guidelines would serve two primary purposes:
informing candidates’ approaches to disclosure and creating expectations that
would encourage adequate disclosure.
Without uniform health disclosure standards, even candidates who aspire
to be transparent might not know exactly what to release. The commission’s
guidelines would allow candidates to efficiently make disclosures calculated
to satisfy the public’s right to know and to blunt baseless health-related
claims. Comments from doctors who treated Paul Tsongas, the 1992
Democratic primary candidate who had suffered from lymphoma, suggest
they may have benefited from disclosure standards. They said “they were

553. Id.
554. See Abrams, supra note 549, at 117 (stating that a President’s party affiliation should
be irrelevant to determining inability).
555. Letter from Burton J. Lee III, former Physician to the President, to Gregory R.
Schwartz, Editor, Journal of the Am. Med. Ass’n (Jan. 31, 1995), in PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY,
supra note 48, at 354, 355.
556. Birch Bayh, The White House Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/08/opinion/the-white-house-safety-net.html
[https://perma.cc/9JVH-Y6DV].
557. This idea has been proposed before by someone with firsthand experience with
candidate health disclosures. After confirming that his lymphoma had returned and conceding
that he had “made mistakes in discussing his health” while running for the Democratic
presidential nomination in 1992, Paul Tsongas called for the creation of a national commission
to determine what presidential candidates should disclose about their health. See Lawrence K.
Altman, Tsongas, Battling Cancer, Admits Candor Is Needed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/06/weekinreview/nov-28-dec-5-american-politics-tsongasbattling-cancer-admits-candor-is-needed.html [https://perma.cc/S465-Q2HF].
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operating in uncharted waters because of the lack of national guidelines on
what to disclose about a candidate’s health.”558
The guidelines could also improve disclosures of candidates who are less
inclined toward transparency. The guidelines’ clear expectations would
improve journalists’ ability to encourage candidates to disclose useful
information about their health. If candidates failed to disclose some basic
information, journalists would be prearmed with a “shopping list” of missing
disclosures. Opposing candidates would also likely pressure candidates who
did not comply with the guidelines.
Health disclosure guidelines should not be binding on candidates; the sole
purpose of disclosure guidelines should be to offer guidance and set
expectations. Compliance with the guidelines could only be required through
laws or political party rules, but, as discussed, such requirements imposed in
that manner would likely face legal challenges. Furthermore, the guidelines
commission should not comment on whether candidates are complying with
the guidelines or issue midcampaign rulings on applications of the guidelines.
If the commission evaluated particular candidates’ compliance, the risk of
partisanship influencing the commission and undermining its integrity would
significantly increase.
1. Who Should Serve on the Commission?
Medical doctors should constitute at least half of the commission’s
membership. Doctors are equipped to understand the implications of
different kinds of health conditions and gauge the usefulness of particular
information to judging a candidate’s health.559 Both internists and
practitioners from a wide variety of medical and surgical specialties should
be part of the commission. Because it is not feasible to represent every
specialty on the commission, consultation with outside experts should occur
as needed.
The commission should also include knowledgeable people who have
experience deciding normative questions on behalf of the community.
Former politicians could be among those who serve this role. They could
also provide insight into the political implications of possible disclosure
guidelines. If former politicians are included, there should be an equal
number from each party to prevent perceptions that the commission favors
one party. Current elected officials should not serve on the commission
because partisan considerations could impact their contributions.
Nonmedical academics or journalists could also serve valuable roles on the
commission. They could provide information about what the public expects
to know about candidates’ health and how the public might react to particular
kinds of disclosures. Ideally, the commission members would receive

558. Altman, Tsongas’s Health, supra note 459.
559. See supra Part VI.B.3.
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compensation or at least receive reimbursement for the costs associated with
their participation.
2. Who Should Create the Commission?
The commission could be formed by Congress or an independent
organization, perhaps by a group of concerned voters or another private
nonpartisan entity.560 Both approaches have advantages. On the one hand,
congressionally created guidelines commission would possess an innate
prestige, which could encourage compliance with their recommendations.
On the other hand, the formation of the commission by Congress would raise
the specter of partisanship.
An independently created guidelines commission would be more likely to
avoid perceptions of partisanship but would face greater challenges
establishing its legitimacy. It could also have trouble raising operating funds
and might be less able to attract members of prominence, which could
compound the legitimacy problem.
3. Meeting of the Guidelines Commission
The commission should meet and issue its guidelines at least two years
before the presidential election. This requirement is meant to prevent
favoritism for certain candidates or parties. If the commission members
knew who the candidates were, it could impact their views.
After the guidelines are issued, the commission should not meet or conduct
any other business until after the election. The commission and its members
should avoid commenting on the compliance of particular candidates with
the guidelines.
Following the election, the members of the commission should reconvene
to consider whether they can improve the guidelines to account for medical
advances and any flaws that might have been exposed in the prior election
cycle. Periodic meetings of the commission for this purpose should occur—
always outside of the two-year period before elections.
4. Considerations in Crafting the Guidelines
The Clinic considered how the commission might develop its guidelines
and some of the issues that might arise in the process. It probably would not
require much deliberation for the commission to include certain basic
disclosures in the guidelines, such as blood test results. But to assist in
determining the appropriate level of detail for disclosures, the commission
might create a standard for the kinds of conditions that the guidelines are

560. The League of Women Voters Education Fund’s sponsorship of presidential debates
during several campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s provides an example of an independent
group taking initiative to help inform voters. See The League of Women Voters and Candidate
Debates: A Changing Relationship, LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS, http://lwv.org/content/leaguewomen-voters-and-candidate-debates-changing-relationship [https://perma.cc/WN3Q-5REU]
(last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
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aimed at uncovering. For example, one possible standard would seek
medical information that would reveal a likelihood of impairment in office.
“Impairment” could include actual disability, such as death or medical
incapacitation. It could also include substantial diminishment of capability,
such as a limitation on working hours that might result from a heart condition.
In deciding whether candidates should disclose specific medical
conditions, the commission will likely consider a variety of factors. For past
conditions that candidates suffered, the guidelines might be based on the
likelihood of recurrence. The commission may wish to adopt special
disclosure standards for some politically sensitive or poorly understood
illnesses, such as HIV/AIDS and certain psychological ailments, because
such disclosures could produce public reactions out of proportion with any
real health risk.
The commission might also consider whether candidates should undergo
tests to assess their cognitive functions.561 Such testing could lend insight
into whether a candidate is suffering any intellectual decline, but tests for
cognitive decline typically must be administered over months and years,
which could make it difficult to provide the results of such tests before an
election. Additionally, candidates would almost certainly view the tests as
invasive.
The commission may want to consider providing a higher standard to
protect medical information of a sitting President. Such a higher standard
would be inherently unfair because it would favor incumbent Presidents
against their challengers but might be necessary in the interests of security.
Emerging technologies for detecting and predicting the onset of illnesses
might present novel and challenging questions for the commission.562 One
of the more significant developments relates to the use of genetic testing. It
is now possible to make genetic assessments in a relatively noninvasive
manner,563 and those assessments might be capable of revealing ailments that
would impair a president, such as Alzheimer’s disease.564 Some scholars
have suggested genetic testing as an alternative method to disclosing

561. See Jeremy Samuel Faust, There’s an Easy Test We Could Use to Assess Older
Politicians’ Cognitive Health, SLATE (June 9, 2017, 3:08 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2017/06/speculating_over_a_politician_s_co
gnitive_decline_is_irresponsible_using.html [https://perma.cc/LKM5-ZB88] (stating that the
“Mini-Mental State Exam” can detect early or mild dementia through administrations over the
course of months and years).
562. See, e.g., Maggie Fox, New Heart Imaging Method May Predict Heart Attacks, NBC
NEWS (July 12, 2017, 2:27 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/new-heartimaging-method-may-predict-heart-attacks-n782271 [https://perma.cc/83G8-WGTC].
563. Rose McDermott, Extensions on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Influence of
Biological Factors on the Assessments of Impairment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV 881, 884 (2011).
564. See Hannah Devlin, New Alzheimer’s Test Can Predict Age When Disease Will
Appear, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/
mar/22/new-alzheimers-test-can-predict-age-when-disease-will-appear
[https://perma.cc/YY59-AZWT].
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presidential health.565 But deciding whether genetic testing should be
required involves a wide array of medical, ethical, and philosophical
questions. Genetic testing does not provide perfect predictions. For example,
someone with a gene marker for depression is not inevitably going to be
depressed.566 Even if genetic testing were perfectly accurate, it might face
criticism as an excessive invasion of privacy.
VII. POLITICAL PARTY RULES
FOR REPLACING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES
Presidential candidates’ health can impact campaigns in more immediate
ways than being the focus of public disclosures. A health issue could cause
a presidential candidate to leave the campaign, potentially resulting in a
vacancy on a political party’s ticket only weeks before an election. And
health is only one of several possible reasons a candidate might drop out.
The political parties’ procedures for filling presidential candidate
vacancies lack detail and might encounter problems if implemented.567 This
Part discusses these problems and proposes improvements. First, it
highlights aspects of campaign history which indicate that vacancies are a
real possibility. It then provides an overview of the current replacement rules
and discusses their shortcomings. It goes on to offer the Clinic’s proposed
rules for replacing presidential candidates after a vacancy. This Part
concludes with a discussion of whether the parties should create rules for
removing their presidential nominees.
A. History of Vacancies and Near Vacancies
There has never been a vacancy in the presidential nominee position of a
major political party before Election Day.568 But there have been two
instances where a vacancy has occurred in the vice presidential
nomination.569 On other occasions, scandals or assassination attempts raised
the prospect of vacancies.
565. Teneille R. Brown, Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters and Public
People, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 295, 371–76 (2008).
566. McDermott, supra note 563, at 888.
567. During Hillary Clinton’s bout of pneumonia in the final weeks of the 2016 campaign,
one former party chairman called for the party to develop a clearer process to select a
replacement nominee. Kyle Cheney, Former DNC Chairman Call for Clinton Contingency
Plan, POLITICO (Sept. 12, 2016, 4:02 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/hillaryclinton-health-replace-contingency-228037 [https://perma.cc/H9HX-HZ32]. Another former
chairman “agreed that the party’s vacancy rules should be modernized” but not until after the
election. Id.
567. The first Clinic recommended that the political parties “examine the need for criteria
and procedures to guide” the candidate replacement process. First Clinic Report, supra note
8, at 54–55.
568. In 1872, Horace Greeley, the presidential nominee for the Democratic and Liberal
Republican parties, died weeks after Election Day. He had won sixty-six presidential electors,
and the political parties instructed those electors to vote for other candidates. See First Clinic
Report, supra note 8, at 56.
569. Although there have been only two vacancies in the vice presidential nomination, it
bears noting that Benjamin Fitzpatrick promptly declined the vice presidential nomination
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1. Vacancies
The first vacancy on a national ticket occurred when Vice President James
S. Sherman died less than one week before the 1912 election.570 Sherman
had been renominated after serving as Vice President during President
William Howard Taft’s first term.571 He died from Bright’s disease, a serious
kidney disease he had developed in 1904.572
At the Republican convention in June 1912, the delegates gave the power
to fill vacancies on the national ticket to the Republican National Committee
(RNC).573 But Sherman’s death immediately before the election gave the
committee little time to act. Recognizing as much, the RNC’s chairman
scheduled a meeting for a week after the election to choose a replacement
vice presidential candidate.574 Woodrow Wilson won the presidency while
Taft came in third with only eight electoral votes.575 In January, the RNC
assigned Sherman’s electoral votes to Columbia University President
Nicholas Butler.576
The other national ticket vacancy occurred in 1972 when Democratic vice
presidential nominee Thomas Eagleton withdrew eighteen days after his
nomination. Eagleton had suffered from bipolar II disorder and had been
Democratic
hospitalized and treated with electroshock therapy.577
presidential nominee George McGovern did not know about Eagleton’s
health history when he offered him the nomination, as the campaign hardly
vetted Eagleton. He was a last-minute choice for McGovern, who invited
him to join the ticket after a thirty-five-second phone call.578
Rumors about Eagleton’s health quickly received extensive media
attention following his nomination.579 When Eagleton told McGovern and
his aides about his health history, McGovern said he believed the campaign
could weather the challenges it posed.580 But McGovern soon took a
grimmer outlook581 and, on August 1, 1972, asked Eagleton to leave the
after receiving it at the 1860 Democratic National Convention. The party instead nominated
Herschel V. Johnson as replacement on the same day. Herschel V. Johnson, From the
Autobiography of Herschel V. Johnson, 1856–1867, 30 AM. HIST. REV. 311, 317 (1925).
570. See Sherman Is Dead, Hurt by Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1912, at 1.
571. MARK O. HATFIELD, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1783–1993, at 325–28
(Wendy Wolff ed., 1997). Sherman became the first sitting Vice President to be renominated
since John C. Calhoun eighty years earlier. Id. at 331.
572. Id.
573. Sherman Always Allied to Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1912, at 5.
574. Id.
575. HATFIELD, supra note 571, at 331.
576. May Be Taft and Butler, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1913, at 1.
577. James N. Giglio, The Eagleton Affair: Thomas Eagleton, George McGovern, and the
1972 Vice Presidential Nomination, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 647, 659, 661 (2009).
578. Id. at 649–63. A more substantial vetting process may have uncovered that rumors
about Eagleton’s mental health had circulated for years in his home state of Missouri. See id.
at 652.
579. Id.
580. Id. at 661.
581. Id. at 656–74.
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ticket less than three weeks after he joined it.582 On August 5, 1972,
McGovern selected Sargent Shriver, the former director of the Peace Corps,
to replace Eagleton.583 The Democratic National Committee (DNC) called a
special committee vote to formally nominate Shriver several days later.584
After the Eagleton incident, the DNC put more focus on proper vice
presidential vetting.585 With the Party feeling the pressure of loss and
internal division, its chairman adopted a charter to reform the Party that
included the Party’s current rule on filling nominee vacancies.586
2. Scandals
Scandals have at least twice raised the prospect of candidates withdrawing
in the final weeks of campaigns. In September 1952, reports emerged that
Republican vice presidential nominee Richard Nixon maintained a fund of
undisclosed donations.587 Nixon explained that the money was used to cover
expenses that arose during his tenure in the Senate, but presidential nominee
Dwight D. Eisenhower and his advisers were livid.588 New York Governor
Thomas Dewey, who had encouraged Eisenhower to select Nixon,
recommended that Nixon offer a public explanation and leave the ticket.589
Some advisors were more measured. Herbert Brownell, who would become
Attorney General, was hesitant to remove Nixon without an investigation.590
Eisenhower said he wanted to give Nixon a chance to explain himself.591
Nixon addressed the controversy in an impassioned address on national
television.592 The address became known as the Checkers speech because
Nixon said one gift he would not return was Checkers, a dog given to his
children by a donor.593 Journalists and voters accepted Nixon’s denial of
wrongdoing, and he remained on the ticket.594
During the 2016 campaign, lewd comments by Donald Trump drew harsh
condemnation from Republican leaders and led the chairman of the RNC,
582. Id. at 670–71. In his statement announcing that Eagleton was leaving the ticket,
McGovern said that health was not a factor. Instead, McGovern attributed his decision to the
attention Eagleton’s medical history was drawing from the greater national issues. Id. at 672.
583. Id.
584. See James M. Naughton, Shriver Is Named for Second Place by the Democrats, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 9, 1972), http://www.nytimes.com/1972/08/09/archives/shriver-is-named-forsecond-place-by-the-democrats-national.html [https://perma.cc/UQU9-SC9R].
585. ROBERT E. DICLERICO, THE CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PRESIDENT 456 (2016).
586. Text of Party Charter Adopted at Democratic Conference Following Compromise,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1974, at 44.
587. Lee Huebner, The Checkers Speech After 60 Years, ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-checkers-speech-after-60years/262172/ [https://perma.cc/4Z92-QRTZ].
588. See HERBERT BROWNELL WITH JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 124 (1993).
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 125.
592. Richard Nixon Foundation, Checkers Speech (full version), YOUTUBE (Jan. 16, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpWwgwytdzk [https://perma.cc/JY5D-G3C7].
593. See Huebner, supra note 587.
594. See id.
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Reince Priebus, to privately suggest that he leave the race.595 Although the
comments in which Trump “bragged in vulgar terms about kissing, groping
and trying to have sex with women” dated back to a 2005 filming of the show
Access Hollywood, the video only became public on October 7, 2016, a
month before the election.596
3. Threats and Violence Against Candidates
Presidential candidates have faced threats to their lives. In 1968,
Democratic primary candidate Robert F. Kennedy was shot and killed on the
night that he won the California primary.597 Many speculated that he would
have been the Democratic nominee had he lived.598 Only four years later,
during the 1972 campaign, George Wallace, another Democratic primary
candidate, was shot.599 Wallace survived the assassination attempt, but it left
him paralyzed and effectively ended his campaign.600
During the 1980 presidential campaign, the man who would eventually
shoot President Reagan in early 1981 was “stalking” President Jimmy Carter,
the Democratic nominee. John Hinckley Jr. came within feet of President
Carter at a campaign event on October 2, 1980.601 He was arrested a week
later, with several guns, at an airport in Nashville, Tennessee, where Carter
was holding a rally.602
B. Current Party Rules and Their Shortcomings
The Republican and Democratic Parties’ respective rules for filling
candidate vacancies are inadequate.

595. Alexander Burns et al., Donald Trump Apology Caps Day of Outrage over Lewd Tape,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/politics/donald-trumpwomen.html [https://perma.cc/KNS7-3J59]; Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Republicans
Look to Reince Priebus, Trump’s Chief of Staff, to Bring Stability, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/us/politics/reince-priebus-chief-of-staff.html
[https://perma.cc/2TNB-AYTX] (reporting Priebus’s suggestion that Trump consider
dropping out of the race). Two Republican Senators and Republican former Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice also called on Trump to drop out. Growing Number of Republicans Rebuke
Trump, CBS NEWS (Oct. 7, 2016, 10:25 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
republicans-rebuke-trump-after-access-hollywood-tape-released/
[https://perma.cc/2PPR8HZ3].
596. See David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation
About Women in 2005, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
3b9ce776-8cb4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html [https://perma.cc/QF9X-EFY9].
597. RONALD L. FEINMAN, ASSASSINATIONS, THREATS, AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:
FROM ANDREW JACKSON TO BARACK OBAMA 112–13 (2015).
598. Id. at 112.
599. Id. at 127. Wallace’s would-be assassin also stalked and considered targeting
President Richard Nixon, the 1972 Republican candidate. Id. at 125.
600. Id. at 129.
601. See Jeremy P. Kelley, John Hinckley Stalked Carter in Dayton Before Shooting
Reagan, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (July 27, 2016, 1:55 PM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/
RCJLMW6RyC74XnbfX8MOpL/ [https://perma.cc/33LP-YHDS].
602. See United States v. Hinckley, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2016).
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1. Republican Party Rules
The Republican Party’s procedures for filling vacancies are found in the
Rules of the Republican National Committee. Rule 9 provides two options
for “fill[ing] any and all vacancies which may occur by reason of death,
declination, or otherwise of the Republican candidate” for the President or
Vice President.603
The first option allows the RNC to choose the replacement nominee. The
RNC comprises approximately 150 voting members with representatives
from Republican parties in every state. If they were choosing a replacement
nominee, RNC members would vote as part of their state delegations with
each state casting the same number of votes as it would cast at the national
convention.604 If the RNC members from a state could not agree on how to
cast their votes, their votes would be divided equally among present RNC
members or those voting by proxy.605 A replacement candidate needs a
majority of votes for approval.606
The second option for filling vacancies provides that the RNC can
reconvene the national convention to select a new candidate.607 Rule 9 does
not specify any procedures for a reconvened national convention to follow.
2. Democratic Party Rules
The bylaws of the Democratic Party give the Democratic National
Committee the “responsibility” of “filling vacancies in the nominations for
the office of President and Vice President.”608 A special meeting for this
purpose is “held on the call of the [DNC] Chairperson.”609 The Bylaws
require a majority of the DNC membership to be present in person or by
proxy to select a replacement candidate.610 Replacement candidates are
selected by majority vote.611 “[T]he DNC is composed of the chair and vicechairs of each state Democratic Party Committee and over 200 members
elected by Democrats in all 50 states and the territories.”612

603. See REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY r. 9(a) (2016)
[hereinafter RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY], https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/docs/2016Republican-Rules-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GN5-GKMU].
604. Id. r. 9(b).
605. Id. r. 9(c).
606. Id. r. 9(d).
607. Id. r. 9(a).
608. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., Bylaws, in THE CHARTER AND THE BYLAWS OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES art. 3, § 1(c) (2015), http://s3.amazonaws.com/
uploads.democrats.org/Downloads/DNC_Charter__Bylaws_9.17.15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U8S6-9LCP].
609. Id. art. 2, § 7(c).
610. Id. art. 3, § 5.
611. Id. art. 2, § 8(d) (“Except as otherwise provided in the Charter or in these Bylaws, all
questions before the Democratic National Committee shall be determined by majority vote of
those members present and voting in person or by proxy.”).
612. The Democratic National Committee, DEMOCRATS, https://www.democrats.org/
organization/the-democratic-national-committee [https://perma.cc/SY9D-VHJ6] (last visited
Nov. 19, 2017).
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The 2016 Call for the Democratic National Convention appears to require
the DNC Chairperson to consult elected officials in the Party before the DNC
selects a replacement nominee. In the event of “death, resignation, and
disability” of a presidential or vice presidential nominee, the Call requires the
Chairperson to “confer with the Democratic leadership of the United States
Congress and the Democratic Governors Association” and then “report to the
Democratic National Committee.”613
3. Shortcomings of the Rules
The DNC and RNC rules permitting the national committee to select a
replacement candidate risk wasting time and heightening intraparty tensions.
The RNC’s alternative procedure of recalling the conventions suffers these
drawbacks while also posing significant logistical challenges.
Absent broad consensus on the replacement candidate, the committee
process could be excessively time consuming. Potential replacement
candidates might launch minicampaigns, and committee members would
likely demand time to consider their options. Forging a consensus among a
committee of over 150 members could also take time. With every lost day,
the major disadvantages facing a party that lost its nominee in the final weeks
of a campaign would only be made worse. The Clinic’s study of the length
of time between party conventions and Election Day since 1980 revealed that
the election was, on average, ninety days after the Democratic convention
and eighty-three days after the Republican convention.
The committee process could also expose rifts among the party’s factions.
Sometimes hard feelings from hotly contested primaries remain well into the
general election season, a phenomenon apparent in both parties during the
2016 campaign.614 When Eisenhower’s 1952 campaign grappled with
Nixon’s scandal, Herbert Brownell feared that recalling the convention to
replace Nixon would reignite tension with Eisenhower’s more conservative
primary opponent.615 Reawakening intraparty tensions in the process of
choosing a replacement nominee, especially at a late stage in the campaign,
could undermine the replacement candidate.
The RNC option of reconvening the convention to select a replacement
nominee could provide a high-profile platform for the replacement
candidate’s introduction to the public and could even result in something of
613. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., Call for the 2016 Democratic National Convention, in
DELEGATE SELECTION MATERIALS art. VIII(G) (2014) [hereinafter Call for the 2016
Democratic National Convention], http://www.demrulz.org/wp-content/files/12.15.14
_2016_Delegate_Selection_Documents_Mailing_-_Rules_Call_Regs_Model_Plan_
Checklist_12.15.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVX9-82QB].
614. See Gabrielle Debenedetti, Democrats Sweat Clinton vs. Sanders Rift, POLITICO (Jan.
16, 2017, 6:52 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/democrats-clinton-sanders-dnc233648 [https://perma.cc/L8EU-F3BS]; Peter Schroeder, No Trump Endorsement from Cruz:
‘Vote Your Conscience,’ HILL (July 20, 2016, 9:56 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballotbox/presidential-races/288607-no-trump-endorsement-from-cruz-who-tells-gop-vote-your
[https://perma.cc/NU2W-MGCP].
615. See BROWNELL WITH BURKE, supra note 588, at 124–25.
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a “convention bump” in popularity. However, the party almost certainly
could not organize an event of the magnitude of regular conventions.
Reconvening the convention presents several challenges. First, the
logistics of holding a convention on short notice may be prohibitive. The
party could struggle to find a large enough venue to accommodate the
thousands of delegates,616 and many delegates may not be able to attend. The
party may have trouble funding a second convention, as the party only
budgets for one convention.617 Second, the convention would have to create
procedures for selecting a replacement nominee.
Under normal
circumstances, almost all convention delegates are bound to vote for
candidates based on the outcomes of their states’ primaries.618 It is unclear
how a special convention to name a replacement candidate would implicate
these rules.
C. Recommended Procedures
This Part discusses possible replacement procedures before arriving at a
recommendation. These proposals do not address vice presidential nominee
vacancies, which raise different considerations than presidential nominee
vacancies.619
1. Designated Replacement Candidate
The parties could designate officials to automatically succeed to the
nomination in case of a vacancy. Such a procedure would not require any
additional proceedings, such as a committee meeting or reconvened
convention. It would save time and allow the replacement candidate to
quickly begin campaigning in earnest. However, this approach is not without
at least one drawback. A rule for having a predetermined successor could
preclude a superior candidate from being the nominee, which would
disadvantage the party.
There are two logical choices for automatic replacement: the vice
presidential nominee and the runner-up primary candidate.
a. Vice Presidential Nominee as Designated Replacement
The vice presidential nominee is, in a way, the most natural replacement,
given the Vice President’s constitutionally designated role as successor to the

616. There were 2472 delegates to the 2016 Republican National Convention. Republican
National Convention Roll Call, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2016/politics/
republican-convention-delegate-count/ [https://perma.cc/93Z4-GP4X] (last visited Nov. 19,
2017).
617. See, e.g., Emily Shah, How Much Will the Democratic National Convention Cost?,
FISCAL TIMES (July 27, 2016), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2016/07/27/How-Much-WillDemocratic-National-Convention-Cost [https://perma.cc/R7NR-MF6R].
618. RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, supra note 603, r. 16(a)(2).
619. This report assumes that the presidential nominee typically has nearly unfettered
discretion in choosing the vice presidential nominee, whereas choosing a presidential
candidate is a decision for the party.
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presidency.620 Vice Presidents are “understudies” whose position affords
them the ability to understand the issues they would face if required to assume
the presidency.621 Vice Presidents also typically share many of their
Presidents’ views, which would prevent any major policy changes if a Vice
President succeeded to the presidency.
Vice presidential candidates could fill a similar role. Upon selection, they
typically educate themselves on the presidential candidate’s positions and
campaign on them. The candidates’ similar ideological outlooks would help
the campaign retain its supporters in the event of a vacancy. Additionally,
the Vice President’s succession responsibilities tend to encourage
presidential candidates to choose running mates based at least partially on
their suitability to assume the Oval Office.622 Furthermore, vice presidential
candidates normally undergo rigorous vetting before selection.623
But the vice presidential nominee may not always be the best choice to
assume the top of the ticket. In some cases, the vice presidential nominee
may not have experience campaigning on the national level, which could be
detrimental to the campaign. This potential shortcoming could also make it
difficult for the successor candidate to overcome a lack of public exposure
relative to the opposing presidential nominee.624
Another drawback to making the vice presidential nominee the automatic
successor is that prospective vice presidential nominees’ “competency to
assume the presidency” is not always the primary criterion for selection.625
Indeed, some presidential nominees do not choose vice presidential
candidates “to succeed them” but “to help them succeed.”626 For example,
Republican nominee John McCain’s selection of Sarah Palin in 2008 sought
to “energize” the conservative base,627 but the McCain campaign chose Palin
without probing the depth of her knowledge on domestic and foreign
policy.628 Palin’s lack of policy knowledge became apparent in the weeks

620. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. amend. XXV.
621. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 106, at 248–49.
622. Telephone Interview with Michael S. Dukakis, Distinguished Professor of Political
Sci., Ne. Univ. (Apr. 20, 2017).
623. Id. (explaining his process for selecting his running mate).
624. This lack of public exposure and input has been a major concern over the years and
has generated many proposals designed to improve upon the way the United States selects its
vice presidential candidates. See DICLERICO, supra note 585, at 465. One proposal “calls for
having candidates run for the vice presidency in the primaries and caucuses, just as presidential
candidates do now.” Id. A second plan would be to “automatically award the vice presidency
to the runner-up in the presidential contest, thereby increasing the likelihood that the Vice
President would be someone of reasonably high quality.” Id.
625. Id.
626. Id.
627. See id.; Michael Cooper & Elisabeth Bumiller, McCain Chooses Palin as Running
Mate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/us/politics/
30veep.html [https://perma.cc/PML7-C638].
628. See DICLERICO, supra note 585, at 464.
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following her selection,629 leading a majority of Americans to conclude that
Palin was not qualified to serve as President.630
b. Primary Runner-Up as Designated Replacement
The primary candidate who received the second highest number of
delegate votes at the party’s convention is another possible designated
successor. A primary candidate is guaranteed to have experience
campaigning at the national level and the ambition to run for President, unlike
some vice presidential nominees. The runner-up will have withstood the
physical, mental, and managerial challenges of national campaigning, which
increases the likelihood that he or she would be an effective presidential
candidate. Additionally, primary candidates are typically well known to the
public and have undergone public scrutiny over the course of months, making
it more likely that they can withstand the scrutiny placed on presidential
candidates.
Still, one may argue there are good reasons that the runner-up candidate
did not win the nomination and that automatically giving that candidate the
presidential nomination would go against the will of primary voters and the
party. Furthermore, the runner-up’s policy positions may be substantially
different from the original nominee’s positions, which could prevent the
runner-up candidate from winning the support of many of the party’s voters.
2. Designated Replacement with Override Provision
If the parties designate successors to the nomination, the parties might
include a “safety valve” provision that allows them to override the designees’
succession in extraordinary circumstances. Such a rule would presume the
succession of the vice presidential nominee, primary runner-up, or someone
else but would allow the national committee to prevent automatic succession
with a two-thirds vote. This approach would likely retain the main benefits
of the designated successor rule, particularly the efficiency of the process and
the minimization of intraparty division, while providing for scenarios where
the designated successor was unwilling or unable to become the nominee or
where there was an obviously superior replacement candidate. The twothirds, or supermajority, vote requirement would ensure that there was good
reason to override succession of the designated candidate.
However, a safety valve provision could encourage division within the
party, whose members might collude or campaign for a replacement other
than the designated replacement. Such efforts could create actual or
perceived disunity late in a presidential campaign—a moment when it is
important for a party to be united behind a nominee.

629. See id.
630. See id.
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3. Special Party Committee to Select a Replacement
Instead of designating a replacement candidate, the parties could provide
for the creation of a special committee to recommend replacement candidates
to the party committee. A “Vacancy Committee” comprising predetermined
members could convene immediately when a vacancy occurs. The
committee could have seven members from different regions of the country.
They might include party officials, legal advisors, campaign managers,
communications experts, and specialized consultants in areas of social media
and technology to aid in proper vetting.631
The Vacancy Committee would only have the power to submit a report to
the party recommending between two and four individuals for the
nomination. The party committee then would have full discretion in choosing
the nominee. This purely advisory role is more appropriate than allowing the
committee to unilaterally choose the nominee, which would vest an
enormously consequential decision in a small group and mark a substantial
change from the current party rules.
Using a committee to aid the selection of a replacement candidate would
have two primary benefits. First, it might help instill public confidence in
the new nominee. Although members of the public would not have any direct
input on the selection, as they do in the primary process, they would at least
know that a transparent and rational process was followed to arrive at the new
nominee. Second, the committee would help narrow the field of potential
replacements. Without a way to limit the choices, the party committees’
selection processes could become prolonged and unwieldy.
The committee approach is not without its drawbacks. First, choosing
committee members who adequately consider the parties’ interests and
represent its constituencies would be challenging. And if the committee did
not have these characteristics, it would lose some or all of its ability to choose
an effective nominee in whom the public and party had confidence. Second,
allowing the committee to limit the choice of possible nominees would
inhibit the party’s and public’s participation in the process, which might
undermine engagement with and support for the replacement nominee’s
campaign. Finally, if a vacancy occurred late in a campaign, the Vacancy
Committee approach could be unreasonably time consuming and place the
party at a disadvantage at a moment when there is likely little time to spare.
4. Recommended Rule:
Combined Timeline Approach
The Clinic recommends that the parties take an approach that combines
aspects of the above options. The recommended rule would provide for

631. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., SELECTING A VICE PRESIDENT: ADVICE FOR
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 11 (2016), https://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/04/BPC-VP-Selection-Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9NS-G53M].
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different replacement procedures for two periods of time following the
convention.
If the vacancy occurs between—
(a) the convention and September 15, a vacancy committee shall select
two to four individuals for recommendation to the national committee,
which will then have full discretion in choosing the replacement
nominee.
(b) September 16 and Election Day, the vice presidential nominee
shall become the presidential nominee unless two-thirds of the national
committee vote against this presumption.

This approach is designed to respond to time and efficiency considerations
while maximizing the parties’ discretion to the greatest practical extent. As
discussed, the short period between the convention and the election places
significant limitations on the deliberative process available for choosing
replacement nominees. But the recommended approach recognizes that there
is a greater opportunity for a more considered process in the time period
immediately after the convention.
In the first period (convention to September 15), there is still sufficient
time for the Vacancy Committee to carefully deliberate on the party’s best
replacement options and ultimately to recommend two to four candidates to
the national committee. If the Vacancy Committee carried out its work
effectively, including by avoiding some of the drawbacks outlined above, it
would help the party arrive at a nominee the public and party could
confidently support.
In the second period (September 16 to Election Day), the vice presidential
candidate would be the presumed successor because there would be less time
for deliberation. Additionally, at this point in the campaign the vice
presidential nominee is more likely to be a viable successor than in the period
immediately following the convention. The vice presidential candidate will
have campaigned for several weeks, gained familiarity with the public, and
embraced the presidential candidate’s policies.
However, the national committee would still have the ability to override
the vice presidential candidate’s succession to the presidential nomination by
a two-thirds vote. This high barrier is intended to prevent overrides in all but
the most extraordinary circumstances, such as where the vice presidential
candidate has died, is disabled, or is blatantly ill-suited to be the presidential
nominee. Barring these conditions, a deliberative process to choose a new
nominee would likely be detrimentally time consuming and could ignite
intraparty tensions at a moment when such behavior would do more harm
than good. Additionally, the provision for an automatic successor is critical
because it might be impossible to choose a replacement nominee in the final
days of a campaign, as was the case with the vacancy caused by James
Sherman’s death in 1912.632

632. See supra Part VII.A.1.
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D. Removal
A party may need to replace a presidential candidate in a range of
circumstances. In some of those circumstances, the need for replacement is
unambiguous, such as where a candidate withdraws or dies. However, other
circumstances are more ambiguous, such as where a candidate becomes
disabled or faces a catastrophic scandal. In these cases, a candidate may be
unable or unwilling to withdraw from the ticket, putting the onus on a party
to affirmatively remove the candidate before replacing him or her. But
neither party has rules that clearly grant it removal authority. The Clinic
recommends that the parties create explicit removal provisions, at least to
cover situations where candidates become physically disabled.
1. Current Rules
The Democratic Party’s rules explicitly mention the possibility of
replacement when a presidential candidate is disabled,633 while the
Republican Party’s rules do not. But the Republican replacement rule uses
broader language that likely does encompass disability scenarios. It states
that the national committee or a recalled convention may replace a
presidential candidate in instances of “death, declination, or otherwise.”634
The “otherwise” contingency appears to be a catchall, likely covering cases
of disability or anything else that could cause the national committee to deem
replacement necessary.
2. Constitutional Concerns
Removing a candidate from the national ticket might implicate the First
Amendment right of political association.635 The First Amendment protects
individuals’ freedom to join political parties and support their preferred
candidates636 while protecting political parties’ ability to manage their
affairs, including determining who can run under their mantles.637 These
protections may come into conflict if a political party attempted to remove a
candidate from its line on the general-election ballot.
A court has never addressed whether a political party can remove a
presidential nominee from general-election ballots. But a state party’s ability
to block a candidate from its primary ballot has been upheld.638 When the
Georgia Republican Party did not allow David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan
leader, to run as a Republican in the 1992 presidential primary, Duke and
633. See Call for the 2016 Democratic National Convention, supra note 613, art. VIII(G).
634. RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, supra note 603, r. 9(a) (emphasis added).
635. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
636. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (stating that the right of political
association allows individuals to make political donations and join political parties, which
“serves to affiliate a person with a candidate . . . [and] it enables like-minded persons to pool
their resources in furtherance of common political goals”).
637. See Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 1996).
638. See id.
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voters who wanted to support him sued both the party committee that made
the decision and the Georgia Secretary of State who effectuated it.639 Duke
and his supporters alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.640
The Eleventh Circuit rejected those claims in Duke v. Massey.641 It held
that Duke had no “right to associate with an ‘unwilling partner’” and that his
supporters did not have a “right to associate with [Duke] as a Republican
Party presidential candidate.”642 “Duke’s supporters were not foreclosed
from supporting him as an independent candidate or as a third-party
candidate in the general election.”643 The court analyzed the alleged
violations with strict scrutiny because, it ruled, barring Duke constituted state
action.644 Nevertheless, the court held that the government has a “compelling
interest in protecting political parties’ right to define their membership.”645
That right, the court stated, flowed from the party’s “freedom of association
and an attendant right to identify those who constitute the party based on
political beliefs.”646
The removal of a presidential nominee would occur under fairly different
circumstances than those in Duke. Most significantly, Duke was never on
the ballot, whereas a candidate subject to removal necessarily will be on the
general election ballot and would have been on the primary ballot. Many
primary voters would have cast their ballots for the candidate. Those voters
might argue that a removal violated their rights because, unlike in Duke, they
would not have an option to adjust their vote. The prospective Duke voters
could have written him in, as the court observed, or they could have voted
for another candidate. Primary voters in a removal scenario would have no
similar recourse. The candidate’s options would also be more limited
because it would likely be too late to run on another party line. This could
provide a basis for the candidate to argue that his or her rights were violated,
although the candidate could mount a write-in campaign.
Duke makes clear that a party can control access to its ballot line to ensure
that candidates who appear on it represent the party’s beliefs. There are
circumstances in which a party might seek to remove a candidate for that
purpose, such as where a scandal raises questions about the candidate’s
personal values. However, in the more likely removal scenario, where a
candidate becomes disabled, the candidate—if conscious and determined to
stay on the ballot—might challenge his or her removal as discrimination
against a disabled person and thus a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.647 A court might treat such a claim differently than Duke’s suit

639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.

Id. at 1228–30.
Id. at 1230.
87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1234.
Id.
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1234.
Id.
See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985).
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because the presence of a disabled candidate on the party’s ticket does not
bear on the party’s policy stances.
Ultimately, however, parties’ discretion over who appears on their ballots
would probably cover most removal scenarios. As Duke shows, the First
Amendment protections afforded to political parties grant them broad leeway
to chart their political courses. And a party’s presidential candidate is critical
to promoting the party’s positions and advancing its political fortunes.
Therefore, a party would have a strong argument that it is empowered to
remove a candidate who severely disadvantaged its electoral prospects or
undermined its core political convictions. Furthermore, in the most likely
removal scenario, where a candidate is severely disabled, there would
probably never be a legal challenge, as removal would only be necessary
because the candidate was not capable of withdrawing.
3. Crafting Removal Rules
The political parties should create procedures to remove presidential
candidates who are medically disabled. The removal procedure should allow
a majority of the national committee to effectuate a removal. The Clinic does
not recommend explicit removal procedures for any other instances, such as
scandals. The narrowness of this proposal reflects concerns about the
undemocratic nature of candidate removal, possible constitutional
challenges, and possible misuse of a removal provision.
In developing a candidate removal proposal, the Clinic looked to the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the reasoning behind its provisions, as the
Amendment addresses similar issues and its framers had to navigate similar
concerns.
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment responded to the absence of constitutional
procedures for declaring the existence of a presidential “inability” to serve.
Similarly, the political parties do not have explicit procedures for situations
where presidential candidates become unable to serve. The parties’ current
replacement rules might be read to infer the power of the national committees
to remove candidates, but explicit procedures are preferable. Removing a
President or presidential candidate is a profoundly consequential action. In
most circumstances, the decision-makers will, appropriately, be hesitant to
act. But the lack of clear removal procedures could deter action even when
it is required. Indeed, the absence of explicit constitutional procedures to
declare presidential inabilities created confusion and led to clearly disabled
Presidents remaining in power.648
When the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s framers designed procedures for the
President’s temporary removal, they grappled with an issue that also exists
with presidential candidate removal rules: how far those rules should go in
defining the situations in which they should be used. The Twenty-Fifth

648. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 8–10, 14–16.
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Amendment’s text simply states that its provisions should be used when the
President is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”649
The Amendment’s framers deliberately did not offer more detail because
they believed that “inability” could manifest itself in different ways and that
a strict definition could impede removal during an unpredictable crisis.650 Of
course the framers did envision limitations; Section 4’s involuntary removal
provision was intended to be narrowly tailored to solving crises involving
severe medical or psychological ailments.651 But the term might take on a
fairly expansive meaning in Section 3, the voluntary declaration provision.
For example, President Nixon might have been able to invoke the
Amendment to temporarily step aside during the Watergate scandal.652
The parties should probably reserve their removal rules for disabilities
similar to those that Section 4 is intended to address. The broad meaning of
inability in Section 3 results from the President’s discretion to determine
whether an inability exists.653 A presidential candidate would not have
similar discretion. Additionally, determining the existence of more
borderline disabilities, such as scandals, might be contentious and require a
fact-intensive investigation. Even though Section 4 does not envision liberal
usage, it still incorporates the possibility of congressional involvement to
review inability determinations. There likely is not sufficient time to engage
in such a process during a campaign. And if there were time for an
investigation, it still might not prevent intense and divisive disagreement
within the party on the issue. Accordingly, candidate removal procedures
should be designed only for use in cases of physical or mental incapacity.
CONCLUSION
Fifty years after the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the country
must continue to build on the Amendment’s legacy by taking further steps to
plan for presidential succession. The Clinic’s recommendations provide
ways to address some of the most pressing remaining issues. It took a tragedy
to jolt lawmakers into crafting and implementing the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. Today’s policy-makers should not wait for a similar impetus.

649.
650.
651.
652.
653.

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3–4.
See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 111; supra Part I.B.
See Feerick, supra note 175, at 925–26.
FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 16, at 161.
See supra Part I.B.1.
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APPENDIX A
U.S. CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE II, SECTION I, CLAUSE 6
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may
by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.654

654. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
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APPENDIX B
U.S. CONSTITUTION
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
SECTION 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office
upon confirmation by a majority of both Houses of Congress.
SECTION 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such
powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.
SECTION 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of
his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress
is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to
assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.655

655. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
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APPENDIX C
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT
3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012)
§ 19. Vacancy in offices of both President and Vice President; officers
eligible to act
(a)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge
the powers and duties of the office of President, then the Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as
Representative in Congress, act as President.
(2) The same rule shall apply in the case of the death, resignation, removal
from office, or inability of an individual acting as President under this
subsection.
(b) If, at the time when under subsection (a) of this section a Speaker is to
begin the discharge of the powers and duties of the office of President, there
is no Speaker, or the Speaker fails to qualify as Acting President, then the
President pro tempore of the Senate shall, upon his resignation as President
pro tempore and as Senator, act as President.
(c) An individual acting as President under subsection (a) or subsection (b)
of this section shall continue to act until the expiration of the then current
Presidential term, except that—
(1) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in
whole or in part on the failure of both the President-elect and the VicePresident-elect to qualify, then he shall act only until a President or Vice
President qualifies; and
(2) if his discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in
whole or in part on the inability of the President or Vice President, then he
shall act only until the removal of the disability of one of such individuals.
(d)(1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, there is no President pro tempore to act as President under
subsection (b) of this section, then the officer of the United States who is
highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary
of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General,
Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce,
Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of
Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of
Homeland Security.
(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue
so to do until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, but not after
a qualified and prior-entitled individual is able to act, except that the removal
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of the disability of an individual higher on the list contained in paragraph (1)
of this subsection or the ability to qualify on the part of an individual higher
on such list shall not terminate his service.
(3) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation
from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as
President.
(e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such
officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.
Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death,
resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the
President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the
House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of
President devolve upon them.
(f) During the period that any individual acts as President under this
section, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the case
of the President.656

656. 18 U.S.C. § 19 (2012).

